Miracles are a Glaring Problem for Evolution, and Here’s Why

Begging the Question

A commenter recently reminded me of one of the many fundamental fallacies of evolutionary thought. When I point out problems with evolution, and make arguments against evolutionary thought, it is not because I am against the idea or want it to be false. Life would be much easier if the evidence simply supported evolution, if evolutionary thought was a stellar example of intellectual progress, if—to put it simply—evolution was an undeniable scientific fact, just as evolutionists insist. But it’s not. Evolution is not any of those. Evolution is not supported by the empirical evidence, it is not a rational, intellectual movement, and it is not a scientific fact, undeniable or otherwise. I’m not grinding a personal ax here, I’m simply pointing out the obvious. It makes no difference to me if evolution is true, false, or somewhere in between. But it does make a difference when we lie to ourselves.

One of the lies we tell ourselves is about miracles and how they relate to evolution. Specifically, evolutionists have been making arguments against miracles for centuries. A convenient starting place is seventeenth century church history, when Roman Catholic and Protestant elements of the church argued with each other, and between themselves, about miracles. It is a long story, but the upshot was that miracles were increasingly viewed with disdain for several reasons.

By the time David Hume arrived in the mid eighteenth century, the dust was settling. Hume is well known for his arguments against miracles, but he was largely repackaging sentiment that had long since been expressed.

Some arguments were epistemological. Others were theological, philosophical or ontological. But the short version is that evolutionary thought emerged in a milieu in which miracles were on the way out, both as explanatory mechanisms and as historical reality. Darwin contemporary David Friedrich Strauss, and his Life of Jesus, is but one of many examples of this broad, robust movement.

The movement against miracles was, not surprisingly, influential in the natural sciences. Simply put, if we’re not to appeal to miracles, then the world must have arisen naturalistically. This had a profound effect on the critical thinking, or lack thereof, of the time. Speculative hypotheses, with little basis in fact, enjoyed serious consideration and triumphant acceptance.

The bar was placed exceedingly low for such theories as pure conjecture became acceptable and celebrated science. Monumental scientific problems with the notion of spontaneous origins went ignored and evolutionary theories (from cosmological to biological) soon became “fact.”

Today strictly naturalistic, evolutionary, theories are a given. They simply are accepted as true, or as true as anything in science can be. And it also is a given that miracles are false. But what evolutionists prefer to overlook is that there is a causal relationship here. The latter made way for, and mandated, the former.

What an incredible coincidence it would be if, on the one hand, miracles were known to be false and, on the other hand, the empirical evidence turned out to prove a naturalistic origins. Theology, philosophy and science would have converged on the same truth.

But there is no such convergence.

The “convergence” that occurred is artificial. It is artificial because the empirical scientific evidence was interpreted according to the cultural mandate. Science was told what to do.

Indeed, from an objective, theory neutral, perspective, evolution is unlikely. It is not good science. In fact it is an outstanding example of bad science, breaking all the rules of what the textbooks tell us about how science is supposed to work. The idea that the multitude of species, the cosmos, consciousness and, well, everything, arose spontaneously by the interplay of chance contingencies of history and natural laws is silly. And that is being kind.

The problem of miracles is another example of the failure of evolutionary thought. Religion drives science, and it matters.

Problems With the Canonical Giant-Impact Model of Moon Evolution

Lunar-Origin Studies Are “In Flux”

The problem with evolutionary theories is not that they are impossible—any theory, no matter how bad it is, if held with sufficient conviction can be adorned with enough epicycles to explain the data and avoid outright impossibility. And evolutionists certainly do have the needed conviction. For evolutionists, their theory simply cannot be false. That option is not on the table and they will do whatever it takes to avoid it, including blackballing scientists, falsely claiming the theory to be a scientific fact, misrepresenting the science in courts and in textbooks, contriving false histories, and so forth. And so while evolutionary theories can never be outright falsified, they are improbable. This can be seen both (i) by comparing the theory with the evidence and (ii) by all those epicycles which evolutionists must use to patch up their theories. The many patches added to evolutionary theories result in high complexity and loss of parsimony. One example that Robin Canup recently discussed is the origin of the Earth-Moon system.

Modern evolutionary theories attempting to explain the Earth-Moon system go back to the late nineteenth century when George Darwin, son of Charles, proposed that the Moon was made of materials ejected from the Earth by tidal instabilities. This fission hypothesis was followed by capture, co-accretion and impact hypotheses as well. Various types of hypotheses have been considered because none of them work very well. For no single hypothesis has been able to account for the various evidences, such as the mass of the Moon, the angular momentum of the system, and the high similarity between the chemical compositions of Moon rocks and the Earth crust.

In recent years the giant-impact hypothesis has been able to explain the size of the Moon and the system’s angular momentum, but not the Moon rock’s composition. Of course explanatory mechanisms can always be contrived. For example, perhaps the impacter just happened to have the same chemical composition as the Earth upper layers. But that would be “extremely improbable” explains Canup, as such similarity is not typical within the solar system.

There are other possible explanatory mechanisms as well, but inevitably, as with biological evolutionary theories, they complicate the theory and rely on serendipity and coincidence. As Canup explains:

It remains troubling that all of the current impact models invoke a process after the impact to effectively erase a primary outcome of the event — either by changing the disk's composition through mixing for the canonical impact, or by changing Earth's spin rate for the high-angular-momentum narratives.

Sequences of events do occur in nature, and yet we strive to avoid such complexity in our models. We seek the simplest possible solution, as a matter of scientific aesthetics and because simple solutions are often more probable. As the number of steps increases, the likelihood of a particular sequence decreases. Current impact models are more complex and seem less probable than the original giant-impact concept.

That, in a nutshell, is the story of evolution. Initially simple theories, which far exceed the scientific knowledge of the day, are constructed from a metaphysical commitment to naturalism. These theories are more mythological than scientific and they inevitably fail badly as science progresses. The commitment to naturalism, however, trumps all else and the theory’s initial parsimony easily gives way to incredible complexities.

The failure of evolution lies not in its falsification—an impossibly high bar evolutionists routinely erect to protect their theory—but in its failed predictions, improbability and resulting complexity and loss of parsimony.

Canup’s acknowledgment of the problem is a rare exception to the rule of declaring evolution to be a scientific fact regardless of the failures.

OOL and Science’s Blind Spot

Organic matter forms tar, biochemical bonds are unstable in water, pathways are entropically uphill, RNA enzymes tend to degrade

The problem with science is not that the naturalistic approach might occasionally be inadequate. The problem is that science would never know any better. Science’s blind spot is that it has no way of determining whether a phenomenon is naturalistic. You might think that scientific failures would provide a pretty good hint. If love defies logic then maybe there is something more to it. But for evolutionists failure merely indicates the problem is not yet solved. See the catch? Anything that defies explanation is automatically placed in the “Research Problem” category. So naturalism can never be false. It is untestable. Here is an example of this metaphysical mandate:

What God did is a matter for faith and not for scientific inquiry. The two fields are separate. If our scientific inquiry should lead eventually to God … that will be the time to stop science. [Maitland Edey and Donald Johanson, Blueprints: Solving the Mystery of Evolution, p. 291]

But how could their inquiries possibly lead to God if they make the assumption up front that “What God did is … not for scientific inquiry.”? If one is searching only for mechanistic solutions, then that is what one will find. God is ruled out from the beginning.

Evolution makes naturalistic explanations not simply the first choice, it makes them the only choice. And one can always contrive naturalistic explanations if one tries hard enough. The theory of evolution is an outstanding example of this. We are told that life must have arisen spontaneously, even though we don’t have any idea how it happened.

Consider, for example, the origin of life problem. Evolutionists say it is a fact that the most complex thing we know of—life—arose spontaneously. And yet from a scientific perspective this claim makes no sense. It is simply uncontroversial that science does not reveal the spontaneous origin of life to be a fact. Here is Steve Benner’s rundown of some of the basic problems:

We have failed in any continuous way to provide a recipe that gets from the simple molecules that we know were present on early Earth to RNA. There is a discontinuous model which has many pieces, many of which have experimental support, but we're up against these three or four paradoxes, which you and I have talked about in the past. The first paradox is the tendency of organic matter to devolve and to give tar. If you can avoid that, you can start to try to assemble things that are not tarry, but then you encounter the water problem, which is related to the fact that every interesting bond that you want to make is unstable, thermodynamically, with respect to water. If you can solve that problem, you have the problem of entropy, that any of the building blocks are going to be present in a low concentration; therefore, to assemble a large number of those building blocks, you get a gene-like RNA -- 100 nucleotides long -- that fights entropy. And the fourth problem is that even if you can solve the entropy problem, you have a paradox that RNA enzymes, which are may be catalytically active, are more likely to be active in the sense that destroys RNA rather than creates RNA.

Once again the science contradicts the dogma. Evolution is scientifically absurd but then again, it never was about the science in the first place. As Oxford professor and Anglican priest Baden Powell explained a century and a half ago, there are certain ground rules that science must obey:

So strong is the inductive assurance of this, that we may safely allow any such apparent exceptions to await their solution without in the least influencing our opinion of the soundness of the broad principle of the continuity of physical causes: a principle of that truly philosophical character which no exception in detail can subvert, or render, in some form, inapplicable or unfruitful. No inductive inquirer can bring himself to believe in the existence of any real hiatus in the continuity of physical laws in past eras more than in the existing order of things; or to imagine that changes, however seemingly abrupt, can have been brought about except by the gradual agency of some regular causes. On such principles the whole superstructure of rational geology entirely reposes; to deny them in any instance would be to endanger all science.

[…]

But however little we know of the laws or causes of these changes, one thing is perfectly clear, the introduction of new species was a regular, not a casual phenomenon; it was not one preceding or transcending the order of nature; it was a case occurring in the midst of ordinary operations going on in accordance with ordinary causes. The introduction of a new species (however marvellous and inexplicable some theorists may choose to imagine it) is not a solitary occurrence. It reappears constantly in the lapse of geological ages. It recurs regularly in connexion with those changes which determined the peculiar characters we now distinguish in different formations. It is part of a series. But a series indicates a principle of regularity and law, as much in organic as in inorganic changes. The event is part of a regularly ordained mechanism of the evolution of the existing world out of former conditions, and as much subject to regular laws as any changes now taking place.

In other words, not only does science lack the tools to test its assumption that all causes are strictly naturalistic, it consciously rejects any such possibility from the beginning. So it doesn’t matter how many scientific paradoxes and absurdities come with evolution, it must be a fact.

Religion drives science, and it matters.

Enter Two More Ideas For Earth-Moon Evolution

Evolutionary thought holds that the universe, the quasars, the galaxies, the solar systems, the planets and moons (oh and all of biology too) arose spontaneously by chance events and natural law. How that occurred is uncertain and under scientific investigation. That it occurred is not uncertain, it is a fact. These two different departments of evolutionary thought are disjoint. The fact of evolution does not derive from the particular theories of how it could have happened. It must be that way because there is substantial uncertainty of how it could have happened. Theories of the Solar system evolution, for instance, fall into two broad categories. In the monistic theories, the planets and Sun arise from the same process, such as in Laplace's Nebular Hypothesis. In dualistic theories, the planets and Sun arise from different processes, such as in Buffon's comet theory. These two rival classes of explanation have competed for centuries and as historian Stephen Brush has observed, the time scale for reversing between these two types of explanation has grown shorter and shorter as we approach the present. Hence the origin of the solar system, says Brush, is an unsolved problem. [1]

This week’s Science magazine provides yet another example of this phenomenon of a multiplicity of explanations in another one of professor Brush’s areas of interest: the evolution of the Earth-Moon system. It is another example of a problem that has required ever increasing complexity of explanation to account for the evidence. Science has two papers on the evolution of the Earth-Moon system, one calling for a larger impactor than usual and a subsequent resonance with the Sun, and the other calling for a faster spinning proto Earth and subsequent resonance between the Sun and Moon. As the perspective explains, the two papers “offer differing solutions to the problem.” Fortunately the fact of evolution does not depend of the science of evolution.


1. Stephen G. Brush, Nebulous Earth: The Origin of the Solar System and the Core of the Earth from Laplace to Jeffreys, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 4.

Daniel Sarewitz: Bias is Like a Magnetic Field That Pulls Iron Filings Into Alignment

Kudos to Daniel Sarewitz for his must-read comment on the problem of bias in scientific research where he discusses mounting evidence that bias in science is not random. If it were then multiple studies would serve to cancel it out. Instead false positive results persist and to make matters worse, science’s attempts at internal controls, such as conflicts of interest disclosure, are not keeping up with the problem. Sarewitz points out that industry teams, who seek actually to implement scientific findings, are consistently unable to confirm what were thought to be “landmark” findings. As John Ioannidis has put it, “claimed research findings may often be simply accurate measures of the prevailing bias.”

The causes of scientific bias are both complex and yet, in retrospect, rather obvious. As Sarewitz explains:

All involved benefit from positive results, and from the appearance of progress. Scientists are rewarded both intellectually and professionally, science administrators are empowered and the public desire for a better world is answered. The lack of incentives to report negative results, replicate experiments or recognize inconsistencies, ambiguities and uncertainties is widely appreciated — but the necessary cultural change is incredibly difficult to achieve.

One reason bias persists, and is so harmful, is that in the moment it is not perceived as bias. In many settings, when a research study begins there are certain outcomes which are acceptable and others which are not. But such a priori commitments are most likely to be perceived as nothing more than a reflection of what science has so far revealed. And most often that is true. But not always.

Sarewitz uses a powerful metaphor of how a magnetic field aligns iron filings—something every freshman learns—to illustrate how scientific bias aligns outcomes into its preconceived framework.

Commentators such as Sarewitz and Ioannidis tend to focus on the field of biomedical research which not only is so important but as an experimental science has the virtue of being, at least in principle, more amenable to verification. But if the experimental sciences are experiencing such problems with bias, one wonders how the historical sciences are faring. As Sarewitz warns, “It would therefore be naive to believe that systematic error is a problem for biomedicine alone.”

As Ioannidis warns, it appears that it is more likely for a research claim to be false than true. And so should we really accept uncritically the evolutionist’s claim that the world spontaneously arose as a consequence of chance events?

If there ever was a scientific field subject to cultural influence and bias this would be it. From the ancient Epicureans to today’s evolutionists, there has always been right answer and a wrong answer. Spontaneous origins is the right answer and, in spite of scientific problems, is now known to be a fact. Is that just a coincidence?

Evolutionist: Sub Hypotheses of Evolution Need Not Be Testable

Though evolutionists often cite testability as a criterion for acceptance, this apparently is not required when the theory is one of their own. The mutational-hazard (MH) hypothesis is difficult to test but, as one evolutionist reminds us, that is no reason to reject it:

Given its broad phylogenetic perspective across species with widely different features, the MH hypothesis is admittedly difficult to test with comparative data. … Unfortunately, the procurement of direct estimates of Ne remains dauntingly difficult [40], and until this problem is solved, it will remain difficult to obtain unbiased estimates of the key parameter Neu. However, there is no justification for rejecting a theory based on its accessibility to formal hypothesis testing.

Evolutionists insist on strictly naturalistic explanations. That makes evolution—broadly construed as the origin of species via natural laws and processes—the right answer. Evolution can be modified by rejecting old sub hypotheses and erecting new ones, but the core idea cannot be wrong. Now even evolution’s sub hypotheses can also be untestable.

What Evolutionists Don’t Understand About Methodological Naturalism

[Ed: An oldie-but-goodie from July 5, 2011]

OK let’s try this again. One more time, this time with pictures. In their celebrated volume  Blueprints, evolutionists Maitland Edey and Donald Johanson argued that “What God did is a matter for faith and not for scientific inquiry. The two fields are separate. If our scientific inquiry should lead eventually to God … that will be the time to stop science.” Similarly for evolutionist Niles Eldredge, the key responsibility of science—to predict—becomes impossible when a capricious Creator is entertained:

But the Creator obviously could have fashioned each species in any way imaginable. There is no basis for us to make predictions about what we should find when we study animals and plants if we accept the basic creationist position. … the creator could have fashioned each organ system or physiological process (such as digestion) in whatever fashion the Creator pleased. [The Monkey Business, p. 39, Washington Square Press, 1982.]

Or again, evolutionist Paul Moody explains that:

Most modern biologists do not find this explanation [that God created the species] satisfying. For one thing, it is really not an explanation at all; it amounts to saying, “Things are this way because they are this way.” Furthermore, it removes the subject from scientific inquiry. One can do no more than speculate as to why the Creator chose to follow one pattern in creating diverse animals rather than to use differing patterns. [Introduction to Evolution, p. 26, Harper and Row, 1970.]

Likewise Tim Berra warns that we must not be led astray by the apparent design in biological systems, for it “is not the sudden brainstorm of a creator, but an expression of the operation of impersonal natural laws, of water seeking its level. An appeal to a supernatural explanation is unscientific and unnecessary—and certain to stifle intellectual curiosity and leave important questions unasked and unanswered.” In fact, “Creationism has no explanatory powers, no application for future investigation, no way to advance knowledge, no way to lead to new discoveries. As far as science is concerned, creationism is a sterile concept.” [Evolution and the Myth of Creationism, pp. 66, 142, Stanford University Press, 1990.]

In his undergraduate evolution text Mark Ridley informs the student that “Supernatural explanations for natural phenomena are scientifically useless,” [Evolution, p. 323, Blackwell, 1993] and commenting on the Dover legal decision Eugenie Scott of the National Center for Science Education explains that supernatural explanations:

would be truly a science stopper, because once we allow ourselves to say, “Gee, this problem is so hard; I can’t figure out how it works—God did it,” then we stop looking for a natural explanation; and if there is a natural explanation, we’re not going to find it if we stop looking.

Over and over evolutionists today agree that science must strictly be limited to naturalistic explanations. One finds this throughout the evolutionary literature and it is a consistent refrain in discussions and debates about evolution.

But this sentiment by no means arose with today’s evolutionists. In 1891 UC Berkeley professor Joseph LeConte argued strenuously for this philosophical mandate:

The origins of new phenomena are often obscure, even inexplicable, but we never think to doubt that they have a natural cause; for so to doubt is to doubt the validity of reason, and the rational constitution of Nature. So also, the origins of new organic forms may be obscure or even inexplicable, but we ought not on that account to doubt that they had a natural cause, and came by a natural process; for so to doubt is also to doubt the validity of reason, and the rational constitution of organic Nature.

Likewise Darwin argued that whether one “believes in the views given by Lamarck, by Geoffroy St. Hilaire, by the author of the ‘Vestiges,’ by Mr. Wallace or by myself, signifies extremely little in comparison with the admission that species have descended from other species, and have not been created immutable: for he who admits this as a great truth has a wide field open to him for further inquiry.”

Explanations needed to be naturalistic for scientific inquiry. And as usual the foundations for this evolutionary mandate long predate 1859. Miracles were increasingly eschewed by leading thinkers and a century before philosopher David Hume had made persuasive arguments against miracles. Much of Hume’s material came from theological debates earlier in the century. On the continent leading Lutherans had already discarded the supernatural.

Method, completeness and realism in pictures

So when an evolutionist today insists that science must be naturalistic he is standing on a deep foundation of ideas. But setting aside this history for a moment, what about this argument? Remember that these same evolutionists claim their idea is also a fact. Is there not something curious about these tandem claims? I was once in a debate where the evolutionists claimed that we know evolution is a fact, and that it also is necessary in order to do science. How did they know that? Let’s have a look.

First, imagine the set of all possible explanations, as represented by the blue area below:

Because the blue area contains all possible explanations, it includes false as well as true explanations, lousy as well as good explanations, aesthetic and clumsy ones, and natural and non natural ones. It is every possible explanation in one set.

Now consider the set of all solutions that are according to a particular method, such as naturalism, as illustrated in the orange area below. All explanations that are strictly naturalistic are in the yellow area, and all other explanations are outside the orange area. Because the blue area contains all possible explanations, the orange area is a subset—it is wholly within the blue area.

Next consider the set of all true explanations as represented by the green circle below. These true explanations provide realistic models of nature. Again, this set of explanations must be wholly within the blue area, but otherwise we don’t know just where this green circle is. It could be in the orange area, it could be outside the orange area, or it could overlap. We don’t know what the true solutions all are, which is why we do science.

I have drawn the green circle above as partly inside and partly outside the orange area merely to illustrate the possibilities. But we don’t know where it is, and therefore whenever we mandate, a priori, a method such as naturalism, we automatically exclude a set of explanations that might be true.

In the early days of modern science philosophers were keen to this issue. Francis Bacon, for instance, wanted science only to pursue true explanations. But Bacon also wanted science to restrict itself to naturalistic explanations. Bacon realized that the restriction to naturalism would exclude any realistic, true, explanations that were not strictly naturalistic.

Bacon said that such non naturalistic phenomena should not be pursued by science. So Bacon insisted on naturalism and realism, but forfeited completeness. Science would not investigate all things. The thick black line below illustrates how this position limits itself to explanations that are both realistic and naturalistic, while potentially forfeiting some true explanations (depending on where exactly the green circle really is).

Like Bacon, another early philosopher, Rene Descartes, also insisted on naturalism. But he didn’t like the idea of forfeiting completeness. Descartes wanted science to be able to investigate all phenomena. But what if some realistic, true, explanations fall outside of naturalism? So what.

Descartes solution was to forfeit realism. Science, according to Descartes, would occasionally produce untrue explanations that otherwise could very well be useful. This approach is illustrated by the thick line below that encompasses all the naturalistic explanations, but misses some of the true explanations. Science might produce useful fictions along the way. Descartes mandated method and completeness, but in doing so had to forfeit realism.

After Descartes several scientists did not like this idea of forfeiting realism, as Descartes did, or forfeiting completeness, as Bacon did. These empiricists were interested in true solutions for all phenomena. This approach is illustrated below with the thick line encompassing the true solutions. But in order to maintain such realism and completeness, this approach cannot guarantee what method would be necessary. They might require non naturalistic explanations, for instance. So this approach provides realism and completeness, but forfeits any guarantee of method, such as naturalism.

Bacon, Descartes and the empiricists represent three different approaches to doing science. All are logically consistent. And who knows, the different methods might yield different insights—let a thousand flowers bloom.

But of course all three approaches have a limitation. Like the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, you cannot have realism, completeness and method all in one. You cannot have your cake and eat it too.

This brings us back to the evolutionists. Unlike Bacon, Descartes and the empiricists, evolutionists do have their cake and eat it too. They claim evolution is a fact, they mandate naturalism, and their science knows no limits. They have realism, method, and completeness all together. How can this be?

The answer is simple. One cannot have realism, method, and completeness simultaneously without some extra, non scientific, knowledge. Evolution’s gnosis is, of course, that true solutions are, indeed, naturalistic. This is illustrated below by the thick line that encompasses all true explanations, but it is also wholly naturalistic. How so? The trick is that the green circle has been moved. It is completely within the orange area. Knowing the location of the green circle, even before doing the science, is evolution’s gnosis—their secret knowledge.

It is this secret knowledge the evolutionists possess that allows them to have their cake and eat it too, and this brings us back to the history of the idea. There is no great mystery here, for evolutionists have for centuries made strong theological arguments that the world must have arisen naturalistically. The true explanations are all naturalistic. Therefore it is little wonder that, while not knowing how the world could have evolved, evolutionists are sure it did evolve. Evolution, one way or another, is a fact.

It is here that many fail to appreciate evolution’s conundrum. They often criticize evolution’s method mandate. Have not evolutionists been wrong to insist on methodological naturalism? No, such a method is perfectly fine.

The problem with evolution is not its insistence on method, but on its underlying theology. By insisting on method and realism and completeness, evolutionists are literally not equipped to consider other legitimate possibilities. They have already made a metaphysical commitment, without knowing whether or not it is true. They have confined themselves to a box. For when problems are encountered there is no way to tell whether the correct naturalistic solution has simply not yet been found, or whether the phenomenon itself is non natural. Of course evolutionists must always opt for the former, no matter how absurd the science becomes.

So the problem with evolution is not that the naturalistic approach might occasionally be inadequate. The problem is that evolutionists would never know any better. The evolutionists truth claims, and the underlying theology, have immense consequences. Religion drives science, and it matters.

Evolution Professors: Science Must be Naturalistic and Testable (Can You Find the Fallacy?)

As we saw here, here and here Randy Moore and Sehoya Cotner, in their new book Arguing for Evolution: An Encyclopedia for Understanding Science, list altruism as an evidence for evolution, make the typical religious arguments that prove evolution, say that evolution predicts “There will be anatomical similarities among related organisms,” and begin the book with a bogus prediction claim.

But this is only the beginning. In their next move Moore and Cotner attempt to precondition the reader by mandating naturalism. In a section entitled “Definitions of Science and Scientific Theory,” Moore and Cotner inform the reader that:

Nonnatural, or supernatural explanations, are neither scientific nor evidentiary (i.e., they cannot be supported by scientific evidence). Scientific hypotheses must be testable and falsifiable. Making conclusions that cannot be tested through experimentation and observation is not scientifically valid.

So if the ground rules are that science must be strictly naturalistic—if science must not stray from the naturalism paradigm—then science cannot test naturalism. Naturalism, insofar as science would be concerned, cannot be falsified. Therefore, according to the evolutionist’s logic, the naturalism ground rule is not scientifically valid.

Next Moore and Cotner explain that the theory of evolution has been, in the words of Stephen Jay Gould “confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent.”

Perverse?

In fact the naturalistic origin of all of biology (and everything else for that matter) is not even testable. Of course it has been confirmed, for there is no other choice. We don’t know how the entire biosphere could have arisen spontaneously, and evolutionary predictions have fallen one after the other, but one way or another, evolution must be the answer. It would be perverse to think otherwise. That’s just the Stuff of Good Solid Scientific Research.

Religion drives science and it matters.

Is Martin Mahner an Anti-Realist?

In his new paper on why science must presuppose metaphysical naturalism (the view that there is no supernatural, but only a materialistic world) Martin Mahner largely ignores questions of completeness and realism. Indeed, completeness goes unmentioned and Mahner’s only mention of the question of realism versus antirealism is in an end note where he dismisses the issue as not too relevant:

… there is an ongoing realism/antirealism debate in philosophy. However, this debate concerns mostly epistemological problems regarding the justification of more detailed realistic claims such as the status of unobservable entities, the truth of scientific theories, etc.

Well perhaps questions of completeness and realism are not what Mahner wants to address in his paper, or perhaps they are just inconvenient. In any case, Mahner is stuck with losing one or the other. As we have discussed before, such as here, here and here, those who mandate method necessarily lose a guarantee of either completeness or realism.

Bacon forfeited completeness and Descartes forfeited realism, but evolutionists will forfeit neither (which is possible only by introducing additional metaphysics which, of course, evolutionists do).

When mandating methodological or metaphysical naturalism, questions of completeness and realism immediately become important. But evolutionists want simply to mandate naturalism without reckoning with the implications. Mahner’s paper, unfortunately, does nothing to remedy this.

Response to Comments: Detecting Miracles and Digging Holes

Evolutionists say they cannot reckon with miracles. They don’t know how to determine if naturalistic explanations don’t work. Therefore science must be limited to naturalism and, indeed, anything else is a science stopper according to evolutionists.

But the fact that evolutionary science can only reckon with naturalistic explanations does not mean that only those explanations are true. This would be like an automobile mechanic claiming that jet aircraft cannot be real because, after all, he does not possess the knowledge or tools to work on them. Evolutionists say they lack the tools to test and evaluate theories that are not strictly naturalistic, but this does not mean such theories are necessarily false.

The irony here is that evolutionists make naturalism unscientific according to their own criterion of testability. This is because naturalistic explanations are the only explanations that are allowed. Imagine if the species were designed. What if the DNA code, the bat’s sonar system and the many other biological wonders were created by a miracle. If this were true, it would not be allowed within evolutionary science. Evolutionists would forever be trying to figure out how such marvels evolved. And they would continue to insist that evolution is a fact.

Of course evolutionists are not fooling anyone but themselves. When you hear an evolutionist claim that evolution is a fact you know there is an commitment to naturalism underwriting the claim.

Digging holes

But it doesn’t help to point out these problems to evolutionists, as I did here and here. They just dig themselves in deeper and deeper. One evolutionist in the know made this comment:

Why don’t you just explain, in simple language, why scientists should adopt your view (which is to insert miracles wherever you don’t understand something),

In simple language, that is not my view. Evolutionists make metaphysical arguments for why evolution is a fact, and when you point out their logical fallacies and scientific errors they blame you for introducing the metaphysics. It seems the evolutionist always blames you for what they do.

In fact I discussed two legitimate ways evolutionists can do science without sacrificing their commitment to naturalism. But as usual, the evolutionist rejects them for they strip away his metaphysics. It’s no fun following the rules if you can’t have your way. The evolutionist continues:

Oh, and please give us some method for including/excluding miracles in science. We're still waiting.

As I’ve already explained, it is not necessary to include/exclude miracles (using Rene Descartes approach, for example). The evolutionist continues:

Without that all you are giving us is meaningless complaining.

Meaningless complaining? Evolutionists violate scientific logic, you point it out, and its dismissed as meaningless complaining. As I pointed out here, the evolutionary claims are not scientific. Evolutionists can modify their approach and join science, or just blame the messenger and continue with their metaphysics.

Response to Comments: The Problem With Miracles

Imagine if a police detective was told his theory had to be strictly natural. The evidence at the crime scene was obvious, but the boss wants no criminals indicted. The cause of the crime must be limited to the wind, rain, earthquakes, polar shifts, whatever. Absurd you say? Welcome to evolution.

Evolutionists say we must be limited to strictly natural explanations, and they then turn around and says they’ve figured out how all of life arose—by mutations and the like. They’re not exactly sure how those mutations could possibly produce the brain and everything else, but they are sure that’s how it happened. After all, we must limit ourselves to strictly natural explanations. Those explanations may not work very well, but they are all we have insist the evolutionists.

Of course this makes no sense, but when you point this out, as I did here, evolutionists just become even more sure of themselves. Here is what one evolutionist in the know said:

Cornelius -- please tell us your method for detecting/testing/refuting miracles, or else scientists have no reason to listen to you.

His point is that in science we just can’t deal with miracles. We can’t detect them, test for them, refute them, and so forth. So no matter what the evidence, evolutionists will forever continue to restrict their answer to naturalism. Show them a code, a machine or a molecular repair kit, it won’t matter.

No matter how badly evolution fares—most of its fundamental predictions have turned out false—evolutionists will always continue to insist it is a fact. This is not science, it is dogma.

In fact, if the evolutionist’s concern is simply that science can’t deal with miracles, then fine. Don’t deal with them. You can limit science to those problems where science works well, as Francis Bacon advocated. Or you can drop the “fact” claim, as did Rene Descartes.

But of course this isn’t the concern at all. We all know what is really going on here. We all know, because evolutionists have written and talked about this ad nauseam. The problem is not that they cannot discern any miracles—the problem is that they do not want to discern any miracles.

From theology (e.g., Christian Wolff), to philosophy (e.g., David Hume), to astronomy (e.g., Gottfried Leibniz), to geology (e.g., Charles Lyell) to biology (e.g., Charles Darwin), evolutionary thinkers have filled libraries with why there shouldn’t be any miracles.

Let’s admit it, science is done by people, and people have biases. Evolutionists pretend they have discovered an important new finding—the world just happened to happen, they proclaim.

Balderdash, people have been saying that ever since there were people. And the idea is contradicted today by high-tech science just as much as it was eons ago by simpler science. The idea is beyond ridiculous—it isn’t even wrong.

In fact, when evolutionists are not busy making their bogus warnings about miracles and claims about facts, they are hard at work attempting to refute the non strictly naturalistic Intelligent Design idea. Evolutionists know perfectly well how to deal with miracles when they think it suits their needs.

Let’s drop the game-playing, silly maneuvering and ridiculous truth claims, and instead deal honestly with the data.

What Evolutionists Don’t Understand About Methodological Naturalism

OK let’s try this again. One more time, this time with pictures. In their celebrated volume  Blueprints, evolutionists Maitland Edey and Donald Johanson argued that “What God did is a matter for faith and not for scientific inquiry. The two fields are separate. If our scientific inquiry should lead eventually to God … that will be the time to stop science.” Similarly for evolutionist Niles Eldredge, the key responsibility of science—to predict—becomes impossible when a capricious Creator is entertained:

But the Creator obviously could have fashioned each species in any way imaginable. There is no basis for us to make predictions about what we should find when we study animals and plants if we accept the basic creationist position. … the creator could have fashioned each organ system or physiological process (such as digestion) in whatever fashion the Creator pleased. [The Monkey Business, p. 39, Washington Square Press, 1982.]

Or again, evolutionist Paul Moody explains that:

Most modern biologists do not find this explanation [that God created the species] satisfying. For one thing, it is really not an explanation at all; it amounts to saying, “Things are this way because they are this way.” Furthermore, it removes the subject from scientific inquiry. One can do no more than speculate as to why the Creator chose to follow one pattern in creating diverse animals rather than to use differing patterns. [Introduction to Evolution, p. 26, Harper and Row, 1970.]

Likewise Tim Berra warns that we must not be led astray by the apparent design in biological systems, for it “is not the sudden brainstorm of a creator, but an expression of the operation of impersonal natural laws, of water seeking its level. An appeal to a supernatural explanation is unscientific and unnecessary—and certain to stifle intellectual curiosity and leave important questions unasked and unanswered.” In fact, “Creationism has no explanatory powers, no application for future investigation, no way to advance knowledge, no way to lead to new discoveries. As far as science is concerned, creationism is a sterile concept.” [Evolution and the Myth of Creationism, pp. 66, 142, Stanford University Press, 1990.]

In his undergraduate evolution text Mark Ridley informs the student that “Supernatural explanations for natural phenomena are scientifically useless,” [Evolution, p. 323, Blackwell, 1993] and commenting on the Dover legal decision Eugenie Scott of the National Center for Science Education explains that supernatural explanations:

would be truly a science stopper, because once we allow ourselves to say, “Gee, this problem is so hard; I can’t figure out how it works—God did it,” then we stop looking for a natural explanation; and if there is a natural explanation, we’re not going to find it if we stop looking.

Over and over evolutionists today agree that science must strictly be limited to naturalistic explanations. One finds this throughout the evolutionary literature and it is a consistent refrain in discussions and debates about evolution.

But this sentiment by no means arose with today’s evolutionists. In 1891 UC Berkeley professor Joseph LeConte argued strenuously for this philosophical mandate:

The origins of new phenomena are often obscure, even inexplicable, but we never think to doubt that they have a natural cause; for so to doubt is to doubt the validity of reason, and the rational constitution of Nature. So also, the origins of new organic forms may be obscure or even inexplicable, but we ought not on that account to doubt that they had a natural cause, and came by a natural process; for so to doubt is also to doubt the validity of reason, and the rational constitution of organic Nature.

Likewise Darwin argued that whether one “believes in the views given by Lamarck, by Geoffroy St. Hilaire, by the author of the ‘Vestiges,’ by Mr. Wallace or by myself, signifies extremely little in comparison with the admission that species have descended from other species, and have not been created immutable: for he who admits this as a great truth has a wide field open to him for further inquiry.”

Explanations needed to be naturalistic for scientific inquiry. And as usual the foundations for this evolutionary mandate long predate 1859. Miracles were increasingly eschewed by leading thinkers and a century before philosopher David Hume had made persuasive arguments against miracles. Much of Hume’s material came from theological debates earlier in the century. On the continent leading Lutherans had already discarded the supernatural.

Method, completeness and realism in pictures

So when an evolutionist today insists that science must be naturalistic he is standing on a deep foundation of ideas. But setting aside this history for a moment, what about this argument? Remember that these same evolutionists claim their idea is also a fact. Is there not something curious about these tandem claims? I was once in a debate where the evolutionists claimed that we know evolution is a fact, and that it also is necessary in order to do science. How did they know that? Let’s have a look.

First, imagine the set of all possible explanations, as represented by the blue area below:

Because the blue area contains all possible explanations, it includes false as well as true explanations, lousy as well as good explanations, aesthetic and clumsy ones, and natural and non natural ones. It is every possible explanation in one set.

Now consider the set of all solutions that are according to a particular method, such as naturalism, as illustrated in the orange area below. All explanations that are strictly naturalistic are in the yellow area, and all other explanations are outside the orange area. Because the blue area contains all possible explanations, the orange area is a subset—it is wholly within the blue area.

Next consider the set of all true explanations as represented by the green circle below. These true explanations provide realistic models of nature. Again, this set of explanations must be wholly within the blue area, but otherwise we don’t know just where this green circle is. It could be in the orange area, it could be outside the orange area, or it could overlap. We don’t know what the true solutions all are, which is why we do science.

I have drawn the green circle above as partly inside and partly outside the orange area merely to illustrate the possibilities. But we don’t know where it is, and therefore whenever we mandate, a priori, a method such as naturalism, we automatically exclude a set of explanations that might be true.

In the early days of modern science philosophers were keen to this issue. Francis Bacon, for instance, wanted science only to pursue true explanations. But Bacon also wanted science to restrict itself to naturalistic explanations. Bacon realized that the restriction to naturalism would exclude any realistic, true, explanations that were not strictly naturalistic.

Bacon said that such non naturalistic phenomena should not be pursued by science. So Bacon insisted on naturalism and realism, but forfeited completeness. Science would not investigate all things. The thick black line below illustrates how this position limits itself to explanations that are both realistic and naturalistic, while potentially forfeiting some true explanations (depending on where exactly the green circle really is).

Like Bacon, another early philosopher, Rene Descartes, also insisted on naturalism. But he didn’t like the idea of forfeiting completeness. Descartes wanted science to be able to investigate all phenomena. But what if some realistic, true, explanations fall outside of naturalism? So what.

Descartes solution was to forfeit realism. Science, according to Descartes, would occasionally produce untrue explanations that otherwise could very well be useful. This approach is illustrated by the thick line below that encompasses all the naturalistic explanations, but misses some of the true explanations. Science might produce useful fictions along the way. Descartes mandated method and completeness, but in doing so had to forfeit realism.

After Descartes several scientists did not like this idea of forfeiting realism, as Descartes did, or forfeiting completeness, as Bacon did. These empiricists were interested in true solutions for all phenomena. This approach is illustrated below with the thick line encompassing the true solutions. But in order to maintain such realism and completeness, this approach cannot guarantee what method would be necessary. They might require non naturalistic explanations, for instance. So this approach provides realism and completeness, but forfeits any guarantee of method, such as naturalism.

Bacon, Descartes and the empiricists represent three different approaches to doing science. All are logically consistent. And who knows, the different methods might yield different insights—let a thousand flowers bloom.

But of course all three approaches have a limitation. Like the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, you cannot have realism, completeness and method all in one. You cannot have your cake and eat it too.

This brings us back to the evolutionists. Unlike Bacon, Descartes and the empiricists, evolutionists do have their cake and eat it too. They claim evolution is a fact, they mandate naturalism, and their science knows no limits. They have realism, method, and completeness all together. How can this be?

The answer is simple. One cannot have realism, method, and completeness simultaneously without some extra, non scientific, knowledge. Evolution’s gnosis is, of course, that true solutions are, indeed, naturalistic. This is illustrated below by the thick line that encompasses all true explanations, but it is also wholly naturalistic. How so? The trick is that the green circle has been moved. It is completely within the orange area. Knowing the location of the green circle, even before doing the science, is evolution’s gnosis—their secret knowledge.

It is this secret knowledge the evolutionists possess that allows them to have their cake and eat it too, and this brings us back to the history of the idea. There is no great mystery here, for evolutionists have for centuries made strong theological arguments that the world must have arisen naturalistically. The true explanations are all naturalistic. Therefore it is little wonder that, while not knowing how the world could have evolved, evolutionists are sure it did evolve. Evolution, one way or another, is a fact.

It is here that many fail to appreciate evolution’s conundrum. They often criticize evolution’s method mandate. Have not evolutionists been wrong to insist on methodological naturalism? No, such a method is perfectly fine.

The problem with evolution is not its insistence on method, but on its underlying theology. By insisting on method and realism and completeness, evolutionists are literally not equipped to consider other legitimate possibilities. They have already made a metaphysical commitment, without knowing whether or not it is true. They have confined themselves to a box. For when problems are encountered there is no way to tell whether the correct naturalistic solution has simply not yet been found, or whether the phenomenon itself is non natural. Of course evolutionists must always opt for the former, no matter how absurd the science becomes.

So the problem with evolution is not that the naturalistic approach might occasionally be inadequate. The problem is that evolutionists would never know any better. The evolutionists truth claims, and the underlying theology, have immense consequences. Religion drives science, and it matters.

Is Evolution Criticism Anti Science?

There is no question that science has made tremendous progress over the centuries, but what exactly does that tell us about science? For some, science’s seemingly inexorable march of progress means that scientific theories are either true or headed in that direction. Scientific ideas, particularly if they are successful, must be revealing something about how the world works. Perhaps they are not exactly correct, but future research will iron out the rough spots. Sure science has had plenty of failed upstarts, but the scientific method provides a feedback loop that rapidly and ruthlessly eliminates those ideas that don’t match up to reality. Scientific theories that are mature, on the other hand, have endured this testing and are well on their way to taking their place as an accurate description of nature. This assessment of science, or at least portions of it, are sometimes referred to as scientific realism, for science is viewed as describing reality. Today, scientific realism plays an important role in evolutionary apologetics but the argument is problematic.

If you question evolution you will, at some point, be told that you are opposing science. Anyone who doubts such a mature, well-established theory must be anti science, whether he knows it or not. Has not the success of science proven the naturalistic approach? As Sean Carroll (the cosmologist, not the geneticist) explains:

Most modern cosmologists are convinced that conventional scientific progress will ultimately result in a self-contained understanding of the origin and evolution of the universe, without the need to invoke God or any other supernatural involvement.

But such raw realism relies on a whiggish understanding of the history of science. Scientific progress, while undeniable, has been accompanied by massive failure. And how to distinguish between the two is not always obvious. Theories that are thought to represent reality often turn out to be miserable failures. And very successful scientific theories are routinely later taken to be a false representation of reality. They were not slightly modified but dropped altogether. But in their day such theories were held with great confidence.

And so it is not terribly surprising that, as a recent paper explains, most published research findings are false. Like the weather forecast, what science tells us is often not true:

There is increasing concern that most current published research findings are false. The probability that a research claim is true may depend on study power and bias, the number of other studies on the same question, and, importantly, the ratio of true to no relationships among the relationships probed in each scientific field. In this framework, a research finding is less likely to be true when the studies conducted in a field are smaller; when effect sizes are smaller; when there is a greater number and lesser preselection of tested relationships; where there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and analytical modes; when there is greater financial and other interest and prejudice; and when more teams are involved in a scientific field in chase of statistical significance. Simulations show that for most study designs and settings, it is more likely for a research claim to be false than true. Moreover, for many current scientific fields, claimed research findings may often be simply accurate measures of the prevailing bias. In this essay, I discuss the implications of these problems for the conduct and interpretation of research.

Published research findings are sometimes refuted by subsequent evidence, with ensuing confusion and disappointment. Refutation and controversy is seen across the range of research designs, from clinical trials and traditional epidemiological studies to the most modern molecular research. There is increasing concern that in modern research, false findings may be the majority or even the vast majority of published research claims. However, this should not be surprising. It can be proven that most claimed research findings are false. Here I will examine the key factors that influence this problem and some corollaries thereof.

None of this means that science does not progress, but science’s progress is not straightforward. It is not as though science smoothly and efficiently gains knowledge of the natural world, like the turning of a Baconian crank. And while careful formulations of realism are possible, there is little basis for the evolutionist’s marshalling of it as an apologetic for naturalism. What is amazing is how often realism is so naively employed. As Larry Laudan once commented:

It is little short of remarkable that realists would imagine that their critics would find the argument compelling. As I have shown elsewhere, ever since antiquity critics of epistemic realism have based their scepticism upon a deep-rooted conviction that the fallacy of affirming the consequent is indeed fallacious. …

No proponent of realism has sought to show that realism satisfies those stringent empirical demands which the realist himself minimally insists on when appraising scientific theories. The latter-day realist often calls realism a “scientific” or “well-tested” hypothesis, but seems curiously reluctant to subject it to those controls which he otherwise takes to be a sine qua non for empirical well-foundedness.

There simply is no basis for the evolutionist’s common retort that criticism of his theory is anti science. In fact, this seems to be more of a protectionist ploy than a genuine defense of truth. Perhaps it is no coincidence that such a ploy is used to defend the empirically problematic evolutionary claim that the universe, and everything in it, spontaneously arose on its own.

Philosophers to Discuss the Metaphysics of Evolutionary Naturalism

Don’t be fooled by the upcoming conference on “The Metaphysics of Evolutionary Naturalism” at the American University of Beirut. In spite of the title the conference is not about the metaphysics of evolutionary naturalism, it is about the metaphysical implications of evolutionary naturalism. As the conference description explains:

From the perspective of the history of philosophy, evolutionary theory raises some very fundamental questions indeed.

Indeed yes, but they won’t be asked at this conference. Here are some questions that won’t be asked:

1. Can a strictly naturalistic research program enjoy guarantees of completeness and realism?

2. Is a strictly naturalistic approach required for legitimate science? If so, can the resulting explanations be objective facts?

3. Is it serendipity that the strictly naturalistic origin of life narrative is (i) required for science and (ii) a fact?

4. Are contrastive approaches to theory evaluation, such as likelihood ratios, undermined by the problem of unconceived alternatives?

5. Does the infinite regress make design impossible? Non scientific? Both? If so, does this mandate evolution as is claimed?

6. Would an all-good, all-powerful, all-knowledgeable creator never intend this world as evolutionists claim?

7. Can atheists make metaphysical assertions, such as that god would never create this world, without contradicting themselves?

How can one be a naturalist after Darwin? On the ancient teleological naturalist picture, namely that of Aristotle, the goal of the study of the physical world, organic and inorganic, was to reveal the ultimate purposes of things. This teleological world-view was then coupled with the belief in a unified deity, and resulted in the belief that the study of the physical world offers a window into the mind of God.

Darwin completed a revolution in the sciences that was begun by Galileo. Galileo’s mathematization of physics removed Aristotelean final causes from the inorganic part of the natural world. Darwin’s theory of natural selection removed those final causes from the organic part of the natural world as well. The implications of such a radical shift in world-view are still vague, especially the implications concerning metaphysical commitments.

But the implications of Darwin’s theory on metaphysics are uncannily similar to the pre Darwin metaphysics from which Darwin argued. Today we conclude that it is a greater god who does not intervene, but this is precisely what Leibniz and others vigorously argued. Shouldn’t the metaphysical inputs be considered as well as the metaphysical outputs?

Given all the advances in science, it seems that we cannot answer the traditional philosophical problems concerning consciousness, freedom or even religion but through this new Darwinian naturalist lens.

But the naturalist lens was crafted from philosophical and theological concerns, long before Darwin got in a boat and went anywhere. Religion drives science, and it matters (but don’t tell the philosophers).

Steve Clarke: Naturalism Can’t Be Sure

In his paper Naturalism, Science and the Supernatural, philosopher Steve Clarke argues that naturalism has a problem. Naturalism, Clarke points out, defers to science. And while fringe movements such as intelligent design appeal to the supernatural, mainstream accepted science does not. There are no contemporary examples, Clarke makes clear, of an explanation that appeals to the supernatural which is the best scientific explanation of some natural phenomenon. But such appeals have been made (and accepted) in the past, and there is no guarantee they won’t be in the future as well. Therefore naturalism, by deferring to science, cannot conclude against the supernatural. It is an interesting paper which raises, and misses, some important points.

Is science complete?

First, Clarke’s assurance that there is no contemporary explanation that appeals to the supernatural which is the best scientific explanation of some natural phenomenon, is rather obvious and practically a truism. Of course appeals to the supernatural don’t work for natural phenomenon. Natural phenomenon, by definition, are described by natural laws. Any appeal to the supernatural, by definition, will fail on Occam’s razor.

So yes, science has appealed to the supernatural in centuries past, but only because the phenomena in question was deemed to be supernatural. For example, it seemed to Newton that the best explanation for the origin of the solar system was that the creator placed the planets in their particular orbits. Likewise, it seemed to Paley that the best explanation for the origin of biological complexity was a designer. The origin of the solar system and biological complexity were deemed to be supernatural events.

This raises the thorny question of how one determines whether a phenomenon is natural. For instance, evolutionary philosopher Barbara Forrest states that science must be restricted to natural phenomena. In its investigations, science must restrict itself to a naturalistic methodology, where explanations must be strictly naturalistic, dealing with phenomena that are strictly natural.

But how do we determine whether a phenomenon is natural? If genuine science is to be restricted to natural phenomena, then how do we demarcate this genuine science from the pseudo science? It has been almost 30 years since Larry Laudan showed the severity of the demarcation problem which evolutionists continue erroneously to use as justification for their unlikely thesis.

Clarke’s criticism of naturalism too soft

Clarke’s thesis that naturalism’s deference to science renders it vulnerable to a possible, future appeal to the supernatural in the sciences is too conservative. Evolutionists motivate and justify evolution with several claims about the supernatural. Richard Dawkins, for instance, argues god would never have designed the blind spot in our retina. Such metaphysical truth claims are by no means limited to outspoken evangelists such as Dawkins. From seventeenth century tracts to today’s textbooks, evolution entails claims about the supernatural.

The fact that some of these evolutionists are atheists does not relieve them of their truth claims about the supernatural. They know god doesn’t exist, but they know a lot about him if he did exist. Such contradictions, or complexities to be more generous, in the naturalist’s position does not ease their predicament.

Clarke’s thesis that naturalism’s deference to science renders it vulnerable to the supernatural is not just a theoretical problem. That deference to science means that naturalism already today must acknowledge a commitment to metaphysical claims about the supernatural. How can they know such truths?

Back to School Part VI

Evolutionists are adamant that science must be free of religion or anything that smacks of religion. And while that sounds good, evolutionists are all-the-while driven by religion. They are sure all of biology is a fluke because of their religious convictions. Religion is both the source of evolution’s certainty and the target of its wrath. When not proclaiming that science must be free of religion, evolutionists make a wide spectrum of religious claims that mandate their theory.

Religious and metaphysical thought pervades the evolution genre. Even the dry textbooks indoctrinate students of evolution’s unobservable truths. Here is a subtle example from George Johnson’s and Jonathan Losos’ popular textbook which portrays the fossil record as decisive evidence for evolution:

If the theory of evolution is not correct, on the other hand, then such orderly change is not expected. [George Johnson and Jonathan Losos, The Living World, Fifth Edition, McGraw Hill, 2008, p. 296.]

Unsuspecting students and instructors will not likely discern the powerful doctrine in this seemingly innocent sentence. There is no mention of a god or holy book, and no appeal to authority. It seems to be an objective, scientific statement about the theory of evolution.

And that makes it all the more dangerous. These powerful non scientific claims are common in the evolution genre, but they can be subtle. Here this insertion of metaphysics is likely to escape detection while laying the groundwork for evolutionary doctrine.

These types of statements make ultimate truth claims. In this case Johnson and Losos claim to know all the possibilities aside from evolution and why none of them predict the orderly change we observe in the fossil record. Evolution, and only evolution, predicts such an outcome. In other words, if-and-only-if evolution is true would we expect to see such orderly change.

Therefore evolution must be true. This is one of the powerful arguments used to prove evolution to be a fact. But it is not from empirical science.

Johnson and Losos did not dream this up on their own. These IF AND ONLY IF statements have a long history in the evolutionary genre. They date back centuries to Enlightenment theology when theists of various persuasions were grappling with how god would have created the world. Their conviction was that creation must have been strictly via natural law, and this laid the groundwork for Charles Darwin’s and Alred Wallace’s theory of evolution.

Yet in seeking legitimacy, evolutionists portray their religiously-motivated, bizarre idea as scientific. And their hypocrisy comes full circle as they insist that science be free of any religious influence. As our textbook authors explain in the very next section:

Explanations that cannot be tested and potentially rejected simply aren’t science. [301]

But how can the explanation that the fossil record’s orderly change is expected only by evolution be tested? How could it be rejected? Evolution fails to qualify as science by the evolutionist’s own definition. The evolutionists are their own judge.

The lie of evolution is not that the species originated via natural law. As scientifically unlikely as that appears to us today, it just may be possible. Let’s not reject ideas just because they appear to be silly.

But evolution claims to be an undeniable scientific fact—a no-brainer. This is the lie of evolution. Evolution excoriates religious influence while insisting on its own religious truths. Though often subtle, evolution is a hypocritical lie. Religion drives science, and it matters.

Aub's World

In Isaac Asimov’s 1958 futuristic short story “The Feeling of Power,” Myron Aub is a technician who rediscovers arithmetic. Aub’s future world is one dominated by computers which do all the number crunching and people who not only are mathematically-challenged but, more importantly, don’t see the point. What good is math anyway? Today evolution has had a similar effect on our thinking. Just as computers can dull our mathematical skills, evolution dulls our critical thinking skills.

According to evolutionists everything from the quasars and galaxies in the cosmos to the millions of biological marvels on earth are a fluke. They all just happened to happen. And though evolutionists don’t know how all this happened, they know for certain that it happened. And their certainty justifies oppression of skepticism. They suppress any intellectual curiosity that doubts their dogma with lawsuits and black lists.

Modern evolutionary thought traces back to the early days of science in the seventeenth century. Over the centuries it gained strength and today it dominates the sciences and beyond. As the evolutionist Teilhard de Chardin proclaimed, evolution is much more than merely a theory, system or hypothesis:

It is much more—it is a general postulate to which all theories, all hypotheses, all systems must henceforward bow and which they must satisfy in order to be thinkable and true. Evolution is a light which illuminates all facts, a trajectory which all lines of thought must follow—this is what evolution is.

That sort of dogma is frightening. But with evolutionists, there can be no alternative. The world must have evolved naturally. Particular hypotheses may come and go, but naturalism cannot be false.

In a word evolution has created an atmosphere of anti-intellectualism. And as de Chardin forecast, evolutionary dogma has spread far beyond science. Not only does evolutionary thought pervade academia in general, but the culture at large as well. From journalism and education to public policy and law, evolution is the gatekeeper. Deep thoughts that doubt evolution’s dogma are not allowed.

This is nowhere more evident than in the various court rulings on the teaching of origins in our public schools. The most recent significant ruling was in 2005 when federal judge John Jones ruled that Intelligent Design could not be taught in Dover, Pennsylvania public schools. As with the 1925 Scopes Monkey Trial, the particular ruling in Dover was less important than the underlying message. In the Scopes Monkey Trial John Scopes was found guilty of teaching evolution, and in the Dover trial the School Board was instructed not to teach ID.

These rulings were not controversial or of lasting importance. Of course Scopes was guilty of teaching evolution, and of course the School Board was guilty of “breathtaking inanity” as Judge Jones concluded.

What was important about the Dover trial, like the Scopes Monkey Trial, was the underlying anti intellectualism that each advanced. Both trials were specifically targeted and used by the ACLU and evolutionists to promote their naturalistic agenda. As Judge Jones wrote, science limits itself to “natural explanations about the natural world.” [66-7] What Jones apparently failed to realize is no one disagrees with that limitation. Of course science must limit itself to natural explanations about the natural world. But what is the “natural world?”

Judge Jones apparently never asked himself that question and instead was swayed by the ACLU’s reasoning. ID, wrote Jones, “takes a natural phenomenon and, instead of accepting or seeking a natural explanation, argues that the explanation is supernatural.” [66-7]

It is astonishing that such a silly canard could be seriously set forth as a characterization of ID. It does, of course, no such thing. Indeed, Jones and the ACLU not only mischaracterize ID, but they evade the crucial issue. The Dover opinion makes the circular assertion that phenomena are natural and so therefore ought to be explained by naturalistic causes. Of course natural phenomena ought to be explained by naturalistic causes, but how do we know if a phenomenon is natural? How do we know that human consciousness arose by strictly natural causes? We don’t, of course.

There are different ways to handle this conundrum. ID is only one approach and certainly can be criticized. But evolutionists have not even begun to reckon with the problem seriously. Instead they evade the deep issue altogether and when asked simply lay the blame with ID.

Unfortunately, rather than transcend evolution’s low-brow critiques, the Dover decision joins right in. Yes, ID should not have been taught as Jones rightly ruled, but that was inconsequential. I was not in favor of teaching ID long before the Dover trial, and I knew no one who was. But the message from Dover was about much more than just teaching ID. Evolution’s religious dogma took another step further into our constitutional jurisprudence.

The Dover trial’s anti intellectualism will breed more of the same, just as did the Scopes Monkey Trial. Indeed, when asked about his education for the Dover case, Jones explained that “I understood the general theme. I'd seen Inherit the Wind.” That is as astonishing as it is frightening. How could a federal judge be so profoundly naïve? It would be like saying I understand the general theme of lung cancer because I’ve seen a Phillip Morris video. Like a trojan horse, evolution’s anti intellectualism has gone viral. It is now widely accepted and even federal judges take it as normative. Like Myron Aub rediscovering basic arithmetic, we need to rediscover basic critical thinking skills.

Why Some People Favor Common Descent

The scientific evidence does not favor evolution but that doesn't mean we know all the answers. In fact some people who agree evolution is unlikely, nonetheless argue for common descent. This can be confusing because common descent is so often presented as integral to Darwin's idea. But this need not be the case.

Evolutionary thought entertains a seemingly unbounded spectrum of hypotheses about how the species arose. It is by no means limited to natural selection, or even common descent. At the core of evolutionary thought is naturalism. The origin of species must be explained naturalistically. Beyond that, practically anything is allowed.

Common descent can also be an open-ended idea. Yes, it is usually considered to be within evolution's strictly naturalistic paradigm, but that is not a necessary constraint. For many people, it is clear that naturalistic explanations don't do a very good job, but nonetheless there is evidence for shared ancestry.

What all this means is that when one person argues against common descent and another for common descent, they may actually be not too far apart. Hopefully we all acknowledge the broad outlines of the evidence. And hopefully we all understand the important role of metaphysics in interpreting that evidence.

But such shared understandings do not narrow us to a single choice. Some may favor common descent while others may not. That does not mean the former denies the evidence against common descent, or that the latter denies the evidence for it. It simply means that our current level of knowledge leaves us with a substantially underdetermined origins problem. We simply do not have sufficient knowledge or evidence, evolutionists notwithstanding, to make heavy-handed declarations about what must be accepted as fact.

The knowledgeable person arguing for common descent views its evidential problems as reasons to reject marrying common descent to evolution, but not rejecting the concept of common descent altogether. But this person's view of common descent is different from the usual evolutionary view, which typically restricts common descent to be within the strictly naturalistic paradigm.

Clearly, it is crucial for people to establish unambiguous definitions for how they are viewing common descent. Most importantly, is their version restricted to naturalism, or not? For instance, those arguing against common descent may have the strict naturalism of evolution in view. In that case, they are not opposing those who, for instance, argue for common descent from an intelligent design perspective.

In my view, evolutionary thought has badly failed on today's science. And so with it the strictly naturalistic version of common descent likewise thus far fails. The only reason to think otherwise is if one carries a priori metaphysical prejudices, as evolutionists do, which color the interpretation of the evidence.

But given this correct understanding of today's science, the question of a broader version of common descent becomes, in my view, far more underdetermined and far more difficult to assess. Problems that are not amenable to methodological naturalism are above my paygrade.