Thursday, December 26, 2013

Problems With the Canonical Giant-Impact Model of Moon Evolution

Lunar-Origin Studies Are “In Flux”

The problem with evolutionary theories is not that they are impossible—any theory, no matter how bad it is, if held with sufficient conviction can be adorned with enough epicycles to explain the data and avoid outright impossibility. And evolutionists certainly do have the needed conviction. For evolutionists, their theory simply cannot be false. That option is not on the table and they will do whatever it takes to avoid it, including blackballing scientists, falsely claiming the theory to be a scientific fact, misrepresenting the science in courts and in textbooks, contriving false histories, and so forth. And so while evolutionary theories can never be outright falsified, they are improbable. This can be seen both (i) by comparing the theory with the evidence and (ii) by all those epicycles which evolutionists must use to patch up their theories. The many patches added to evolutionary theories result in high complexity and loss of parsimony. One example that Robin Canup recently discussed is the origin of the Earth-Moon system.

Modern evolutionary theories attempting to explain the Earth-Moon system go back to the late nineteenth century when George Darwin, son of Charles, proposed that the Moon was made of materials ejected from the Earth by tidal instabilities. This fission hypothesis was followed by capture, co-accretion and impact hypotheses as well. Various types of hypotheses have been considered because none of them work very well. For no single hypothesis has been able to account for the various evidences, such as the mass of the Moon, the angular momentum of the system, and the high similarity between the chemical compositions of Moon rocks and the Earth crust.

In recent years the giant-impact hypothesis has been able to explain the size of the Moon and the system’s angular momentum, but not the Moon rock’s composition. Of course explanatory mechanisms can always be contrived. For example, perhaps the impacter just happened to have the same chemical composition as the Earth upper layers. But that would be “extremely improbable” explains Canup, as such similarity is not typical within the solar system.

There are other possible explanatory mechanisms as well, but inevitably, as with biological evolutionary theories, they complicate the theory and rely on serendipity and coincidence. As Canup explains:

It remains troubling that all of the current impact models invoke a process after the impact to effectively erase a primary outcome of the event — either by changing the disk's composition through mixing for the canonical impact, or by changing Earth's spin rate for the high-angular-momentum narratives.

Sequences of events do occur in nature, and yet we strive to avoid such complexity in our models. We seek the simplest possible solution, as a matter of scientific aesthetics and because simple solutions are often more probable. As the number of steps increases, the likelihood of a particular sequence decreases. Current impact models are more complex and seem less probable than the original giant-impact concept.

That, in a nutshell, is the story of evolution. Initially simple theories, which far exceed the scientific knowledge of the day, are constructed from a metaphysical commitment to naturalism. These theories are more mythological than scientific and they inevitably fail badly as science progresses. The commitment to naturalism, however, trumps all else and the theory’s initial parsimony easily gives way to incredible complexities.

The failure of evolution lies not in its falsification—an impossibly high bar evolutionists routinely erect to protect their theory—but in its failed predictions, improbability and resulting complexity and loss of parsimony.

Canup’s acknowledgment of the problem is a rare exception to the rule of declaring evolution to be a scientific fact regardless of the failures.

79 comments:

  1. What we have here is the normal process of scientific research. A complete understanding of a phenomenon is not obtained in one fell swoop. Scientists figure it out by bits and pieces.

    Let us look at examples from the past. The theory of the atomic spectra was developed over several decades. Even in the case of the simplest atom—hydrogen—a complete theory of spectral lines requires a fairly complex theory.

    Bohr's planetary model (1913) was able to explain Rydberg's empirical formula for the frequencies of observed transitions. It could not explain many observable details such as the intensity of the spectral lines. It also failed to explain why some of the spectral lines were split (fine structure).

    Schroedinger's wave mechanics (1926) and Heisenberg's matrix mechanics (1925) provided a firmer foundation for the theory of the hydrogen atom. The new quantum mechanics was able to explain the intensity of spectral lines but not their fine structure, nor the fractional value of intrinsic angular momentum known as spin.

    Dirac's relativistic quantum mechanics (1928) provided a theory for the fine structure and explained the strange value of spin angular momentum.

    Then there was a problem of the energy difference for states 2S1/2 and 2P1/2 (the Lamb shift). Its explanation had to wait until the advent of quantum electrodynamics (Behe, 1947).

    So it took 34 years to get a complete theory of the spectrum of even the simplest atom (longer for atoms with more electron). It is not a simple theory. A rough picture can be obtained in the framework of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. However, to get a detailed agreement with experiments, one has to add relativistic corrections (fine structure and spin), nuclear magnetic moments (hyperfine structure) and even quantum fluctuations of the electromagnetic field in the vacuum (Lamb shift). Are these epicycles, too? Not quite. These extra factors are all required for getting the complete picture of the hydrogen spectrum.

    Nonetheless it was clear even in 1913 that Bohr's simplistic model was onto something. It didn't explain everything. Especially the half-integer value of spin was a big problem when it was introduced in 1924. These puzzles were eventually solved.

    Likewise, Hunter's lame criticisms don't cast a big shadow on our understanding of the formation of the Solar system. By criticizing every aspect of modern science, he makes himself into an angry crackpot.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "By criticizing every aspect of modern science..."
      Oh, give me a break.

      Delete
  2. Anyone with a brain can see that the moon is intelligently designed. Lol thank you for pointing out the ridiculous hamster wheel of logic that evolutionist astronomers try to keep up with Dr. Hunter.

    God Bless and Merry Christmas.

    ReplyDelete
  3. The things you mention, Oleg, are child's play compared to explaining the current configuration of the solar system by applying some set of physical laws to some initial, pre-planetary conditions. Again, where there is no actual extant explanation, inductive criteria don't even come into play. Which is to say that where there is no actual explanation, there is no inductive plausibility/evidence. Such hypotheses, rather than being explanatory, merely amount to bald, historical assertions. They may serve to constrain the direction of research, but they have no inductive evidence in their favor.

    ReplyDelete
  4. For some "real" science on the subject, check this out.

    http://www.creationresearch.org/crsq/articles/21/21_3/21_3.html

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The abstract begins thus:

      God could have started magnetic fields in the solar system in a very simple way: by creating the original atoms of the planets with many of their nuclear spins pointing in the same direction.

      This is already very promising. (A real science!)

      We can discuss the technical merits of this seminal work. (I happen to work in the field of magnetism.) But it already warms my heart to know what passes for real science in these circles.

      Awstar, you made my day!

      Delete
    2. "It's only weird if it doesn't work"

      So what scientific objections do you have regarding the physics and the math and the predictions and the results?

      Delete
    3. I would be glad to do that. However, I am not optimistic that my technical points will make it past Cornelius's censorship. Most of my recent comments (at least one purely technical) are stuck in moderation.

      Delete
    4. One technical problem with Humphreys' article is that he overestimates the magnetic field that can be produced by proton magnetic moments in water. Even if they are 100 percent aligned, the top field they can produce would be about 4 gauss, or 0.4 millitesla. Multiply that by exp(−t/T) = 0.055 to account for the exponential decay during t = 6000 years with a characteristic decay time of T = 2075 years. That would give a current field of 0.22 gauss, lower than what we currently observe (0.30 gauss).

      Of course, paleomagnetic data going back millions of years indicate that the magnetic field did not decay exponentially. It went up and down. And on top of that, a model based on a 6,000-year old Earth is ludicrous.

      Delete
  5. Child's play, Jeff? Do you realize that solving the problem of atomic spectra required the invention of an entirely new approach to physics, i.e., quantum mechanics?

    In contrast, the problem of Moon's origin is not so much conceptual as computational. It may require a hard effort to solve, but that effort amounts to grinding through, rather than figuring out an entirely new path.

    It's not even clear to me why Hunter has a beef with the formation of the Solar system. My guess is that he wants a tinkerer God.

    There is empirical evidence that Moon once orbited very close to Earth. You might be aware of the effect of tidal friction: tides resulting from Moon's gravity slow down fast-spinning Earth and transfer angular momentum to Moon, accelerating its orbital rotation. As a result, Moon is gradually receding from Earth. The effect has been measured by bouncing laser pulses off Moon's surface. Moon is moving away from Earth at the rate of 38 mm per year. The current distance between the two planets is 380,000 km. Extrapolating the current rate into the past tells us that zero distance was 10 billion years ago. Not bad for an order-of-magnitude estimate. (The Solar system arose 4.5 billion years ago.) So it's plausible that Moon originated at the time when the Solar system formed and kept moving away gradually.

    I don't agree with you that the giant-impact hypothesis is merely a bald historical assertion. It puts forward a scenario that can be checked. For example, a central impact should result in a low angular momentum of the Earth-Moon system, whereas a glancing blow would create a large angular momentum. This rules out a central impact.

    So Moon formation isn't a fairy tale. The theory is not finished, but it's well on its way to being done.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. What I said, Oleg, is that modeling observations mathematically, as difficult as it can be, is child's play COMPARED to explaining the current configuration of the solar system in terms of physics/math applied to some pre-planetary conditions existing at that posited time.

      Nor did I say that a hypothesis needs to be an assertion at all, much less a bald one. But an hypothesis that IS asserted to be plausible when, in fact, it isn't even yet explanatory of the relevant observations certainly is a BALD, a-plausible assertion.

      Delete
    2. Jeff,

      It appears to me that you conflate mathematical modeling with scientific theory. These two have some things in common, but they are emphatically not the same.

      To give an example, the Rydberg formula (1888) is a mathematical model that provides fairly accurate values for the wavelengths of the spectral lines of atomic hydrogen. As a mathematical model, it merely provides an economical description of the spectrum but gives no explanation and no further predictions.

      Quantum mechanics (1927) is a scientific theory in whose framework one can deduce the spectrum of atomic hydrogen. It explains lots of things that the mathematical model (the Rydberg formula) missed: the fine and hyperfine structure etc.

      Coming up with a new scientific theory such as quantum mechanics is orders of magnitude harder than modeling the origin of the Earth-Moon system. The latter task does not require a new framework. The physics is well understood. However, it is sufficiently complex: the collision produces a debris disk and one must keep track of the mechanical motion of the debris as well as thermal and chemical processes. This is a hard problem on the computational level. Which is why progress has only been made fairly recently, with the advent of powerful computers.

      This isn't to say that one can solve this problem by mechanically sifting through all possible scenarios. Nonetheless, saying that this problem is harder than that of developing from scratch quantum mechanics is sheer nonsense.

      Delete
  6. Moon is going bye bye 3 cm a year. I feel bad we are loosing the Moon. Other than that our Solar system is pretty abnormal comparing to others found in the galactic neighborhood.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I mentioned Moon's recession in a comment in this thread. Unfortunately, for some reason Cornelius has censored it.

      Delete
    2. We didn't see it. You might try resending.

      Delete
  7. Nope, I'm still not getting it. Why is a theory in biology being applied to cosmology? How is it even the slightest bit relevant?

    The problem with evolutionary theories is not that they are impossible—any theory, no matter how bad it is, if held with sufficient conviction can be adorned with enough epicycles to explain the data and avoid outright impossibility.

    Well, at least you concede the theory of evolution is not impossible. That's something, I suppose. Still not seeing the connection with cosmology.

    For evolutionists, their theory simply cannot be false.

    I don't know where you get that idea. It's quite possible that the theory of evolution may be superseded by a more comprehensive and detailed explanation. After all, the current form of the theory has already moved some way beyond Darwin's original concept.

    That option is not on the table and they will do whatever it takes to avoid it, including blackballing scientists...

    How exactly do you "blackball" scientists? Which club are they being excluded from?

    ...falsely claiming the theory to be a scientific fact...

    Actually, you seem to be the one making that claim most frequently.

    ...misrepresenting the science in courts and in textbooks, contriving false histories, and so forth.

    It was creationists who tried to conceal the true history of Pandas, creationists who tried to insert the Genesis myths into the science classroom and creationists who, given the chance present their case in court, either made a complete pig's ear of it on the witness-stand or found convenient reasons to avoid testifying at all.

    Modern evolutionary theories attempting to explain the Earth-Moon system go back to the late nineteenth century when George Darwin, son of Charles, proposed that the Moon was made of materials ejected from the Earth by tidal instabilities.

    Aha! Now I get it! George Darwin, the astronomer was the son of Charles Darwin, the naturalist . So the son's theory about how the Moon was formed must be a branch of the father's theory about how living things have changed and diversified over time!

    Or something.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Ian said: "Why is a theory in biology being applied to cosmology? How is it even the slightest bit relevant?"

      Would the relationship in question be that both evolutionary biology and cosmology are branches of "historical" science and therefore based on the axiomatic beliefs of the "scientist", who is really, by definition, more of a philosopher than a scientist -- and that, in both cases, the shear dumb luck guys are getting their hypotheses trounced by the findings of "operational" science, making the ID guys looking pretty good?

      Delete
    2. awstarDecember 28, 2013 at 1:29 AM

      [...]

      Would the relationship in question be that both evolutionary biology and cosmology are branches of "historical" science and therefore based on the axiomatic beliefs of the "scientist", who is really, by definition, more of a philosopher than a scientist -- and that, in both cases, the shear dumb luck guys are getting their hypotheses trounced by the findings of "operational" science, making the ID guys looking pretty good?


      In a word, no.

      The silly distinction between "historical" and "operational" science is a rhetorical device of Intelligent Design/Creationism whose only purpose is to undermine the credibility of research into past events.

      The facts are that, as far as we are aware, we are unable to acquire any reliable data about the future, the present moment is a fleeting instant that is gone as soon as we are aware of it, which leaves only historical data for us to work with, the only difference being how far back in the past it originates.

      Many people believe that the Creation event described in Genesis happened just as surely as did the Battle of Gettysburg. Yet no one alive today was around for either event. Without a predisposition to treat the Bible as a factual account, the only difference between our knowledge of the two events is that we have much more detailed and extensive evidence for the historical veracity of accounts of the Battle of Gettysburg than we do for Genesis.

      As for Dr Hunter's campaign to spin new research into contradictions of existing theory, it really doesn't matter. If the new data can be fitted into an existing theory then that theory grows bigger and stronger by that amount. If the new data cannot be accommodated by the theory then it could force a rethink which, hopefully, will take us a little closer to the truth. Did the discovery of Mendelian inheritance undermine the theory of evolution because Darwin had not predicted and described it? No, of course not. What happened was that once the two pieces of research were brought together and integrated, like two pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, a broader and clearer picture emerged.

      And when it comes to trying to unravel the complexities of the human brain or comprehend the unimaginable vastness of the observable universe science will take all the sheer, dumb luck and any other source of inspiration it can get.

      Delete
    3. Ian said: "Did the discovery of Mendelian inheritance undermine the theory of evolution because Darwin had not predicted and described it? No, of course not. What happened was that once the two pieces of research were brought together and integrated, like two pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, a broader and clearer picture emerged."

      So what did this powerful integration of the two lines of research produce, -- THAT WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED WITHOUT THE CONTRIBUTION OF EVOLUTION?

      Seems the evolution theory is more accurately described as a nasty virus that jumps from one "operational" science discovery to the next.

      Delete
  8. Ian: Nope, I'm still not getting it. Why is a theory in biology being applied to cosmology? How is it even the slightest bit relevant?

    J: Because neither theories explain in any atheistic way, as advertised. This or that observation is explicable by analogical extrapolation from the previously-observed. But the vast majority of what is hypothesized contra ID is non-explanatory of relevant observations. It's just a collection of high-level metaphysical assertions that are completely untestable. At least ID allows for the explanation of the "validity" of inductive plausibility criteria or the existence of "warranted" belief and the existence of a rational moral order. And science. without these, can't even be demarcated in the first place.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Jeff December 28, 2013 at 7:43 AM

      [...]

      J: Because neither theories explain in any atheistic way, as advertised. This or that observation is explicable by analogical extrapolation from the previously-observed. But the vast majority of what is hypothesized contra ID is non-explanatory of relevant observations. It's just a collection of high-level metaphysical assertions that are completely untestable. At least ID allows for the explanation of the "validity" of inductive plausibility criteria or the existence of "warranted" belief and the existence of a rational moral order. And science. without these, can't even be demarcated in the first place.


      How do you think these theories were "advertised", as a source of inerrant Absolute Truth like the Bible, for example? Or were they put forward as possible explanations based on the limited observational data available at the time? If the latter then, in the words of the old commercial, they do exactly what it says on the can.

      The fact is that your boilerplate complaints about the alleged inadequacy of a theory like evolution are based on setting absurdly high standards of justification or warrant or whatever you want to call it. According to you, unless the theory of evolution is able to identify the very first replicator and then map out the causal chain, link by link, between it and any extant species, as well as describing all the environmental influences that came to bear over that long journey, then it is no more than worthless metaphysical speculation. It is akin to saying that, since we have no theory in physics that can predict exactly when and how a specific electron will travel along a copper wire as part of an electric current, the work of the likes of Faraday and Maxwell was worthless.

      As for the demarcation problem, it reminds me of a comment made by a doctor about the differences between conventional and alternative treatments in which he argued that it was a pointless distinction, all that counted was whether or not a treatment worked. I also think this quote from The Irish statesman Edmund Burke sums it up quite nicely "" Though no man can draw a stroke between the confines of night and day, still light and darkness are on the whole tolerably distinguishable.".

      Delete
    2. Ian, you're very confused if you can't see the difference between the ABSOLUTE indistinguishableness of "science" and "religion" as the two terms are used by your side and the mere fuzziness of boundaries between "night and day."

      Moreover, it is NOT true that we know that the consensus BELIEF about the broad outlines of the formation of the solar system is a POSSIBLE explanation. Rather (and this is logically distinct in meaning), we merely DON'T know that it is IMPOSSIBLE that the solar system could have been formed naturalisticallly in the posited time-frame. And, Ian, without foundationalism (of which benevolent/competent theism is by far the most parsimonious instance), that's the most pathetically low bar of any conceivable hypothesis. And yet STILL the more vociferous of the consensi shudder at the thought that sane people articulate this in class-room settings. Such consensi are the very kind that render "science" utterly non-demarcatable. If you're not defending that portion of the consensi, then you have no discernable disagreement with CH, best I can tell. For you have yet to point me to a post where CH has advocated the defunding of any particular research. What he does do, routinely, is point out the undeniable (to sane people, anyway) absurdity of the claims of the more vociferous consensi.

      Delete
    3. Jeff,

      Your assertion that science and religion are indistinguishable is patently absurd.

      Also, the plural of consensus in English is consensuses. In Latin, consensus is fourth declension, so the plural would be the same as the singular, consensus.

      Delete
    4. Oleg, you're reading comprehension is quite poor. I didn't say, "science and religion are indistinguishable." If you wish to argue with what I actually said, please try again.

      Concerning your claim that "the plural of consensus in English is consensuses," you clearly understood my what I was driving out on that one point. Consequently, I'm not worried about such minutiae. Your poor reading comprehension together with your straining at a nat while swallowing a camel explains volumes.

      Delete
    5. Jeff,

      It takes two to tango. Two things are required for me to understand what your write: (1) you writing clearly and (2) me reading carefully. So maybe my reading comprehension is not up to snuff, but maybe you don't write well.

      I think you don't write well. Your comments are long, tedious, and a bit pompous (consensi). Maybe you should simplify things a bit so that us mere mortals can grasp what you're trying to say.

      Cheers!

      Delete
    6. Oleg, if any of you COULD define science and religion such that we knew what you meant by it, the conversation might START to address relevant aspects of CH's posts. We know that CH is a benevolent/competent theist, not a deist or a process theist or an atheist.

      But benevolent/competent theism, deism, and process theism are positions posited to explain the reality of certain distinctions that most of humans use routinely. Most of us (and yes I know Scott is one of the exceptions) believe we can get some distinction, however fuzzy at the boundaries, between warranted belief and non-warranted belief, or between positive evidence and the lack thereof.

      You do at least see that most people talk that way, contra Scott, right? And you do see why Scott disagrees, right? Because these distinctions, if they correspond to REALITY, certainly are relevant to a conceivable definition of science if science has any knowable value.

      So lay out your definitions of science and religion so we can see how you, at least, distinguish between them.

      As I've said before, I define "science" as the application of inductive criteria to conceivable logically possible explanations of apparent memories using seemingly intuitive, categorical conceptions like the intuitions of causality, finality, time, space, quantitative relationships, etc.

      Theism is a species of explanation that relates to finality of explanation and which explains the validity of induction. In that sense, it is distinguishable from that conception of religion having to do with ideas derived from putatively sacred texts.

      But if categories and inductive criteria are to be deemed worthless because, as Scott says, we can't perform an infinite regress of justifications, then all propositions are, as he admits, void of positive evidence (which, after all, is all most of us mean by evidence). And if that's the case, any putative distinctions between religion and science are irrelevant to any practical pursuit since you would have no idea in that case whether you've ever ACTUALLY remembered making any distinctions whatsoever.

      Delete
    7. ... oh yeah. As for "consensi," I had once seen it used for those who are in consensus on a matter. Having just looked it up, I see that's probably wrong. It's precisely because communication is difficult that I try to use one word for several when that's possible and equally unequivocal.

      Delete
    8. Jeff: As I've said before, I define "science" as the application of inductive criteria to conceivable logically possible explanations of apparent memories using seemingly intuitive, categorical conceptions like the intuitions of causality, finality, time, space, quantitative relationships, etc.

      This definition misses one important aspect of the scientific method: empirical verification. (It is also very wordy and vague.)

      Delete
    9. Jeff December 29, 2013 at 10:37 AM

      Ian, you're very confused if you can't see the difference between the ABSOLUTE indistinguishableness of "science" and "religion" as the two terms are used by your side and the mere fuzziness of boundaries between "night and day."


      And you are apparently unable to see the wood for the trees if you think the epistmological difficulty of drawing a bright line between science and religion means that we are completely unable to distinguish between the two at a functional level. However unsatisfying it may be, fuzzy boundaries are what we have to live with in many areas but pretending they are an insuperable barrier to any form of knowledge and will never be refined at some point in the future is simply defeatist.

      Moreover, it is NOT true that we know that the consensus BELIEF about the broad outlines of the formation of the solar system is a POSSIBLE explanation. Rather (and this is logically distinct in meaning), we merely DON'T know that it is IMPOSSIBLE that the solar system could have been formed naturalisticallly in the posited time-frame.

      The logical distinction between knowing something is possible and not knowing something is impossible is insignificant in this case. As with so much of what happened in the far distant past, science is trying to construct explanations of how the solar system was formed based on limited and fragmentary evidence. Ideally, as with all such hypotheses, these accounts should embrace what is already known and point us to where we can find as yet unknown data which, if found, would end to confirm them. Their plausibiity thus rests both on their explanatory breadth and predictive power which, in turn, determine the degree of confidence they inspire in observers. Whether subjective judgements concerning plausibity and confidence constitute knowledge is a question for epistemology. Whether it has any practical bearing on the research being is a question for scientists. Both sides could probably benefit from an open debate on the issues; "open debate" being a free exchange and honest consideration of the ideas coming from all sides rather than an exchange of ideological fire between entrenched positions which is what tends to happen now.



      Foundationalism is but one of a number of arguable positions in epistemology. Since you have yet to show why it is preferable to other views like coherentism, your assertion of its claims - or your version of its claims - and, hence, your line of attack on the theory of evolution are unpersuasive.

      As for what is taught in science classes, it should be what is considered to be the best of what is current thinking about a subject by those best placed to judge, competent authorities in the field. By all means stress that these are tentative explanations rather than some sort of absolute truth, and that confidence in them depends on properties like explanatory breadth, predictive power and evidential support. Explain that they are continuously subject to revision in the light of new evidence and that this should be considered as a feature of the sceintific process rather than a bug. Just don't try to pretend that because we don't know everything that we don't know anything.

      Delete
  9. O: This definition misses one important aspect of the scientific method: empirical verification.

    J: One can not verify anything if the criteria used to "verify" are themselves void of plausibility. When that is the case, no set of verification criteria is discernibly better than any other, leading to the absurd conclusion that verifications can contradict one another. This is what Scott understands.You are confused about the basic nature of logic, O. And that's why you can't demarcate science in such a way that it is discernibly more valuable to anyone than is religion, however you define religion.

    O: (It is also very wordy and vague.)

    J: That's because you have to articulate enough to imply what you're trying to account for. Your over-simplistic approach is obviously impotent in that regard.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. That explains your confusion, Jeff. Mental gymnastics is a good thing, but it only takes you so far. Switching to empirical testing is what propelled natural philosophy (that which we now call science) to a highly successful path. If you don't get that, too bad.

      Delete
  10. Oh, but I do get it, O. It's just that there is no such thing as a way to non-arbitrarily distinguish between empirical (in the sense of having to do with putative "stuff out there") and non-empirical if you can't account for the EXISTENCE of positive evidence. All propositions are equally a-plausible without such an accounting. And THAT'S what you can't do as an atheist.

    Thus, you merely pontificate to a degree that would make the pope blush thinking all the while that you're saying something knowably relevant to anything of knowable value. But you're not.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Jeff: All propositions are equally a-plausible without such an accounting. And THAT'S what you can't do as an atheist.

      Even atheists can learn to avoid putting their hand on the stovetop.

      Delete
    2. Jeff: Oh, but I do get it, O. It's just that there is no such thing as a way to non-arbitrarily distinguish between empirical (in the sense of having to do with putative "stuff out there") and non-empirical if you can't account for the EXISTENCE of positive evidence.

      Doesn't it bother you, Jeff, that scientists have made so much progress since the middle ages—despite not knowing that they can't (according to you, anyway)?

      Delete
    3. How would you know, Z? If the law of non-contradiction is actually a law, all propositional claims are either bald pontifications, self-evident, or grounded in the self-evident. Atheists can't account for the existence of self-evident propositions. Thus, they can't account for warranted belief at all--including a warranted belief in the existence of stovetops.

      Delete
  11. Jeff: How would you know, Z?

    Um, by talking to atheists.

    Jeff: If the law of non-contradiction is actually a law, ...

    The law of non-contradiction only applies to propositions with clearly defined truth-values, which excludes most of induction.

    Jeff: If the law of non-contradiction is actually a law, all propositional claims are either bald pontifications, self-evident, or grounded in the self-evident.

    To be consistent in your position, you really have to preposterously claim that atheists can't learn to avoid putting their hand on a hot stovetop.

    ReplyDelete
  12. Z: The law of non-contradiction only applies to propositions with clearly defined truth-values, which excludes most of induction.

    J: No, Z. The LNC applies to propositions PER SE.

    Z: To be consistent in your position, you really have to preposterously claim that atheists can't learn to avoid putting their hand on a hot stovetop.


    J: No I don't. I need only claim what I do claim: Atheists are extremely contradictory. You see, Z, most atheists I know realize that there are propositions that are MERELY bald pontifications. But how do they account for evident propositions without appealing to the self-evident? And how do they account for a proposition that is self-evident if it is neither self-evident nor evident that they are designed TO KNOW at all? But to say they are designed to know means knowledge is CAUSED. But atheists insist we can't even know that events PER SE are caused!!

    But on the other hand, there is absolutely NO property of uncaused events (like regularity vs non-regularity) that we could use to distinguish a caused event from an uncaused event. Thus, if we aren't evidently designed TO KNOW (because events are not known to just BE caused), then if we believe any true proposition at all, it is PURE COINCIDENCE! And that's just another way of saying that warranted belief and/or positive evidence doesn't EXIST.

    Scott understands all this, but still pontificates non-stop as if CH should give a squat about pontifications.

    ReplyDelete
  13. Jeff: The LNC applies to propositions PER SE.

    In classical logic, a proposition affirms or denies a a predicate and is either true or false. Other logical systems have other types of propositions.

    Zachriel: To be consistent in your position, you really have to preposterously claim that atheists can't learn to avoid putting their hand on a hot stovetop.

    Jeff: No I don't.

    Oh gee whiz. Can atheists learn to avoid putting their hands on hot stoves?

    ReplyDelete
  14. Z: In classical logic, a proposition affirms or denies a a predicate and is either true or false. Other logical systems have other types of propositions.

    J: Induction doesn't trump the LNC. As for non-classical logical systems, what do we predict successfully with them?

    Z: Oh gee whiz. Can atheists learn to avoid putting their hands on hot stoves?

    J: If all you mean is associative learning, like a dog can do, yes. If you mean conceptually-thinking atheists who never take their atheistic axioms to their logical conclusion, yes. Which are you?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Jeff: Induction doesn't trump the LNC.

      It has nothing to do with "trumping". It's a different form of logic. Many things in the real world are not perfect propositions, and people don't always think in such terms.

      Jeff: Induction doesn't trump the LNC. As for non-classical logical systems, what do we predict successfully with them?

      Most things. People use fuzzy logic all the time. That's because many propositions about the real world don't have discrete truth values.

      Jeff: If all you mean is associative learning, like a dog can do, yes.

      Dogs, eh? Well, that puts them one step above you.

      So we agree that dogs and atheists can successfully learn things about the world. Science is a type of learning about the world.

      Delete
    2. Z: It has nothing to do with "trumping". It's a different form of logic. Many things in the real world are not perfect propositions, and people don't always think in such terms.

      J: Well, you would be wrong. You can always articulate an inductive inference in a deductive form. But deduction per se never tells you what's true. The premises have to be known to be true and the axioms of deduction have to be known to be true before a valid deductive argument can be known to produce a true conclusion.

      Z: Most things. People use fuzzy logic all the time. That's because many propositions about the real world don't have discrete truth values.

      J: What do you mean "many propositions about the real world don't have discrete truth values?" Do you mean an intelligible, finite proposition can be neither true nor false? Give me an example.

      Z: Science is a type of learning about the world.

      J: Is to learn to come to the knowledge of some truth? If so, what does it mean to say science is tentative? If not, define "learn."

      Delete
    3. Jeff: You can always articulate an inductive inference in a deductive form.

      Sure you can. But the root of that knowledge may still be induction. Such knowledge is an approximation. Some statements may be less wrong than other statements, that is, there is a relative wrongness-value to statements.
      http://chem.tufts.edu/answersinscience/relativityofwrong.htm

      Delete
    4. Jeff: You can always articulate an inductive inference in a deductive form.

      Z: Sure you can. But the root of that knowledge may still be induction... Some statements may be less wrong than other statements,

      J: No, you're dealing with another issue. The degree to which an explanation can be accurately extrapolated over time and space is an issue of degree, for sure. But propositions per se are either true or false PER their meaning.

      What you are arguing is that explanations are tentative since we don't know the true range of time and space over which they are accurately applicable, even when they ARE successful for some range. But that's different than saying they aren't true or false AS articulated.

      Delete
  15. Jeff: But propositions per se are either true or false PER their meaning.

    Empirical propositions are judged by their accuracy and utility. Is the Earth a flat surface or a sphere?

    http://chem.tufts.edu/answersinscience/relativityofwrong.htm

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Z: Empirical propositions are judged by their accuracy and utility. Is the Earth a flat surface or a sphere?


      J: Are you giving me the definition of an empirical proposition? Because if so, it doesn't have anything to do with whether material particles exist or not. Idealism could be true and there could still be accuracy, inaccuracy, and utility.

      It's the way our diverse "senses" affect us that causes us to infer 3-D entities. Most people mean by "empirical" that which has to do with material (i.e., 3-D-extended) entities and their effects upon our conscious experience in the form of quales. These quales are then synthesized into causal theories because of our categories of causality, etc.

      But if our categories and some of their negations (we have a category that allows us to apply negations to other categories like causality, etc) are just arbitrary, bogus "constraints," having no correspondence to what is REALLY possible, then we can never have positive evidence for any proposition. This is why many "scientists" now argue that the self is an "illusion." But I'm not sure what they mean by a self-less "illusion." And I'm pretty sure they don't either.

      It does not good to negate when the negation is the equivalent of conceptual annihilation. That's what denying the self or time or space amounts to. We can still conceive of change once we've abandoned causality. But to negate time, space, or the self is to just annihilate conceptual knowledge thoroughly.

      Delete
    2. Zachriel: Is the Earth a flat surface or a sphere?

      J: Blah, blah.

      If someone says the Earth is flat and someone says the Earth is a sphere, are the statements of equal validity?

      Delete
    3. Z: If someone says the Earth is flat and someone says the Earth is a sphere, are the statements of equal validity?

      J: If atheism is true, neither can be known to be valid since no proposition is explicably self-evident or conceivably testable per atheism. Because epiphenomenalism could be true if atheism is true as well as a host of other "ism's" that we find absurd. Without relevant self-evident truths that indicate otherwise, I have no reason to believe that my beliefs have anything to do with future events, or that there will even be future events. There are no rational inferences without premises, valid or no.

      If, on the other hand, benevolent/competent teleology explains my belief that I'm designed to know, then inductive criteria are valid, deduction and its axioms are valid, and apparent memories are almost always actual memories, and so on. And this would mean that I am warranted in believing the earth is spherical, but not in believing the earth is flat.

      Delete
    4. Zachriel: If someone says the Earth is flat and someone says the Earth is a sphere, are the statements of equal validity?

      Jeff: If atheism is true, neither can be known to be valid since no proposition is explicably self-evident or conceivably testable per atheism.

      The Earth more closely resembles a sphere than a flat surface. If your philosophy leads to some other conclusion, then it is just silly nonsense.

      Delete
    5. I just told you what my philosophy "leads to." Can you not read, either? Pontifications, on the other hand, lead to nothing knowable. To posit is not to know. Otherwise, the law of non-contradiction, even, has nothing to do with knowledge whatsoever. Because clearly one can posit contradictory assertions/hypotheses. Utterly confused, you are, Z.

      Delete
  16. Jeff: I just told you what my philosophy "leads to."

    If your philosophy leads you to the conclusion that atheists can't tell the difference between a flat world and a round world, or a table and a chair, then your philosophy is just fluff.

    ReplyDelete
  17. Short memory, huh, Z? I already explained why atheists can learn. They can "learn" associatively like other animals, or they can learn like humans and then contradict themselves thereafter by denying benevolent/competent teleology.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Atheists can use deductive reasoning, and hypothetico-deduction. They don't have to make any more fundamental assumptions than theists do.

      Delete
    2. Z: J: The issue, Z, is that atheists deny the necessary conditions for the EXISTENCE of warranted belief (i.e., belief that can be distinguished from a-plausible belief -- i.e., mere pontification). They start with nothing plausible/warranted and, therefore, end with nothing plausible/warranted.

      This is why they wouldn't know if they had deduced even if they had. One can't deduce that memories occur except by positing premises that, per atheism, are no less seemingly implausible than premises that imply memories DON'T occur.

      Delete
  18. Jeff: The issue, Z, is that atheists deny the necessary conditions for the EXISTENCE of warranted belief (i.e., belief that can be distinguished from a-plausible belief -- i.e., mere pontification).

    They do? Thought they just didn't believe in gods.


    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Then articulate the necessary conditions that, when stated as propositions, IMPLY that plausible/warranted belief occurs. Surely you see why you can't do that when you admit you can't even account for memory per se. What you call beliefs are indistinguishable from a-plausible, unwarranted beliefs.

      And theists can't prove THAT there are such things AS plausible/warranted beliefs. They can, however, posit necessary conditions for their existence. Atheists can do neither.

      Delete
    2. We might make the assumption that our sensations are reflections of "reality".

      Delete
  19. Jeff: One can't deduce that memories occur except by positing premises that, per atheism, are no less seemingly implausible than premises that imply memories DON'T occur.

    One doesn't deduce memories. One experiences them.

    ReplyDelete
  20. Z: We might make the assumption that our sensations are reflections of "reality".

    J: But a sentient experience per se isn't a "reflection" of anything. One must INFER that it is. What would be the premises of that inference? Also, you deny that any proposition is self-evident. That would include the proposition, "Apparent memories have occurred," and "Some apparent memories are actual memories." So why would you assume you have a history at all? It's not like you need to explain anything, because you deny that the proposition, "Some events are caused," is knowable.

    Z: One doesn't deduce memories. One experiences them.

    J: You deny that claim is self-evident. And it's utterly impossible to prove it once you deny the existence of self-evident propositions. IOW, I could say "Nothing ever deduces or experiences memories or apparent memories," and you have no evidence to the contrary.

    ReplyDelete
  21. Jeff: But a sentient experience per se isn't a "reflection" of anything. One must INFER that it is.

    No. Just adopt it as a fundamental.

    Jeff: So why would you assume you have a history at all?

    Why not? It's fun and productive!

    ReplyDelete
  22. Z: No. Just adopt it as a fundamental.

    J: But you deny you know you remember. So you would never know whether you "adopted" anything.

    Jeff: So why would you assume you have a history at all?

    Z: Why not? It's fun and productive!

    J: But you claim you don't know you've ever remembered having fun or any other experience. So how could you know whether you've ever experienced fun, much less due to some particular state of affairs (seeings how you deny knowing any state is caused by other states).

    ReplyDelete
  23. Jeff: But you deny you know you remember.

    We did no such thing! People have a sensation of memory. You can try to ignore your memory or you can embrace it!


    ReplyDelete
  24. Jeff: But you deny you know you remember.

    Z: We did no such thing! People have a sensation of memory. You can try to ignore your memory or you can embrace it!

    J: I assume by "sensation of memory" that you mean you experience apparent memories involuntarily. But how would you know the claim/proposition you made is true since you deny the self-evidentiality of EVERY proposition? This is what I mean by my claim that atheists do learn by contradicting themselves constantly. They deny foundationalism, and then turn around and think JUST like a foundationalism.

    So the real question, to those of us who are sane, is, "who posits the least to explain the most?" And since you, as an atheist, can't even rule out counter-inductive conceptions of extra-ego "reality," a benevolent/competent theism that is articulated to explain the validity of human inductive criteria wins that question HANDS DOWN.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Jeff: I assume by "sensation of memory" that you mean you experience apparent memories involuntarily. But how would you know the claim/proposition you made is true

      You can't. You might be a brain in a vat. So you have a choice of assuming your sensations are a reflection of something real and building from there, or not.

      Delete
  25. J: Jeff: I assume by "sensation of memory" that you mean you experience apparent memories involuntarily. But how would you know the claim/proposition you made is true

    Z: You can't. You might be a brain in a vat. So you have a choice of assuming your sensations are a reflection of something real and building from there, or not.

    J: If you're not aware of having experienced an apparent memory, what would make you think you've had a sensation at all, much less one that you could make further assumptions about?

    ReplyDelete
  26. Jeff: If you're not aware of having experienced an apparent memory, what would make you think you've had a sensation at all, much less one that you could make further assumptions about?

    Of course you're aware of the sensation. One might quibble as to what to make of it.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. How can you be aware when 1) awareness is inconceivable unless it occurs with a positive duration, and 2) a positive duration implies the need for MEMORY, and 3) you deny that the claim that memories occur is self-evident?! Dude, there's NO way around foundationalism if there is such a thing as knowledge. If we claim we can distinguish between beliefs that are knowledge and those that aren't, you need distinct necessary/sufficient conditions (i.e., causes) for that.

      Benevolent/competent teleology is what can conceivably account for that distinction. Nothing else can. Of course, I'm all ears if you have hypothetico-deductive premises that account for that distinction which are independently known to be true. Good luck.

      Delete
  27. Jeff: How can you be aware when 1) awareness is inconceivable unless it occurs with a positive duration

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D58LpHBnvsI
    Awareness occurs in the moment.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. So one can be aware for a duration of precisely 0? How could you know that?

      Delete
  28. Z: Awareness occurs in the moment.

    J: Awareness requires positive duration.

    Now, since you insist that foundationalism is false, how do you argue that I'm wrong?

    ReplyDelete
  29. Jeff: since you insist that foundationalism is false

    It's an arbitrary assumption. You can adopt it or not.

    ReplyDelete
  30. Jeff: since you insist that foundationalism is false

    Z: It's an arbitrary assumption. You can adopt it or not.

    J: But since "I have the capacity to adopt assumptions" is not a knowable proposition (if foundationalism is false), it is mere pontification to say "you can adopt it or not." So is "science" JUST another set of bald pontifications? And if so, why is it any more defensible than any other set?

    You're not saying enough to demarcate science from what you call non-science such that science is recognizably valuable. Indeed, nothing IS recognizable as valueable if the claim "I have the capacity to recognize" is, itself, a bald pontification.

    You can't test the axioms that ground the intelligibility of "tests."

    ReplyDelete
  31. Jeff: But since "I have the capacity to adopt assumptions" is not a knowable proposition (if foundationalism is false), it is mere pontification to say "you can adopt it or not."

    Of course it's knowable in the sense of plausible. There is no certainty.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Z: Of course it's knowable in the sense of plausible. There is no certainty.

      J: Only if you can simply KNOW that distinctions between more and less plausibility correspond to reality. But you insist you don't possess such foundational knowledge. Nor can you prove it from a-plausible premises.

      Delete
  32. Jeff: Only if you can simply KNOW that distinctions between more and less plausibility correspond to reality.

    Your problem is that you want certainty, insist upon it, but you can't have it. If you want deductive certainty, you have to adopt arbitrary axioms. You want your parallel postulate or not? It's up to you.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Z: Your problem is that you want certainty, insist upon it, but you can't have it.

      J: It doesn't matter what I have or want. What matters is what we do and whether it's explicable. That's only knowable if foundationalism is true. One can't even CONCEIVE of the falsehood of foundationalism without using the LNC as a supposed ground of the intelligibility of that idea.

      Z: If you want deductive certainty, you have to adopt arbitrary axioms.

      J: Arbitrary axioms don't render anything certain. An axiom isn't even intelligible without using the LNC as a principle. There isn't a classical logic book in the world that says what you're saying. Hence, you are not at all talking about ACTUAL deduction and its believed significance to human thought.

      As for non-classical logic, you have yet to give me an example of its claims or its demonstrated utility.

      Delete
  33. Jeff: Arbitrary axioms don't render anything certain.

    Of course not. But it may have utility.

    Jeff: An axiom isn't even intelligible without using the LNC as a principle.

    The Law of Non-contradiction divides the universe into exactly two distinct parts. It's handy to think that way, but the universe doesn't have to go along with you just because it's easier for you to think about it.

    ReplyDelete
  34. Jeff: Arbitrary axioms don't render anything certain.

    Z: Of course not. But it may have utility.

    J: But you must, to be consistent, say that "it might not have utility." And you must, to be consistent, add that it's impossible to ever determine which is true.

    Z: The Law of Non-contradiction divides the universe into exactly two distinct parts. It's handy to think that way, but the universe doesn't have to go along with you just because it's easier for you to think about it.

    J: Which is another way of saying you have no idea whether there's a universe. And I agree. You don't. So why are you arguing? You can never demonstrate that any proposition has positive evidence in its favor. Thus, there is no way to influence another mind LOGICALLY by your approach. So what are you appealing to other than my mind since you have no intellectual argument FOR anything.

    ReplyDelete
  35. Jeff: But you must, to be consistent, say that "it might not have utility."

    Sure.

    Jeff: And you must, to be consistent, add that it's impossible to ever determine which is true.

    That's only a problem because you can't deal with uncertainty.

    Jeff: Which is another way of saying you have no idea whether there's a universe.

    There you go again with your black-and-white thinking. The evidence suggests the existence of the universe. If it bothers you, just add "Given the existence of the universe" as a suffix to any declarative sentence.

    Jeff: Thus, there is no way to influence another mind LOGICALLY by your approach.

    Of course there is. However, you can't argue about the universe from a strictly LOGICAL point of view. There has to be the experience of fire, of passion. An isolated mind with no sensory input is not capable of understanding the universe.

    ReplyDelete
  36. Jeff: But you must, to be consistent, say that "it might not have utility."

    Z: Sure.

    J: We've made head way. Let's stick with it. Can one know it's more probable that it HAS utility than that it DOESN'T? As I'm understanding you, you would have to say no. And with that "no" is the end of any reason to argue. For one can never find positive evidence for anything, just as Scott admits.

    Z: The evidence suggests the existence of the universe.

    J: Define evidence and how explain such that the definition explains HOW it "suggests" anything whatsoever.

    Z: However, you can't argue about the universe from a strictly LOGICAL point of view. There has to be the experience of fire, of passion. An isolated mind with no sensory input is not capable of understanding the universe.

    J: You're confused. A "sense" can consistently be defined as a class of sentient experience, implying nothing about stuff "out there." You've already admitted this in earlier discussions. But this means there can never BE positive evidence for "stuff out there" unless inductive criteria and it's axioms are simply KNOWN to be true.

    It matters not whether we know anything, Z. We BELIEVE we do. And since all beliefs are only conceivable to us as premises or derived inferences/conclusions, SOME of the premises must be believed to be KNOWN intuitively to render intelligible the distinction between more or less plausible DERIVED beliefs. It matters not whether this is all illusory. The very INTELLIGIBILITY of the distinction requires the relevant fundamental BELIEFS.

    In short, we have to BELIEVE we know certain things to get the very INTELLIGIBILITY of the distinction between more or less plausibility of other DERIVED beliefs, whether or not this is all illusory. And that's all foundationalism means.

    You are insisting that we must BELIEVE that we DON'T have WARRANTED belief. But then what's to argue about? It's over at that point. Because there's no way to non-arbitrarily distinguish between more or less plausible/probable DERIVED conclusions. But an arbitrary distinction, by definition, has nothing to do with what we MEAN by plausible/probable and warranted. Why would I care about your (assuming a-plausibly and therefore contra parsimony that you exist!) arbitrariness over my own?

    ReplyDelete