One of the Most Important Questions in Evolutionary Biology
Lyell, however, deeply influenced Darwin, and just as Lyell invoked uniformitarianism as part of his efforts to make geology a science, I believe Darwin followed suit in his development of evolutionary thought. Huxley famously wrote to Darwin immediately before publication of The Origin, suggesting that Darwin had adopted a gradual view of evolution too unreservedly.
But what if Darwin had not cast his evolution as a gradual, law-like process? If he had allowed for saltations to explain the discontinuities, rather than gaps left by an imperfect fossil record, then his theory would have been less compelling. Now, 150 years later, we have yet another false prediction and evolutionists struggling to patch the theory. And if something as fundamental as this remains in question, then certainly evolution is not a scientific fact.
Amen. Evolutionists are retreating a little here under modern pressure of discovery of lack of a continuum.
ReplyDeleteIf evolution had never happened it would be a prediction of the gaps. Just to point that out!
Evolutionists do seek the intermediates and parade the ALLEGED few intermediates. Indeed they dream of finding them surely.
They don't find them at all and so its a problem.
Its a bigger problem also because fossils are not biological evidence for a biological hypothesis. They are only biological data points entirely without meaning outside of a geological deposition conclusions.
Otherwise they are just variations on a type living in diffeent areas that were deposited during some big event.
Any geological/taphonomical theory consistent with tons of posited but thus-far-unobserved transitional biological forms of historical life must also explain all stratigraphic range increases consistently with the belief that observed stratigraphic ranges correspond well with existential ranges. Otherwise, fossil succession has no known relevance to UCA.
ReplyDeleteIt is obvious that no such theory exists. Thus, the seeming failure to explain observed fossil succession by flood geology is of no logical relevance to the plausibility of UCA. Both views (indeed, all views thus far) are utterly a-plausible since no one can even enumerate the requisite number of a-plausible hypotheses to imply the relevant observations.
What we haven't done, though, is demonstrate that our apparent memories are inconsistent with an inductive/deductive rational order sufficient for the continued intentional survival of our species. Thus, since one species of ID explanation can at least allow for explaining such an order with a doable enumeration of hypotheses, it can provide for greater explanatory breadth than any purely naturalistic or atheistic approach to explaining our apparent memories.
Naturalists and atheists prefer to deny the reality of a rational and/or moral order if necessary to rule out ID explanations. But by doing so, they have also ruled out the ability to demarcate science in a way that is knowably relevant to utility of any conceivable kind.
They will move back to saltation in a heartbeat if it means saving the theory, and ultimately saving the cultural perception that materialistic origins is plausible. Would not be surprised at all if in thirty years, some kind of "saltationism/natural genetic-engineering" is the new dogma. Neo-darwinism is pretty much just a PR campaign at this point.
ReplyDelete"the periods during which species have undergone modification, though long as measured in years, have probably been short in comparison with the periods during which they retain the same form." — Charles Darwin, Origin of Species, 4th edition
ReplyDeleteChanges in tempo do not mean morphological discontinuities. Read the paper.
DeleteCornelius Hunter: Changes in tempo do not mean morphological discontinuities.
DeleteChanges in tempo would result in morphological discontinuities. For instance, rapid adaptation occurring in small, isolated populations would be unlikely to fossilize. We would see only the disconnected end-points.
Darwin had a simplified, somewhat linear view, where change is slow, a new niche opens up, then rapid change occurs. A new niche may be the result of an accumulation of evolutionary innovations. For instance, once arthropods developed the ability to breathe air, a period of rapid diversification would occur. More generally, we would expect mostly small changes, a few larger changes, and the rare revolution.
The paper points to developmental kernels. Once these evolved, then there was a rapid burst of innovation.
Cornelius Hunter: Morphological Discontinuities Trouble Evolutionists
DeleteTroubled as in interested. Of course it's interesting! If the rate of morphological evolution isn't constant—and it's not, then how and why it varies becomes an important question.
"For instance, once arthropods developed the ability to breathe air..."
DeleteI love statements like that!
Go arthropods!
Aristotelianism is dead, long live Aristotelianism !
DeleteZ: Changes in tempo would result in morphological discontinuities.
DeleteJ: Variation can be cyclical or variation on a constant theme. Thus, you're wrong. You need millions more a-plausible premises to imply the posited lineages in the posited time-frame.
Zachriel:
DeleteTroubled as in interested.
Troubled as in troubled.
Ron Van Wegen: Go arthropods!
Deletehttp://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51bY9bVmcgL._SL500_AA300_.jpg
Jeff: Variation can be cyclical or variation on a constant theme.
DeleteSure, however, sampling may still result in discontinuities.
If by "may" you mean we can't prove otherwise, then of course. But you can't prove they weren't designed on the other hand. So that gets us nowhere. What CH is arguing against incessantly is those who for some reason can't tell the difference between a "known" fact and the inability to prove something impossible. Many scientists deny foundationalism in the first place, which means absolutely NOTHING can be proved impossible. Confused people they are.
DeleteJeff: If by "may" you mean we can't prove otherwise, then of course. But you can't prove they weren't designed on the other hand.
DeleteYou're not even addressing your own point. Given changes in the tempo of evolution, the question is whether random sampling would result in discontinuities.
Changes in tempo of VARIATION is all that is meant by changes in tempo of evolution, Z. If variation is only cyclical and/or mere variation on a theme, tempo has nothing to do with explaining the existence of the discontinuities, per se. You're not stating enough premises to imply your conclusion. It takes MILLIONS of such premises to imply the posited lineages in the posited time-frames.
DeleteJeff: It takes MILLIONS of such premises to imply the posited lineages in the posited time-frames.
DeleteThat's just silly. It's like saying you have to know what each and every particle does before you can explain air pressure.
Zach: Changes in tempo would result in morphological discontinuities. For instance, rapid adaptation occurring in small, isolated populations would be unlikely to fossilize. We would see only the disconnected end-points.
DeleteDarwin had a simplified, somewhat linear view, where change is slow, a new niche opens up, then rapid change occurs. A new niche may be the result of an accumulation of evolutionary innovations.
First of all, there is not a shred of evidence that a "niche" leads to selection of mutations that result in morphological novelty. The morphological adaptations we DO observe, are usually plastic responses, or changes in expression levels of existing genetic function.
Neo-Darwinian "niche" evolution is nothing but theoretical imagineering. While there is no evidence for it, there are several strong arguments against even its hypothetical basis. One of these arguments is that niche-environments are going to induce too much fitness noise in an individual phenotype (in the form of epigenetics and plasticity), for selection of the fitness signal from a mutation to be feasible. And that's on top of the untold amounts of fitness noise of every day survival.
For instance, rapid adaptation occurring in small, isolated populations would be unlikely to fossilize. We would see only the disconnected end-points.
We would also see only the disconnected end-points if Common Descent was false.
So can we also affirm the consequent and take this as evidence that Evolution never happened? Or are only evolutionists allowed to commit logical fallacies?
The fact is, Z, modeling is not the same things as EXPLAINING in terms of the causal capacities of particles. They are both valuable when they allow predictions that enable us to increase our satisfaction or diminish our dissatisfaction. That's what we went over in the discussion of methodological phenomenalism. But they are NOT the same thing.
DeleteMethodological phenomenalism can conceivably work whether or not there is "stuff out there" at all. But Darwinism ASSUMES there is "stuff out there" that changes states over time, not merely that our subjective conscious experience changes over time. Or am I wrong about that, even? Has Darwinism succumbed to idealism too?
Thus far, you don't even have a model for biological variation that implies testable novel observations. Because you neither know to what extent (given the unknown historical variables of geographic ranges of species, erosion, taphonomical conditions, population density, etc) observed stratigraphic ranges correspond to actual stratigraphic ranges nor to what extent actual stratigraphic ranges correspond to existential ranges.
We've already been over this with the fishy-pod example. You insisted that since the observed stratigraphic ranges are contrary to the cladistic model order, the fishy-pod prediction was not falsified. But it wasn't corroborated EITHER. That's what we mean by the absence of EVIDENCE for the hypothesis that cladistics models biological history in that sense.
It is ludicrous to believe, prior to LOTS of corroborations, that cladistic models not only accurately model:
1) amounts of morphological/phenotypic variation per time-frame,
2) specific lineage trajectories,
and
3) effects of historical mutations, etc
... but, as well:
a) the implied (in cases like the fishy pod) disparities between observed stratigraphic ranges and existential ranges
and/or
b) the absence of discovered transitional forms.
It matters not whether quantum equations gives us insight into the properties of particles "out there" so long as they MODEL observations in a way that allows us to use those models for utility. Nothing like that yet exists for Darwinism. It's pure metaphysics so far.
lifepsy: First of all, there is not a shred of evidence that a "niche" leads to selection of mutations that result in morphological novelty.
DeleteThere are many examples of adaptive radiation, e.g. Darwin's finches.
lifepsy: The morphological adaptations we DO observe, are usually plastic responses, or changes in expression levels of existing genetic function.
There are also examples of morphological novelty, e.g. Danionella dracula.
lifepsy: We would also see only the disconnected end-points if Common Descent was false.
Sure, but that wasn't the question raised. As for common descent, there is strong evidence of that in the nested hierarchy and the succession of fossils.
lifepsy: So can we also affirm the consequent and take this as evidence that Evolution never happened?
Again, that wasn't the point raised.
Jeff: The fact is, Z, modeling is not the same things as EXPLAINING in terms of the causal capacities of particles.
Sure. Not all models are explanatory. However, theories are explanations.
Jeff: Thus far, you don't even have a model for biological variation that implies testable novel observations.
Of course there are. For instance, mutations happen.
Your position is equivalent to saying you have to know what each and every particle does before you can explain air pressure. That's simply not the case.
And one more thing, Z: If explanation of your subjective, conscious experience doesn't, in your opinion, depend on the existence of entities with positive volume, it is UTTERLY counter-inductive to posit them. In that case, you're always merely MODELING the timing of elements or aspects of your subjective, conscious experience, NOT explaining it in terms of properties of extra-self entities.
DeleteAlternatively, the positive VOLUME of particles has to imply the timing of some elements or aspects of your subjective, conscious experience. Such a theory, then, would need to imply that the timing of those elements or aspects FROM premises whose meanings include the specification of those positive volumes.
And yet you insist that modern models suppose particles are point particles. Thus, they certainly ARE merely models of the timing of certain elements or aspects of subjective, conscious experience if they're anything valuable at all, giving us no insight into the reality of or the nature of stuff "out there."
Zach: There are many examples of adaptive radiation, e.g. Darwin's finches.
DeleteThose are non-mutation changes in expression levels of beak morphology and are probably plastic because of the short seasonal cycles they are timed to. All animals slightly vary around middle points like this. These are clearly not evolutionary progressions. The observed changes are not even the result of a mutation.
Zach: morphological novelty: Danionella dracula
As far as I can tell this is simply a new species variation that was discovered. The adaptation was not observed, some researchers just found some fish with teeth-like protrusions in their jaws. Researchers discover new types of animals all the time. For all you or I know the other members of that species have the ability to express the same morphology under the right conditions.
Zach: As for common descent, there is strong evidence of that in the nested hierarchy and the succession of fossils.
I think you're mistaken. Weren't you the one arguing that mammals lack of feathers is confirming evidence for the nested hierarchy of Common Descent?
Common Descent does not predict the succession of fossils, it merely accommodates it. The fossil record could be found in infinitely different orders than what it is and CD could still accommodate it.
Both of these claims of evidence are illusory and will not withstand scrutiny.
lifepsy: Those are non-mutation changes in expression levels of beak morphology and are probably plastic because of the short seasonal cycles they are timed to.
DeleteThe changes in beak size have been traced to heritable variation, including variations in BMP4.
See Abzhanov et al., Bmp4 and Morphological Variation of Beaks in Darwin's Finches, Science 2004.
lifepsy: As far as I can tell this is simply a new species variation that was discovered.
It's clearly a different species with a significant morphological novelty.
lifepsy: For all you or I know the other members of that species have the ability to express the same morphology under the right conditions.
We'd be pleased to look at your evidence, when you have it.
lifepsy: Weren't you the one arguing that mammals lack of feathers is confirming evidence for the nested hierarchy of Common Descent?
No single trait can determine a nested hierarchy.
lifepsy: Common Descent does not predict the succession of fossils, it merely accommodates it.
It explains it, and makes novel predictions.
lifepsy: The fossil record could be found in infinitely different orders than what it is and CD could still accommodate it.
Yet is an infinitesimal of what would be consistent with Common Descent.
Zach: The changes in beak size have been traced to heritable variation, including variations in BMP4.
DeleteThey are variations in expression levels of BMP4. Abzhanov et al. make no mention of a mutation causing the changes as far as I can tell. They allude to possible changes in regulation factors. Plastic and epigenetic changes can be heritable as well.
Can you show me your evidence that finch beak morphology is caused by DNA mutation?
Zach: It's clearly a different species with a significant morphological novelty.
Researchers discover new animal designs all the time. But we were talking about observed cases of adaptation in the wild. Like I said, you know nothing of the processes that gave rise to this morphological variation. I don't know why you
brought it up.
Zach: No single trait can determine a nested hierarchy.
Obviously, but if the nested hierarchy of Common Descent is a scientific model then an out-of-place trait should be able to falsify it. But your nested
hierarchy is not falsifiable. As an example, Evolutionists typically argue (and I'm fairly certain I've seen you make this same argument) that mammals lack of feathers is supportive of the nested hierarchy, yet if a mammal did have
feathers it could be explained as an example of convergent evolution.
Your nested hierarchy (as any kind of falsifiable model) is an illusion. It's just something that sounds good to say.
Zach: [common descent] explains [the fossil record], and makes novel predictions.... Yet is an infinitesimal of what would be consistent with Common Descent.
Common Descent could explain an infinite arrangement of fossils. Life could start on land, adapt to water, climb back onto land. Amphibians could be made to evolve into mammals, and mammals into reptiles. Or mammals into birds. Or reptiles could go in reverse, adapt to water, and evolve into fish. It's explanatory power is nearly infinite. So we find a certain order out of thousands of orders that Common Descent could "explain".
The predictions are simply based off the known pattern of fossils, and are independent of beliefs about Common Descent or Evolution, as CD does not predict any kind of specific order. It's a very clever illusion, and understandable that so many people fall for it.
Also, beyond a very general order of fossils, Evolution/CD completely fails and immediately falls into extreme ad-hoc for well-known reasons. (sudden appearances of virtually all major body plans, and stasis, massive convergence,
no transitional anatomy, etc.) Not that I need to repeat what is common knowledge.
lifepsy: They are variations in expression levels of BMP4. Abzhanov et al. make no mention of a mutation causing the changes as far as I can tell.
DeleteYou suggested the changes were "plastic", but they are heritable variations.
lifepsy: Can you show me your evidence that finch beak morphology is caused by DNA mutation?
Mutation is only one of many types of heritable variation. They showed that misexpression in other avian species expressed the same morphological change.
lifepsy: Researchers discover new animal designs all the time. But we were talking about observed cases of adaptation in the wild.
Yes, and we provided you one.
lifepsy: I don't know why you brought it up.
Because you asked.
lifepsy: Obviously, but if the nested hierarchy of Common Descent is a scientific model then an out-of-place trait should be able to falsify it.
Common Descent doesn't predict a perfect nested hierarchy. See Darwin, Origin of Species, 1859.
lifepsy: Evolutionists typically argue (and I'm fairly certain I've seen you make this same argument) that mammals lack of feathers is supportive of the nested hierarchy, yet if a mammal did have feathers it could be explained as an example of convergent evolution.
Convergent evolution entails observable patterns. See Darwin, Origin of Species, 1859.
lifepsy: Your nested hierarchy (as any kind of falsifiable model) is an illusion.
It's an observation. First you argue that the nested hierarchy may have other explanations. Then you argue that there is no nested hierarchy.
lifepsy: Common Descent could explain an infinite arrangement of fossils.
Sure. For instance, non-avian dinosaurs may never have died out. In any case, such arrangements would still constitute an infinitesimal of possible arrangements of fossils.
lifepsy: Amphibians could be made to evolve into mammals, and mammals into reptiles. Or mammals into birds. Or reptiles could go in reverse, adapt to water, and evolve into fish.
Amphibians did evolve into mammals. Mammals don't evolve into birds, but may evolve the ability to fly (Chiroptera). Reptiles don't evolve into fish, but may evolve the ability to swim (Plesiosauria).
lifepsy: So we find a certain order out of thousands of orders that Common Descent could "explain".
History is funny that way. Maybe Caesar would cross the Rubicon. Maybe not. But evidence strongly supports the existence of Caesar.
lifepsy: It's a very clever illusion, and understandable that so many people fall for it.
There is a clear succession of fossil life.
Okay Zachriel, so you throw out comments like "there is strong evidence for common descent by the nested hierarchy" and then are unable to provide a single trait that would falsify this model. You've never been able to do this. All you do is just keep repeating this "nested hierarchy" mantra without any explanation.
DeleteConvergent Evolution does not "entail patterns". Character traits can be switched from homologous to homoplastic arbitrarily if it means a better phylogenetic resolution.
Of course there is a "succession" of fossils. That's not the point.
If, hypothetically speaking, mammal fossils were found immediately above fish. (with no reptile intermediates) Then Common Descent could easily accommodate that. Just a little bit speedier of a water to land adaptation. You know it could, too, along with nearly any fossil sequence we might have found. This is why the fossil record, with regards to common descent, is not a falsifiable model.
Fossil predictions are based solely on the existing fossil record, totally independent of CD models.
lifepsy: Okay Zachriel, so you throw out comments like "there is strong evidence for common descent by the nested hierarchy" and then are unable to provide a single trait that would falsify this model.
DeletePreviously, you said "Your nested hierarchy (as any kind of falsifiable model) is an illusion." The nested hierarchy isn't a model, but an observation.
lifepsy: Convergent Evolution does not "entail patterns".
Since 1859, it has been integral to evolutionary theory.
lifepsy: Of course there is a "succession" of fossils. That's not the point.
It's called evidence.
lifepsy: If, hypothetically speaking, mammal fossils were found immediately above fish. (with no reptile intermediates) Then Common Descent could easily accommodate that.
That would be quite a gap to traverse "immediately" by evolutionary processes. Rates of evolution can be inferred from the fossil record.
lifepsy: Just a little bit speedier of a water to land adaptation.
There are a range of adaptations required, and evolutionary theory would *posit* intermediaries. Reptiles, or something like them, would be a prediction. Let's look at the fossil record!
lifepsy: You know it could, too, along with nearly any fossil sequence we might have found.
You neglected the most obvious sequence, mammals before fish.
Zach: Previously, you said "Your nested hierarchy (as any kind of falsifiable model) is an illusion." The nested hierarchy isn't a model, but an observation.
DeleteCall it whatever you want. You're still avoiding providing a single trait that was falsify your conception of a Common Descent-supporting nested hierarchy. It's in your imagination. That's why you can't explain it when pressed for details.
Zach:That would be quite a gap to traverse "immediately" by evolutionary processes. Rates of evolution can be inferred from the fossil record.
It would just be dealt with as a "puzzle" similar to the current puzzle of the Cambrian Explosion. There are countless such rapid evolutionary jumps today on an anatomical level.
Zach: You neglected the most obvious sequence, mammals before fish.
Admittedly it would be harder for evolution do accommodate, but there is nothing stopping a rapid convergent evolution of mammalian forms on land, millions of years prior to the most recent adaptation. Evolution never made any rules excluding things like this, it simply attached itself to a pre-existing fossil record.
There are other common sense reasons that mammals are not found buried with fish, and that is the vast majority did not live underwater.
Zachriel, neither of your points are very strong. You can't even discuss them when pressed. Just popping out little one-liners and avoiding the arguments. Anyways, I won't keep wasting my time. Enjoy your future bluffing.
lifepsy: Call it whatever you want.
DeleteIt has nothing to do with what we want. The nested hierarchy is observed. Don't avoid responding to this point.
lifepsy: It would just be dealt with as a "puzzle" similar to the current puzzle of the Cambrian Explosion.
History is full of puzzles.
lifepsy: There are countless such rapid evolutionary jumps today on an anatomical level.
The Cambrian Explosion took millions of years, there is evidence of ancestral forms, and the rates are within known rates of evolution.
lifepsy: There are other common sense reasons that mammals are not found buried with fish, and that is the vast majority did not live underwater.
It has nothing to do with being "buried with fish", but the geological succession. Or are you saying geology is wrong too?
lifepsy: Just popping out little one-liners and avoiding the arguments.
They're not one-liners, but points to be addressed. For instance, we stated that the nested hierarchy is observed, and you pretended it didn't matter even though it's considered fundamental evidence for common descent.
Whatever we observe is what evolutionism predicted :rolleyes:
ReplyDelete"It's like saying you have to know what each and every particle does before you can explain air pressure."
ReplyDeleteMore of evolutionary genre trying to conflate different issues. Air pressure is, let's say, a quite known phenomenon with scientific ground. UCA in no way isn't in the same set. It was, and it remains, just a darwinist "mirage" (no real scientific validation then, and just more "mirages" added to the original "idea" along years of public inculcation).
Darcy: More of evolutionary genre trying to conflate different issues.
DeleteNo. We were addressing a specific point brought up by Jeff.
Darcy: Air pressure is, let's say, a quite known phenomenon with scientific ground.
So is evolution.
It is the Theory of Evolution not the Law of Evolution ( and never will be in its current state of disarray/ contradictions)
DeleteBy definition evolution is not a science because you cannot directly observe or test macro evolution.
Therefore predictions are limited & may not accurately represent the actual reality or fossil record.wrong predictions have been made & continues to be patchy / ad hoc in nature.
Z: Not all models are explanatory. However, theories are explanations.
ReplyDeleteJ: Then QT isn't a theory. It's math that models to some statistical accuracy certain observations.
Z: Of course there are. For instance, mutations happen.
J: But that doesn't help us determine whether UCA or SA is true. And that's the degree of ignorance of evolution CH is talking about. He's not making the absurd claim that descent with variation doesn't occur or that mutations aren't necessary conditions of much variation.
Z: Your position is equivalent to saying you have to know what each and every particle does before you can explain air pressure. That's simply not the case.
J: You can model without even knowing all the properties or quantity of the relevant particles. But that is not the same things as EXPLAINING (i.e., IMPLYING) effects/observations in terms of their properties and some initial conditions. So long as the implications of the model don't clearly contradict what we think we know about the particles, neither the model nor the theory about the nature of the particles need be assumed false. But they aren't necessarily the same thing unless entailed in the variables of the math are units corresponding to all the causal properties of the ontological theory.
Jeff: Then QT isn't a theory. It's math that models to some statistical accuracy certain observations.
DeleteThe terms are sometimes used interchangeably, but in the sense used above, mechanics refers to the how, theory refers to the why.
Jeff: But that doesn't help us determine whether UCA or SA is true.
That wasn't the question you asked. You do that alot.
Jeff: You can model without even knowing all the properties or quantity of the relevant particles. But that is not the same things as EXPLAINING (i.e., IMPLYING) effects/observations in terms of their properties and some initial conditions.
But we do have an explanation of air pressure, Kinetic Theory, and it doesn't require knowing what every particle does at every point in time.
Z: The terms are sometimes used interchangeably, but in the sense used above, mechanics refers to the how, theory refers to the why.
DeleteJ: The question of "how" is not intelligible apart from causality. Apart from causality, you could still have "when," but not "how."
Jeff: But that doesn't help us determine whether UCA or SA is true.
Z: That wasn't the question you asked. You do that alot.
J: I didn't ask a question. And yes, that's all this whole site is about--WHETHER there is evidence for UCA or some other hypothesis that means the same degree of radical evolutionary transformation has taken place in the posited time-frame. If you honestly think CH doesn't believe in evolution per se, you're really confused.
Z: But we do have an explanation of air pressure, Kinetic Theory, and it doesn't require knowing what every particle does at every point in time.
J: And yet you insist we can't even know an electron has correlative properties simultaneously. Not logically possible. The LNC rules it out. Correlative properties (like location and volume, location and velocity, volume and velocity, etc) are necessarily instantiated SIMULTANEOUSLY if they are instantiated at all. Otherwise, the LNC is invalid and no proposition has an intelligible, determinant meaning. The violation of the LNC at the propositional level is basically the violation of the law of identity at the being level. And without the law of identity, science can not be demarcated.
Jeff: The question of "how" is not intelligible apart from causality.
DeleteIn quantum mechanics, causality if a property of ensembles.
Jeff: I didn't ask a question.
Gee whiz, Jeff.
J: Thus far, you don't even have a model for biological variation that implies testable novel observations.
This is asking for a model of variation. Mutations are a model of biological variation that implies testable observations. You forgot your original request, then went on about whatever it is you go on about.
Jeff: And yet you insist we can't even know an electron has correlative properties simultaneously.
Technically, there's a fundamental limitation in complementary variables.
Jeff: Not logically possible. The LNC rules it out.
The Law of Noncontradiction doesn't rule any such thing. Just because you insist that location must have a well-defined value has nothing to do with classical logic. The world may or may not conform to your preconceptions. It's an empirical statement.
Z: This is asking for a model of variation. Mutations are a model of biological variation that implies testable observations.
DeleteJ: How many times do I have to tell you the obvious, dude. No one DENIES evolution or that mutations are necessary conditions of much evolution. What we deny is that there is evidence for UCA or radical transformational lineages in the posited time-frame, etc. We don't even claim we can falsify it, just like you can't falsify ID. We just say the obvious -- there is NO inductive evidence for UCA, etc.
Z: You forgot your original request, then went on about whatever it is you go on about.
J: Read the above comment. You and yours never seem to get what the argument is about. ID'ists, more than anti-ID'ists, believe in causality. We, more than y'all, believe in the validity of induction. That's why we understand what evidence MEANS in conventional language. I couldn't care less what you and Scott arbitrarily re-define evidence to mean.
Z: Technically, there's a fundamental limitation in complementary variables.
J: No one is arguing about what is limited "technically," Z. Technical limitations have nothing to do with epistemology, the meaning of evidence, etc.
Z: Just because you insist that location must have a well-defined value has nothing to do with classical logic.
J: Location per se is a generic concept that has no specific value. Location of a SPECIFIC electron, is, by definition, SPECIFIC.
Z: The world may or may not conform to your preconceptions. It's an empirical statement.
J: Z, you're utterly confused. To say that the "world" need not conform to your axioms is to say that you have no idea that there is a "world." You really are confused, dude.
Jeff: No one DENIES evolution or that mutations are necessary conditions of much evolution.
DeleteGood. Then we'll ignore your previous claim that there doesn't exist "a model for biological variation that implies testable novel observations."
Jeff: No one is arguing about what is limited "technically," Z.
Just making a clarification. You had said an electron "we can't even know an electron has correlative properties simultaneously". There are two problems. One, it isn't a matter of knowing. Uncertainty seems to be fundamental. Second, we can have simultaneous knowledge of both complementary variables within the limitations of the uncertainty principle.
Jeff: Location of a SPECIFIC electron, is, by definition, SPECIFIC.
Heh. If it's by definition, then it's arbitrary. Rather, there is an inherent uncertainty about the location of the electron given some knowledge of its momentum.
Where is the edge of the land. Do you stand in the surf and say this is the place? Is it at high-tide? Where the biggest waves crash? Where is a wave? At the peak? At the trough?
It's your definition that leaves you confused. You define the electron to be a mote of dust, and expect it to behave like a mote of dust. But it doesn't. It's your understanding that has to change, not the electron.
Jeff: To say that the "world" need not conform to your axioms is to say that you have no idea that there is a "world."
You're the one who is making axiomatic claims saying, "And yet you insist we can't even know an electron has correlative properties simultaneously. Not logically possible. The LNC rules it out."
Sorry the world doesn't conform to your preconceptions.
Z: Good. Then we'll ignore your previous claim that there doesn't exist "a model for biological variation that implies testable novel observations."
DeleteJ: Z, if you're truly moronic enough to think people are moronic enough to doubt whether mutations cause variation, I have no idea why you're debating here. CLEARLY we're talking about a model that predicts the lineages UCA'ists posit, not variation PER SE. For crying out loud!
Z: There are two problems. One, it isn't a matter of knowing. Uncertainty seems to be fundamental.
J: No it doesn't. The lack of an explanation per se can't mean the non-existence of one, else science is impossible. We don't pop in the world with explanations of things.
Z: Second, we can have simultaneous knowledge of both complementary variables within the limitations of the uncertainty principle.
J: That doesn't imply the uncertainty principle is a principle of reality. It's merely a modeling constraint for all you know.
Jeff: Location of a SPECIFIC electron, is, by definition, SPECIFIC.
Z: Heh. If it's by definition, then it's arbitrary.
J: No, Z. There are concepts that are not arbitrary in the sense that humans can't cease to use them. E.g., time, being, property, etc. All you're arguing for, if you reject even this, is radical skepticism. Which is just another way of saying science is arbitrary.
Z: Rather, there is an inherent uncertainty about the location of the electron given some knowledge of its momentum.
J: No, Z. The uncertainty is not known to have any ontological implications. You've already admitted as much. There are ALTERNATIVES that we can't rule out. We just don't have theories FOR those alternatives. But that doesn't falsify their existence.
Z: It's your definition that leaves you confused. You define the electron to be a mote of dust, and expect it to behave like a mote of dust.
J: On the contrary. Science is tentative. I don't define the electron to be anything when doing so doesn't explain reality. Rather, the "electron" is a word used to describe aspects of mathematical equations that MODEL certain observations. That's all it currently is. It may be a composite that decays, etc. We don't have a model of fundamental particles that implies all observations yet.
Z: You're the one who is making axiomatic claims saying, "And yet you insist we can't even know an electron has correlative properties simultaneously. Not logically possible. The LNC rules it out."
J: You're utterly confused, Z. All propositions that you assert indicatively are only conceivable as inferences, self-evident axioms, or bald pontifications. What would be the fourth category?
Z: Sorry the world doesn't conform to your preconceptions.
J: Sorry you can't distinguish between the definition of a tentative model and the definition of reality. What utter confusion you live in, dude.
Jeff: I have no idea why you're debating here.
DeleteWe were discussing what you explicitly stated.
Jeff: No it doesn't.
Tests of Bell's Inequality indicate that uncertainty is not a limitation of measurement.
Jeff: The lack of an explanation per se can't mean the non-existence of one, else science is impossible.
We were referring to the uncertainty principle. There may certainly be an underlying explanation, but that doesn't mean the universal conforms to your preconceptions.
Jeff: That doesn't imply the uncertainty principle is a principle of reality.
No, but tests of Bell's Inequality indicate that uncertainty is not a limitation of measurement.
Jeff: No, Z.
Definitions can be changed.
Jeff: There are concepts that are not arbitrary in the sense that humans can't cease to use them. E.g., time, being, property, etc.
Of course humans can and do cease to use them.
Jeff: All you're arguing for, if you reject even this, is radical skepticism.
Not at all. We just reject that your personal cognitive limitations in any way constrain the universe.
Jeff: There are ALTERNATIVES that we can't rule out.
Tests of Bell's Inequality seem to rule out alternatives. Of course, there could still be alternatives, but then again, there may not be. Your arguments, however, are vacuous.
Jeff: Rather, the "electron" is a word used to describe aspects of mathematical equations that MODEL certain observations.
Electrons are as real as tables and chairs.
Jeff: All propositions that you assert indicatively are only conceivable as {deductive} inferences, self-evident axioms, or bald pontifications.
Evidence from experience.
Z: We were discussing what you explicitly stated.
DeleteJ: People don't deny descent with modification. And only the most extremely uninformed are unaware that mutations are necessary conditions of much variation. No need to discuss that, Z.
Z: Tests of Bell's Inequality indicate that uncertainty is not a limitation of measurement.
J: How would you measure whether there are particles smaller in diameter than the smallest wavelength of light that we use? This is what I mean. We can test all hypotheses and therefore Bell's inequality doesn't prove what you think it does. Bell himself realized that.
Z: Definitions can be changed.
J: There either are or have been positive-volumed entities or not, Z. It does no good to deny even the law of identity.
Z: Of course humans can and do cease to use them.
J: Right. I run into people all the time that never use words like "then," "when," "after," "before," "because," "why," "what for," "how," "what," "which," "where," "there," "east," "west," .... What was I thinking?!
Z: Not at all. We just reject that your personal cognitive limitations in any way constrain the universe.
J: Then you don't know there's a universe. All people have cognitive limitations. You're really confused. You don't generate realities corresponding to your beliefs merely by articulating them. You're not God. Is this news to you?
Z: Tests of Bell's Inequality seem to rule out alternatives.
J: You've already admitted otherwise. Bell himself knew better.
Z: Of course, there could still be alternatives,
J: Then how do the tests "seem to rule out alternatives?"
Z: but then again, there may not be.
J: By your view, solipsism could be true. After all, your most fundamental axioms may not be true, per you. So what's your point?
Z: Your arguments, however, are vacuous.
J: All arguments are vacuous per your epistemology. Because you deny that the law of identity is knowably true.
Z: Electrons are as real as tables and chairs.
J: But by your view, there is no reason to believe tables and chairs are real. So, again, what's your point?
Jeff: All propositions that you assert indicatively are only conceivable as {deductive} inferences, self-evident axioms, or bald pontifications.
Z: Evidence from experience.
J: There's no such thing as positive evidence for the existence of actual memories or anything else once our most fundamental axioms (that we believe we remember) don't constrain reality. You're UTTERLY confused.
By "constrain reality," I meant, rather, "correspond to constraints OF reality." E.g., if our category of causality doesn't correspond to reality, then there may be no explanations at all. Deduction would be arbitrary having no known correspondence to real relations.
DeleteJeff: No need to discuss that, Z.
DeleteAs we said, we were discussing what you explicitly stated. We'll consider your statement withdrawn.
Jeff: There either are or have been positive-volumed entities or not, Z.
Or volume is not a well-defined property at the quantum scale. How long is the coast of Norway?
Jeff: Then you don't know there's a universe.
Your cognitive limitations don't limit other's knowledge of the universe.
Jeff: All people have cognitive limitations.
Sure, and people use science to extend their understand beyond their personal limitations.
Jeff: Then how do the tests "seem to rule out alternatives?"
Tests of Bell's Inequality are empirical. All such findings must be considered tentative.
Jeff: By your view, solipsism could be true.
Of course solipsism could be true.
Jeff: All arguments are vacuous per your epistemology.
Not at all.
Jeff: But by your view, there is no reason to believe tables and chairs are real.
That's why we used the construction we did. Electrons are as real as tables and chairs. If we agree that tables and chairs are real, then we should agree, based on the evidence, that electrons are real, that they exhibit both the properties of waves and particles, that they obey the uncertainty principle, just as chairs have certain properties.
Jeff: There's no such thing as positive evidence for the existence of actual memories or anything else once our most fundamental axioms (that we believe we remember) don't constrain reality.
You are welcome to your solipsism. Most people agree that tables and chairs are real. From there, they can reason together—even if they reject your metaphysics.
J1: We can test all hypotheses and therefore Bell's inequality doesn't prove what you think it does. Bell himself realized that.
DeleteJ2: That should have been "we CAN'T test all hypotheses and therefore ..."
Jeff: No need to discuss that, Z.
DeleteZ: As we said, we were discussing what you explicitly stated. We'll consider your statement withdrawn.
J: My statement isn't withdrawn. I just didn't realize you were so ignorant of what the debate is about.
Jeff: There either are or have been positive-volumed entities or not, Z.
Z: Or volume is not a well-defined property at the quantum scale.
J: Only conscious, conceptual minds "define," Z. The question isn't about what definition such a mind might make. It's what categories of thought are necessary and sufficient to the conception of definition per se and about temporal and spatial relations and extended beings in particular.
Z: How long is the coast of Norway?
J: That would depend on how you defined the "coast of Norway" and whether you had access to the means to measure it, given that definition.
Jeff: Then you don't know there's a universe.
Z: Your cognitive limitations don't limit other's knowledge of the universe.
J: Of course not. But if there isn't at least someone whose cognitive limitations correspond to what is possible, then no one can know what's possible. Are you actually saying there are scientists who have no cognitive limitations?
Jeff: All people have cognitive limitations.
Z: Sure, and people use science to extend their understand beyond their personal limitations.
J: No, Z. Science has axioms. It can't bring us to understand that 2+2 = 43. But feel free to get the word out to the public if you think so. That way all the subsidizers of your brand of insanity can have a good laugh at least.
Jeff: Then how do the tests "seem to rule out alternatives?"
DeleteZ: Tests of Bell's Inequality are empirical.
J: You can't know that if reality isn't constrained by your assumption that reality is classifiable into the empirical and non-empirical.
Jeff: Then how do the tests "seem to rule out alternatives?
Z: All such findings must be considered tentative.
J: How is it that every conclusion of every application of criteria a scientist applies as a "test" to assumed historical experiences (on the assumption that "the past" is a concept having something to do with reality) is tentative and yet one of them can still SEEM to rule out alternatives?
Jeff: By your view, solipsism could be true.
Z: Of course solipsism could be true.
J: What could count as positive evidence against it, in your opinion? Or what could count as positive evidence for the belief that there is at least one other being than you?
Jeff: All arguments are vacuous per your epistemology.
Z: Not at all.
J: Uh huh.
Jeff: But by your view, there is no reason to believe tables and chairs are real.
Z: That's why we used the construction we did. Electrons are as real as tables and chairs. If we agree that tables and chairs are real, then we should agree, based on the evidence, that electrons are real, that they exhibit both the properties of waves and particles, that they obey the uncertainty principle, just as chairs have certain properties.
J: Not at all. There is no model of fundamental particles that implies all observations. Thus, given the tentativeness of all scientific inference, we have no idea whether a model that implies all of our observations will be anything like the one we use to explain very limited numbers of observations.
But beyond that, implication itself requires that we use conceivable propositions. If a particle is defined to NOT be a wave, then to say an electron is simultaneously a particle and a wave is to deny the validity of the law of non-contradiction, which is to deny the law of identity, which is to render science and all else undefinable.
The only way out is to define a particle as HAVING some properties that waves have. But that wasn't the definition in use at the time when Einstein etal were contending against Bohr etal.
Jeff: There's no such thing as positive evidence for the existence of actual memories or anything else once our most fundamental axioms (that we believe we remember) don't constrain reality.
Z: You are welcome to your solipsism. Most people agree that tables and chairs are real. From there, they can reason together—even if they reject your metaphysics.
J: You have no way, per your epistemology, of knowing whether there ARE other people, Z. Much less what they do or agree about.
Jeff: My statement isn't withdrawn.
DeleteYour statement was "you don't even have a model for biological variation that implies testable novel observations." There are many testable models, including mutation, recombination, migration, assortative mating, etc.
Jeff: Only conscious, conceptual minds "define," Z.
Oh gee whiz.
well-defined, having clearly distinguishable limits, boundaries, or features
Jeff: That would depend on how you defined the "coast of Norway" and whether you had access to the means to measure it, given that definition.
So you can't give an unambiguous answer.
Zachriel: people use science to extend their understand beyond their personal limitations.
Jeff: No, Z.
Of course they do. That's rather the point.
Jeff: Science has axioms.
That doesn't change that people use science to extend their understanding beyond their personal limitations.
Jeff: How is it that every conclusion of every application of criteria a scientist applies as a "test" to assumed historical experiences (on the assumption that "the past" is a concept having something to do with reality) is tentative and yet one of them can still SEEM to rule out alternatives?
Because scientific claims are always considered tentative, no matter how well-established. However, some claims can be considered fact when 'confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent.'
Jeff: What could count as positive evidence against it, in your opinion?
Metaphysical solipsism is both irrefutable and indefensible.
Jeff: There is no model of fundamental particles that implies all observations.
There is no model of tables and chairs that implies all observations.
Jeff: If a particle is defined to NOT be a wave, then to say an electron is simultaneously a particle and a wave is to deny the validity of the law of non-contradiction, which is to deny the law of identity, which is to render science and all else undefinable.
But an electron is not just a wave, and not just a particle.
Don't have time to address much. So I'll address the one relevant to this site:
DeleteZ: Metaphysical solipsism is both irrefutable and indefensible.
J: So is every proposition if no propositions are self-evident. And even assuming the validity of deduction and induction, UCA is completely irrefutable and indefensible. So are the hypotheses:
1) Some apparent memories are actual memories.
2) Some apparent sense perceptions aren't illusions.
3) Some events are caused.
4) Some apparently-remembered satisfaction actually occurred in the past.
5) Some apparently-remembered dissatisfaction actually occurred in the past.
If those are neither self-evident nor testable, then nothing else is testable either. Naive falsificationism is impossible. And even inductive criteria are of no discernible value if no proposition is self-evident.
Jeff: So is every proposition if no propositions are self-evident.
DeleteAxioms don't have to be self-evident, merely adopted.
Jeff: And even assuming the validity of deduction and induction, UCA is completely irrefutable and indefensible.
To address that, you would have to give up your philosophical games.
Z: Axioms don't have to be self-evident, merely adopted.
DeleteJ: If it is not self-evident that some apparent memories are actual memories, and evident that an apparent memory of such an adoption is an actual memory, you have no idea whether any such adoption has ever occurred. Indeed, without the self-evident fact that past, present, and future ARE what we mean by those terms, "memory" has no intelligible meaning. You are an utterly confused person, Z. Do you have a hat to go with your ridiculous incessant pontifications?
Jeff: Indeed, without the self-evident fact that past, present, and future ARE what we mean by those terms, "memory" has no intelligible meaning.
DeleteOf course it does. It has meaning for those who have the memories. And for those who share the memories.
But you claim you don't know there ever have been memories. That would be (absurdly, in your opinion) imposing on "reality" a criteria of your own. And you insist this is not allowed. You apparently can't see that that is quintessential radical skepticism. But of course neither you nor anyone else can live that way. So you contradict yourself incessantly. Hence, it's no wonder you demonstrate an abysmal confusion as to how logic applies to science, and UCA in particular.
DeleteJeff: But you claim you don't know there ever have been memories.
DeleteSure. Last Thursdayism is self-consistent. It works for theists and non-theists alike!
Jeff: And you insist this is not allowed.
We didn't deny the necessity of fundamental axioms. We said "Axioms don't have to be self-evident, merely adopted."
Z: We didn't deny the necessity of fundamental axioms. We said "Axioms don't have to be self-evident, merely adopted."
DeleteJ: But if one has to "adopt" that one remembered that one "adopted" you've entered a vicious circle. IOW, even your CLAIM that you've adopted anything is untestable and utterly a-plausible. There's no getting off the ground that way.
In the meanwhile, Z, it is literally obvious that some beliefs SEEM to just form involuntarily, and that several of those beliefs are precisely those fundamental axioms that we use to explain ANYTHING at all with the characteristic of "plausibility." These beliefs are self-evident in THAT sense. We can't function without them and, therefore, don't ever utterly cease to use them. Only really confused people believe one can explain and do so in that way we call "plausibly" after denying the logical necessity of those so-called "self-evident beliefs" TO the intelligibility of PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATIONS.
In short, those very beliefs, as expressed in propositions, have to be TRUE as propositions for it to be TRUE that we can distinguish between the plausibility and the a-plausibility of hypothetical explanations. Short of that, you know absolutely nothing.
Z: Last Thursdayism is self-consistent. It works for theists and non-theists alike!
DeleteJ: If you don't even know you remember, Z, you never know what does or doesn't work. Z, this ain't hard. That's why most people don't even struggle with the concept of self-evident propositions. They realize that without them meaningful communication is not known to be possible, even by pure chance, even if it is.
Jeff: That's why most people don't even struggle with the concept of self-evident propositions.
DeleteNo, they don't. Not sure why you do.
I don't for the same reason they don't. We realize that apart from self-evident propositions, there is no such intelligible thing as warranted/plausible belief.
DeleteClueless atheists, like yourself, don't struggle with denying the existence of self-evident propositions because you are so confused you think you can (though you can't) atheistically account for the distinct necessary conditions that are sufficient for the distinct effects of warranted/plausible and UNwarranted/plausible beliefs. You can't even demarcate science. You're utterly clueless.
Jeff: Clueless atheists, like yourself,
DeleteWe're not atheist.
Jeff: you think you can (though you can't) atheistically account for the distinct necessary conditions that are sufficient for the distinct effects of warranted/plausible and UNwarranted/plausible beliefs.
Atheist and theist have to make the same fundamental assumptions.
Jeff: Clueless atheists, like yourself,
DeleteZ: We're not atheist.
J: You're not the relevant kind of theist either. Deism, process theism, and other non-atheistic isms can't account for plausible beliefs any better than atheism.
Z: Atheist and theist have to make the same fundamental assumptions.
J: If you contend that positing benevolent/competent design to account for the rational-orderliness of extra-ego reality isn't necessary to meaningfully demarcating science, then, no, we don't. Because apart from that, there is no such conceivable thing as "positive" evidence, just like Scott admits.
J1: But they aren't necessarily the same thing unless entailed in the variables of the math are units corresponding to all the causal properties of the ontological theory.
ReplyDeleteJ2: I should have included constants with the variables. The units are what is important for the correlation to the ontological theory. If there are spatial units, they have no correlation with an ontological theory if the ontological theory either denies the existence of 3-D-extended (i.e., POSITIVE-volume'd) at the modeled locations while also denying the consciousness of some psychological state "there" (like "localized" pain, e.g.).
Jeff: You're not the relevant kind of theist either.
ReplyDeleteAh, not Jeff flavored theism.
Jeff: If you contend that positing benevolent/competent design to account for the rational-orderliness of extra-ego reality isn't necessary to meaningfully demarcating science, then, no, we don't.
It only requires acknowledging the persistence of phenomena.
Z: Ah, not Jeff flavored theism.
ReplyDeleteJ: Right, the theism held by people who account for the existence of "positive" evidence." Why would I care about any other, for crying out loud?
Z: It only requires acknowledging the persistence of phenomena.
J: Apparently you don't know what "acKNOWLEDGE" means. How can you know what persists if no one knows whether they remember?
Jeff: How can you know what persists if no one knows whether they remember?
ReplyDeleteOf course people know within reason. It's just that classical logic requires axioms to stand in for these sorts of insights. Like this,
Given the persistence of sensory phenomena, the book is on the table where you left it.
Jeff: How can you know what persists if no one knows whether they remember?
DeleteZ: Of course people know within reason.
J: How so? Once you deny that ANY proposition can be self-evident to a mind, there's no way to posit any proposition more or less
plausible than any other. And since that includes the proposition that "Z remembers," there is no reason to believe you remember or, therefore, that anything persists.
Jeff: How so? Once you deny that ANY proposition can be self-evident to a mind, there's no way to posit any proposition more or less plausible than any other.
ReplyDeleteThe problem isn't in people, it's in your view of logic. People have no problem understanding that the book is on the table where they left it. It takes a great deal of artifice to consider this a problem. If you want a philosophical foundation, then simply adopt the axiom of persistence, and move on. If you don't, then don't. You're not hurting anyone.
Z: People have no problem understanding that the book is on the table where they left it.
ReplyDeleteJ: Of course not, because they're foundationalists.
Z: If you want a philosophical foundation, then simply adopt...
J: Note, you have to believe something foundationally to either know intuitively or infer THAT you can adopt or have adopted. You're utterly confused. This is why philosophers aren't troubled by silly confused people who call themselves scientists. Most philosophers, as nutty as many of them can be, aren't THAT confused about basic logic.
Jeff: you have to believe something foundationally to either know intuitively or infer THAT you can adopt or have adopted.
ReplyDeleteNo, you can adopt it anyway. But don't feel obligated or anything.
Wrong. Whether or not an adoption has occurred has no relevance to the question of whether one can KNOW an adoption has occurred. Unless, of course, foundationalism is true. If one can't know any proposition is true by virtue of it being self-evident, no inference from propositions has any knowable plausibility. You really need to read a logic book, dude.
DeleteJeff: If one can't know any proposition is true by virtue of it being self-evident, no inference from propositions has any knowable plausibility.
DeleteYou're conflating "true" and "plausible". We can never know anything with certainty.
Z: You're conflating "true" and "plausible". We can never know anything with certainty.
DeleteJ: Then we can never know with certainty that any proposition is more probable/plausible than another in any sense. This in turn means you know ABSOLUTELY nothing. This is exactly why Scott insists there is NO such knowable thing as POSITIVE evidence. He's right that atheism MEANS that. But he's wrong to think any sane person would care about his particular pontifications after admitting that epistemological show-stopper of atheism.
Jeff: Then we can never know with certainty that any proposition is more probable/plausible than another in any sense.
ReplyDeleteThat's right. We can never be certain.
Jeff: This in turn means you know ABSOLUTELY nothing.
No, it just means we can't be certain, but we can have plausible beliefs.
Your problem is that you want certainty, insist upon it, but you can't have it. If you want deductive certainty, you have to adopt arbitrary axioms. You want your parallel postulate or not? It's up to you.
Jeff: Then we can never know with certainty that any proposition is more probable/plausible than another in any sense.
ReplyDeleteZ: That's right. We can never be certain.
J: Then we can't be certain there is a way to distinguish between more or less plausibility.
Z: Your problem is that you want certainty, insist upon it, but you can't have it.
J: Me? Why do you keep asserting claims in the indicative mood? Dude, we ALL want to believe we can know HOW to distinguish between warranted and unwarranted beliefs SINCE we all DO make such distinctions. But apart from foundationalism, that's impossible. Because all beliefs are either intuitive (naturally-caused) or discursively/inferentially derived (voluntarily-caused). If there are none of the former that are knowable, there can be none of the latter. PERIOD! This is what ALL classical logic books admit. Now, if you can show me the discernable VALUE of non-classical logic to human flourishing, I'll look into it.
Jeff: Then we can't be certain there is a way to distinguish between more or less plausibility.
DeleteThat's right. There's no certainty. It's just something you have to learn to live with. Or you can shake your fist at the clouds.
Jeff: Then we can't be certain there is a way to distinguish between more or less plausibility.
ReplyDeleteZ: That's right. There's no certainty. It's just something you have to learn to live with. Or you can shake your fist at the clouds.
J: How is it that I "have" to do anything? Don't I have to exist to "have" to do something? Don't you deny that you can know anything? Including whether I exist? When you speak in the indicative mood, are you really meaning to use statements like, "well, assuming you exist (and, granted, there's no positive evidence for your existence), and assuming you will continue to exist (and, granted, there's no positive evidence for you will continue to exist), and assuming you will possess a capacity to 'learn to live with something' while you existing ((and, granted, there's no positive evidence for such a capacity), and ....?" Of course, the actual number of assumptions, given the falsehood of foundationalism, is astronomical when all the conceivable histories are considered.
Jeff: How is it that I "have" to do anything?
ReplyDeleteNo. You have a choice.
http://static4.wikia.nocookie.net/__cb20111002053618/simpsons/images/b/b1/Hi.jpg
Jeff: Don't you deny that you can know anything?
No. We said you can't have certainty. You can have plausible knowledge.
Jeff: When you speak in the indicative mood, are you really meaning to use statements like, "well, assuming you exist (and, granted, there's no positive evidence for your existence), and assuming you will continue to exist (and, granted, there's no positive evidence for you will continue to exist), and assuming you will possess a capacity to 'learn to live with something' while you existing ((and, granted, there's no positive evidence for such a capacity), and ....?"
There is evidence of existence, just not certain knowledge.
Jeff: Of course, the actual number of assumptions, given the falsehood of foundationalism, is astronomical when all the conceivable histories are considered.
Assume foundationalism if it makes you feel better.
Z: No. You have a choice.
DeleteJ: You can't know that. There is at least one classical logic alternative that has, per you, equal plausibility. And that's the claim that I have no choice. But if the LNC is invalid, which you grant to be equally probable as not, there may be an infinite set of alternative possibilities for all you know.
Z: We said you can't have certainty. You can have plausible knowledge.
J: But then you insist that I can't be certain that plausible knowledge exists.
Z: Assume foundationalism if it makes you feel better.
J: Foundationalism isn't a choice. It's inevitable for humans. One can't live any other way. One can only contradict oneself over and over by trying to deny it consistently with the claim that knowledge exists.
Jeff: You can't know that.
ReplyDeleteSure we do.
Jeff: But then you insist that I can't be certain that plausible knowledge exists.
No, you can't be certain.
Jeff: You can't know that.
ReplyDeleteZ: Sure we do.
J: Define knowledge such that the pope or some other theist doesn't know what he thinks he knows about the teleological nature of reality. Good luck.
Z: No, you can't be certain.
J: You're confusing "certainty," which is subjective, with "correct," which is objective (assuming the objective exists, which is what you deny we can know). If there is no "objective," then "subjective" has no meaning. For they are defined as contrary to one another.
Jeff: Define knowledge such that the pope or some other theist doesn't know what he thinks he knows about the teleological nature of reality.
ReplyDeleteThere's different kinds of knowledge, e.g. scientific knowledge.
Jeff: You're confusing "certainty," which is subjective, with "correct," which is objective (assuming the objective exists, which is what you deny we can know).
There's no perfect objectivity, but there are methods for improving objectivity. Your problem is black-and-white thinking.
Z: There's different kinds of knowledge, e.g. scientific knowledge.
ReplyDeleteJ: Just define "knowledge." Good luck.
Z: There's no perfect objectivity, but there are methods for improving objectivity.
J: Articulate how any methodology can knowably have anything to do with objectivity when the propositions that are required to define the methodology are themselves utterly a-plausible in the first place.
Z: Your problem is black-and-white thinking.
J: Your problem is thinking that criteria that aren't defined consistently with the LNC are intelligible. If a criteria doesn't rule out it's negation, you got nothing.
Jeff: Just define "knowledge." Good luck.
ReplyDeleteknowledge, information, understanding, or skill that you get from experience or education
Jeff: Articulate how any methodology can knowably have anything to do with objectivity when the propositions that are required to define the methodology are themselves utterly a-plausible in the first place.
Sorry, but just because you wave your hands doesn't mean everything ceases to have meaning for others.
Jeff: Your problem is thinking that criteria that aren't defined consistently with the LNC are intelligible.
The Law of Non-contradiction is a valuable tool, but still an abstraction. The universe isn't always amenable to dichotomies. Understanding this, we can know when and how to apply our tools.
Z: Jeff: Just define "knowledge." Good luck.
ReplyDeleteknowledge, information, understanding, or skill that you get from experience or education
J: It's all clear now. You define "knowledge" as "knowledge." And you say you're not a foundationalist! You're as confused as one can get.
Jeff: You define "knowledge" as "knowledge."
ReplyDeleteWe defined it in a way that most people would understand. Feel free to provide your definition.
Yes, Z. Even idiots know that knowledge is "knowledge." Thanks for that great enlightenment. Oh, and by the way, that's the law of identity that you claim you can transcend. But "we" appreciate that you condescend to the "world" of classical logic for "we" inferiors.
ReplyDeleteJeff: Oh, and by the way, that's the law of identity that you claim you can transcend.
ReplyDeleteWe didn't claim it to be an exact identity. That's a clue, by the way.
Zachriel: Feel free to provide your definition.
Jeff: Even idiots know that knowledge is "knowledge."
Feel free to provide your definition.
Jeff: Oh, and by the way, that's the law of identity that you claim you can transcend.
ReplyDeleteZ: We didn't claim it to be an exact identity. That's a clue, by the way.
J: You must be using non-classical logic. In classical logic, a definition has no discernible meaning if the same concept you're defining is listed in the definition itself. So I guess I'm back to my earlier question: In what cases does what you call "science" use non-classical logic, and what kind of human problems have been solved thereby?
Zachriel: Feel free to provide your definition.
Jeff: One can't prove there is knowledge. It can only be believed. And as such, knowledge is a species of belief that we distinguish from other species of belief. The minute you try to prove that knowledge exists, you have "entered into" radical skepticism and "can't get out." It's not logically doable.
So all one can do is determine if one shares axioms and criteria with another. You say there's different kinds of knowledge. In one sense that's correct. But I deny that knowledge can exist if the law of identity/LNC are not BONA-FIDE laws. You say otherwise.
So you and I can't have meaningful debate. So at that point, I want to know what criteria "scientists" use to determine when the LNC/LOI hold since you claim they have such criteria. And don't say it's about usefulness if you can't distinguish, via the LOI/LNC, the difference between useful and non-useful. That's just irrational non-sense. If you're really saying "scientists" have super-human cognitive capacities that I can't even meaningfully attribute to God, just say so, and we're done.
Jeff: You must be using non-classical logic.
ReplyDeleteMany, if not most, definitions are inexact equalities.
Jeff: In classical logic, a definition has no discernible meaning if the same concept you're defining is listed in the definition itself.
The word knowledge is not in the standard definition we provided.
Jeff: One can't prove there is knowledge. It can only be believed. And as such, knowledge is a species of belief that we distinguish from other species of belief.
That's a really bad definition, if that is what it is supposed to be.