More Insertion Site Preferences: A Reminder of Evolutionists Having it both Ways

New research is showing that P transposable elements have some interesting insertion site hotspots. Specifically, in the fly genome these transposons often show up in the promoter region of a few hundred seemingly unrelated genes. One common theme, however, is that many of the P element target sites serve as starting points for the DNA replication process that creates a duplicate copy of the genome prior to cell division. So there is a correlation, in this case, between the transposon insertion site preference and DNA replication. This finding has implications for how the P elements spread through a population. And it is yet another indication of, in contrast to evolution’s it’s-all-just-a-random-fluke view, how much really goes on under the hood. But this new twist on insertion site preferences also reminds us of evolution’s pretzel logic.

One way evolutionists try to avoid the many problems with their theory is to compare evolution with an alternative. Elliott Sober explains this in his book Evidence and Evolution, and you can see examples here, here and here.

The idea is to show how much more likely common descent is than the alternative. But in making this comparison, what evidence does Sober and the evolutionists use, and what alternative do they use?

Would you be shocked to learn that Sober and the evolutionists are highly selective? They avoid the many evidences that contradict common ancestry. And they use a strawman alternative which, for example, has no common mechanisms.

Not surprisingly the verdict of this kangaroo court is that common descent is a no-brainer—it is beyond a shadow of a doubt.

When challenged evolutionists say their strawman allows for no common mechanisms because—notwithstanding findings such as the transposon insertion site preferences discussed above—we don’t have evidence for common mechanisms on such a massive level.

True enough but if evidence of mechanisms were required then common ancestry would have been ruled out as well. In fact, evolutionists repeatedly explain that their proof does not entail explanations of exactly how common ancestry is supposed to have worked. The details, for the purposes of the proof, are not required. Regardless of the mechanics, evolutionists say common descent can be evaluated against the evidence, and compared to the alternative. But when it comes to hypothesizing an alternative, only known, fully established, mechanisms are allowed.

It is another example of the evolutionist’s pretzel logic. In order to prove common descent he has it both ways. The many contradictions to common descent are ignored, and a strawman alternative serves as the foil.

Religion drives science, and it matters.