Monday, January 13, 2014

We Have a Backup Sense of Smell to Protect the Lungs

Just Not That Smart

Our noses have specialized cells that give us a sense of the vapors around us by detecting the presence of chemicals and sending signals to the brain. New research is now explaining how our lungs also have such chemosensors. These sensors send signals not to the brain but to the nearby tissues causing a fast response, such as coughing and wheezing, when we inhale irritating or toxic vapors. Our lungs need this protection since they essentially are open to the external environment. As one evolutionist explained, “it makes sense that we evolved mechanisms to protect ourselves.” But such reasoning violates Occam’s Razor and reveals again how Aristotelianism lives on inside of evolution.

In science we must never multiply entities. That is, gratuitous explanations are not allowed. In this example of odor receptors in the lungs, there is no evidence that they evolved. Indeed, it is highly unlikely. We would have to believe that chance mutations caused odor receptors to be constructed at random locations around the body. And since these are chance mutations, we must also believe that other types of receptors would also be constructed. Furthermore, other types of cells (other than receptors) would be constructed. In short, a vast universe of possibilities would constantly be sampled by evolution. Light sensors, otherwise found in our eye, must have appeared on our big toe at some point in evolutionary history.

Evolution must have been sampling an astronomically large hyper-dimensional design space. Otherwise it never would have luckily constructed these odor receptors in our lungs.

But that is not all.

Having luckily constructed these odor receptors in our lungs (and in the right place in our lungs), there would have been precisely zero benefit. It would have made no difference because there would have been no signaling pathways, to the nearby tissues, for those receptors to excite. And those signaling pathways would have to, in turn, excite the correct type of response. It wouldn’t help much if the response, rather than coughing, would have been to breathe deeply.

With evolution we must believe that not only did it luckily construct the right kinds of receptors in the right place, but it also constructed the right kinds of signals and responses, so the entire system would work. Such an outcome is improbable.

So the evolution of these odor response systems in the lungs is not likely to have occurred. In fact, it is astronomically unlikely. It is not a scientifically motivated idea and it violates Occam’s Razor to say that “it makes sense that we evolved mechanisms to protect ourselves.” The correct scientific conclusion would be: “it makes sense that we have mechanisms to protect ourselves.”

And this leads us to another aspect of Aristotelianism within evolutionary thought.  Of course there is evolution’s incessant reliance on Aristotelianism’s teleological language. But there is also the use of explanations which, themselves, are in need of explaining. Saying that it “makes sense” that the lung’s odor response system evolved explains nothing and raises enormous questions about how that possibly could have evolved.

This is no different than Aristotelianism’s notorious “qualities” that Descartes bemoaned. A hot fire dried out a damp cloth because, Aristotelians explained, fire has the quality of dryness and heat. But these were nothing more than descriptive labels. The qualities did not explain how the fire dried the cloth. As Descartes later complained:

If you find it strange that … I do not use the qualities called “heat,” “cold,” “moistness,” and “dryness,” as do the philosophers, I shall say to you that these qualities appear to me to be themselves in need of explanation.

Likewise, if you find it strange that we do not use the mechanism called “evolution,” as do the philosophers, we shall say to you that this mechanism appears to us to be itself in need of explanation.

Nothing in biology makes sense in the light of evolution.

24 comments:

  1. To quote Lincoln: "If a man will stand up and assert, and repeat, and re-assert, that two and two do not make four, I know nothing in the power of argument that can stop him. I think I can answer the Judge so long as he sticks to the premises; but when he flies from them, I can not work an argument into the consistency of a maternal gag, and actually close his mouth with it."

    Science students and teachers may have to be emancipated from evolutionist plantation owners with something other than arguments.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Amen
    To have johnny on the spot mutations bring these sensors and then selection arrange and keep and refine them just as needed is asking for the impossible.
    The more they research about the inter relatedness of biology the more they will find that co evolving systems are NOT even possible nevermind the ordinary impossibility.
    its almost sad to see how evolutionary biology is being a human embarrassment concerning intellectual enquiry into nature.

    smell does into our memory and is therefore useful. however going towards the use of the lungs demands a true agenda to make this so.

    ReplyDelete
  3. I'm confused by this argument as well. Doesn't ID use "design" as an Aristotelianism quality as if "design" itself doesn't need an explanation?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Scott: I'm confused by this argument as well. Doesn't ID use "design" as an Aristotelianism quality as if "design" itself doesn't need an explanation?

      J: No, to say something is designed is to say that libertarianly-free causality was a necessary condition of the event being explained. Libertarian causality per se is not explicable, any more than a natural cause per se is explicable. Causes are what render explanations CONCEIVABLE. They can not BE explained. That would involve vicious circularity.

      Delete
    2. 30 seconds ago I chose to design a drug that cures cancer. According to you, I've just exercised my libertarianly-free will. Yet, I do not have a drug that cures cancer. The same can be said for hundreds of cancer researchers in the field who have been working on this problem for decades. Why is this the case?

      Regardless of how much we desire a cure, we do not possess the knowledge of how to transform raw materials into a drug that cures cancer. And when we do have a cure, it will be because we created the necessary knowledge.

      In the same sense, ID does not explain how some designer knew exactly how to choose the right genes would result in the right proteins that would result in the right biological adaptations it wanted. This is opposed to choosing genes that would result in some other biological adaptations or none at all. Nor does it explain how said designer actually knew how to change just some genes, but not others, in biological organisms.

      At which point, 'design', as it's being used, has an Aristotelianism quality because, apparently, you do not think this knowledge needs to be explained.

      This is why I keep pointing out that both creationism and ID greatly discount the role that knowledge plays in biological organisms. And, I would suggest this is, well, by design.

      Delete
    3. CH: But there is also the use of explanations which, themselves, are in need of explaining. Saying that it “makes sense” that the lung’s odor response system evolved explains nothing and raises enormous questions about how that possibly could have evolved.

      First, what of the enormous question about how the designer knew exactly which genes would result in the right proteins that resulted in just the right biological adaptations? Doesn't this need to be explained?

      This is in contrast to biological darwinism, which does explain the origin of this same knowledge: it was genuinely created via trial and error.

      Furthermore, it fits under the same umbrella as our current, best explanation for the universal growth of knowledge.

      Of course, if you think that knowledge in specific spheres comes from authoritative sources, then of course you would reject this explanation. And, in doing so, you've multiplied entities because you lack a universal explanation for the growth of knowledge.

      Finally, just because you have rejected an explanation, doesn't mean that one hasn't been provided.

      Delete
  4. In science we must never multiply entities.

    Not quite.

    The Razor warns us that we should not multiply entities beyond necessity. In other words, you need to show there is a good reason why some additional entity such as a god - is essential to your explanation.

    That is, gratuitous explanations are not allowed. In this example of odor receptors in the lungs, there is no evidence that they evolved.

    Hardly surprising there's no evidence given that they've only just been discovered.

    With evolution we must believe that not only did it luckily construct the right kinds of receptors in the right place, but it also constructed the right kinds of signals and responses, so the entire system would work. Such an outcome is improbable.

    Still sticking with the old tornado-in-a-junkyard line of attack?

    What's next? Challenge 'evolutionists' to come up with a credible explanation of how these receptors arose naturally, then dismiss all the conjectures as 'just so' stories?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I: The Razor warns us that we should not multiply entities beyond necessity.

      J: The Razor applies to hypothetico-deductive premises of explanation. As such, it applies to non-observed properties as well as entities. Since
      no one can yet articulate enough hypothetico-deductive premises to explain any UCA tree, the Razor is not applicable to the historical belief that UCA is true.

      I: In other words, you need to show there is a good reason why some additional entity such as a god - is essential to your explanation.

      J: Positing the relevant kind of "designer" is the only way that I've ever seen to EXPLAIN the EXISTENCE of plausible beliefs. Plausible beliefs are inductively derived beliefs. Without them, there is no way to distinguish between plausible beliefs/explanations and mere pontifications. Without such an explanation, you're epistemology is void of the intelligibility of plausibility.

      I: What's next? Challenge 'evolutionists' to come up with a credible explanation of how these receptors arose naturally

      J: Or challenge them to admit they have no naturalistic explanation for earth's biological history. If all they're trying to do is explain this or that without denying SA, and they can do that in a way that allows the subsidizers of the research to make useful predictions, no problem. But we all know that ain't what's going on.

      Delete
  5. Jeff:Positing the relevant kind of "designer" is the only way that I've ever seen to EXPLAIN the EXISTENCE of plausible beliefs.

    Deus ex Machina. How would this designer explain the existence of plausible beliefs?

    ReplyDelete
  6. V: How would this designer explain the existence of plausible beliefs?

    J: The only plausibility criteria that virtually all humans seem to use at least SOME of the time are inductive criteria. These criteria apply to explanations. They are the criteria of parsimony, breadth of explanation, etc, which are obviously related to human satisfaction (which, btw, most atheists absurdly deny has any relevance to truth whatsoever). This is why analogical explanation is so popular to the human mind -- because analogical extrapolation is a way of increasing BREADTH of explanation. But we've learned that corroborative tests are necessary to warrant extrapolations to some extent. But of course we couldn't have learned any such thing apart from foundationalism. For without foundationalism, we don't even know if real possibilities are limited to logical possibilities (which is what the law of non-contradiction means) or that we remember.

    So let's think through (which atheists virtually never do, since they can't seem to be radical skeptics any more than the different brand of theists can) what it means to MERELY eliminate inductive criteria as KNOWLEDGE. We certainly can't test them. And if they are invalid QUA criteria, then we are left with an infinite set of merely logically conceivable histories to which we have no KNOWN criteria to apply to them. This means knowledge not only doesn't exist foundationally, but it can't exist inferentially, either. For 1 divided by infinity is ZERO, which would be the only conceivable probability of any one of those histories being true APART from the validity of inductive criteria.

    But what, then, would EXPLAIN that the inductive criteria are valid after all? First of all, certain other axioms need to be true.

    1) Events have to be caused, since there are no criteria by which to test WHETHER an event is caused--remember the inductive criteria apply ONLY to explanations, not uncaused, merely-conceivable histories.

    2) Explanation has to have finality, else all events have an infinite explanation, and humans can't conceive of an infinite number of specific causes to know whether they imply, hypothetico-deductively, an event -- IOW, the only kind of human explanation that could be known to BE an explanation IS a finite explanation.

    3) Apparent memories are probably actual memories unless the inductive criteria indicate otherwise.

    4) Apparent memories occur (even this is denied as knowable by anti-foundationalists like Scott--if you don't believe me, ask him to define knowledge consistently with his denial of the existence of positive evidence).

    5) The law of non-contradiction is true.

    1), 2) and 5) alone imply design unless one can think of another way to account for finality of explanation of events we're conscious of. A sympathetic designer is required to account for 3) and 4) since inductive criteria are clearly used for their believed conduciveness to human SATISFACTION. And this is just another way of saying that discursive, inferential reasoning/deliberation is voluntary (until it becomes habit, at least), unlike intuition, which is natural. Take away design and you can't even account for 1) or 2). And yet design is an instance OF 1) & 2).

    In short, induction can only be known to "work" if benevolent teleology is true. Now, explain to me what I've missed.


    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Jeff: In short, induction can only be known to "work" if benevolent teleology is true.

      And we know Induction works? What of all the criticism of induction you haven't addressed? Oh, that's right, when pressed for details of how induction works, you end up describing conjecture and criticism, but calling it induction.

      Also, perhaps you can explain how Foundationalism actually solves any problem, such as knowing you actually have memories?

      Please be specific.

      Delete
    2. Scott: Oh, that's right, when pressed for details of how induction works, you end up describing conjecture and criticism, but calling it induction.

      J: Not quite. One could use a host of non-inductive criteria if one so chose. But that's not the relevant point. The point is that the only way any criteria could be known to "work" is IF foundationalism is TRUE. The application of criteria is always done deductively. This is just another way of saying that conclusions derive from premises. So, if all SINGLE premises are equally a-plausible to V (and that's what the denial of the existence of "positive" evidence would mean for him!!), absolutely NOTHING can be known by V. This is such simple logic that it's astounding that you can't see it. Please tell me tax-payers don't pay your salary!!!!!!

      Delete
    3. Scott: And we know Induction works? What of all the criticism of induction you haven't addressed? Oh, that's right, when pressed for details of how induction works, you end up describing conjecture and criticism, but [end up] calling it induction.

      Jeff: Not quite.

      You don't call it induction? You’ve addressed all of the criticisms of Foundationaism? Or what you describe when pressed for details isn't compatible with conjecture and criticism? why don’t you remind me, what is your criteria for determining which beliefs are basic.

      Jeff: The point is that the only way any criteria could be known to "work" is IF foundationalism is TRUE.

      So, Foundationalism does solve a problem? If so, how?

      Jeff: So, if all SINGLE premises are equally a-plausible to V (and that's what the denial of the existence of "positive" evidence would mean for him!!), absolutely NOTHING can be known by V.

      As a foundationalist, of course, you think that. The assumption that the denial of positive evidence means all premises are equally a-plausible is part of the idea that *is* Foundationaism. That’s what it means to *be* a Foundationalist. But, again, I’m not a Foundationalist. As such, claiming I think everting is equally a-plausable is mistaken. I don’t know why you’re having such a problem understanding this.

      Furthermore, any module ponens argument can be transformed into modus Tollens. Do you have any criticism of this? Or will you simply choose to ignore it again?

      Delete
    4. Jeff,:The only plausibility criteria that virtually all humans seem to use at least SOME of the time are inductive criteria.

      Then logically they must use something else for the remaining time

      These criteria apply to explanations. They are the criteria of parsimony, breadth of explanation, etc, which are obviously related to human satisfaction (which, btw, most atheists absurdly deny has any relevance to truth whatsoever)

      I don't believe any atheists deny that a simple answer can be satisfactory, and the breadth of the explanation needed depends on the question one is answering. More explanatory,more to explain

      This is why analogical explanation is so popular to the human mind -- because analogical extrapolation is a way of increasing BREADTH of explanation.

      Thor's hammer as an explanation for the thunder,for instance.

      But we've learned that corroborative tests are necessary to warrant extrapolations to some extent

      Sir Bedevere: There are ways of telling whether she is a witch.
      Peasant 1: Are there? Oh well, tell us.
      Sir Bedevere: Tell me. What do you do with witches?
      Peasant 1: Burn them.
      Sir Bedevere: And what do you burn, apart from witches?
      Peasant 1: More witches.
      Peasant 2: Wood.
      Sir Bedevere: Good. Now, why do witches burn?
      Peasant 3: ...because they're made of... wood?
      Sir Bedevere: Good. So how do you tell whether she is made of wood?
      Peasant 1: Build a bridge out of her.
      Sir Bedevere: But can you not also build bridges out of stone?
      Peasant 1: Oh yeah.
      Sir Bedevere: Does wood sink in water?
      Peasant 1: No, no, it floats!... It floats! Throw her into the pond!
      Sir Bedevere: No, no. What else floats in water?
      Peasant 1: Bread.
      Peasant 2: Apples.
      Peasant 3: Very small rocks.
      Peasant 1: Cider.
      Peasant 2: Gravy.
      Peasant 3: Cherries.
      Peasant 1: Mud.
      Peasant 2: Churches.
      Peasant 3: Lead! Lead!
      King Arthur: A Duck.
      Sir Bedevere: ...Exactly. So, logically...
      Peasant 1: If she weighed the same as a duck... she's made of wood.
      Sir Bedevere: And therefore...
      Peasant 2: ...A witch!

      For without foundationalism, we don't even know if real possibilities are limited to logical possibilities (which is what the law of non-contradiction means) or that we remember.

      I think it means we can't be sure of exactly what the logical possibilities are

      Delete
  7. Scott: Also, perhaps you can explain how Foundationalism actually solves any problem

    J: You're missing the point Scott. How, apart from foundationalism, can you know there ever has been a problem, much less a solution? That's impossible. This is why you can't define knowledge consistently with your denial of the existence of positive evidence. And when you can't even define your terms, your shooting blanks, dude. By your view, NO one can "know" anything.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Scott: Also, perhaps you can explain how Foundationalism actually solves any problem

      Jeff: How, apart from foundationalism, can you know there ever has been a problem, much less a solution?

      That’s the problem, Jeff. How does Foundationalism solve the problem of, well, knowing there is a problem? Please be specific.

      Delete
  8. Not knowing whether there is a problem is not a problem. Because if you're that ignorant, you couldn't know if you had a solution either.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Scott: Also, perhaps you can explain how Foundationalism actually solves any problem

      Jeff: How, apart from foundationalism, can you know there ever has been a problem, much less a solution?

      Scott: That’s the problem, Jeff. How does Foundationalism solve the problem of, well, knowing there is a problem? Please be specific.

      Jeff: Not knowing whether there is a problem is not a problem. Because if you're that ignorant, you couldn't know if you had a solution.

      So, we're back to where we started. Again, why do I need to accept foundationalism, if it doesn't solve any problems?

      Delete
    2. You don't "have" to accept foundationalism, Scott. You just DO use foundational categories. You think according to categories and criteria that are HUMAN. That's all you can do and still be claiming to be thinking anything relevant to HUMAN science.

      Delete
    3. It seems a recap is in order.

      Under Foundationalism, beliefs are dividend into two categories: non-basic and basic. On one hand, non-basic beliefs need to be justified by some other beliefs. Otherwise, we are not justified in holding them or knowing they are true. On the other hand, basic beliefs supposedly need no justification.

      In that context, my question to you is, what is your criteria for determining the boundary between beliefs that are non-basic, and need justification, and beliefs that are basic and supposedly need no further justification? Walk me though it.

      Nor is it controversially that I *use* ideas that you consider basic beliefs. The question is, what does it mean to know something and how do you know it ? That’s the field of epistemology is all about.

      Delete
    4. Scott: The question is, what does it mean to know something and how do you know it ?

      J: Indeed, Scott. That IS the question. So define "knowledge." And don't bother using the word "information" in the definition if you're not going to define "information." That's the source of your circularity. It needs resolving. Information IS knowledge in everyday parlance. Thus, information doesn't help define knowledge.

      Delete
    5. Scott: In that context, my question to you is, what is your criteria for determining the boundary between beliefs that are non-basic, and need justification, and beliefs that are basic and supposedly need no further justification? Walk me though it.

      Jeff:

      Not much of a surprise here.

      Jeff: Indeed, Scott. That IS the question. So define "knowledge." And don't bother using the word "information" in the definition if you're not going to define "information." That's the source of your circularity.

      Your objection is transparent, Jeff, as we have been over this several times before. You don’t want me to define information, because I’ve already pointed you to references, etc. What you want is for me to justify knowledge. And to do so by a definition of information that you will accept.

      As a Foundationalist, this comes a no surprise either.

      Delete
  9. Jeff: You don't "have" to accept foundationalism, Scott. You just DO use foundational categories.

    Tell me again, Jeff, what is your criteria for whether a belief is basic? Walk me though it.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. A category or criteria is considered basic to HUMANS (disregarding extreme cases of malfunction, etc) if the only way you know you can make sense of human words is by assuming they are using them.

      Note this means you've already used them to infer the EXISTENCE of humans. And this also means, despite your protestations, that apparent memories OCCUR and are KNOWN to occur. Otherwise, absolutely NOTHING is knowable.

      And this is the essence of your error. You think there is an alternative to foundationalism. There isn't. To claim all propositions are equally a-plausible is to imply that you could SIMULTANEOUSLY claim, with equal a-plausibility, that there is no such thing as criteria, memories, etc.

      Delete