I once debated an evolutionist who listed a dozen or so major areas of evidence he said proved evolution. The problem was each of the areas of evidence was problematic for evolution. True, one could find within those areas, as he did, supportive evidences. But the story was not so simple. In fact the areas of scientific evidence, when carefully examined from a theory-neutral perspective, reveal all kinds of problems for evolution. Is evolution false? Is it true? The answer is there are no easy answers. There certainly are substantial scientific problems with Darwin’s idea—that much we do know. If evolution is true then there is much we have to learn about science. But the scientific evidence can tell us something else, and with far more certainty. It tells us that we should not turn to evolutionists for a serious evaluation of the scientific evidence.
It is both shocking and disappointing how grossly evolutionists misrepresent science. This becomes painfully obvious when they, as with the evolutionist I debated, claim problematic areas of evidence as powerful proofs. Consider, for example, the findings of de novo genes.
One of the facts of biology that evolutionists claim as powerful supporting evidence is the many similarities in genes between the different species. There are many such similar genes, and they certainly do fall in the list of supporting evidence. But if such genomic similarities are powerful evidence for evolution, then what about the genomic differences?
There are, in fact, substantial genomic differences even between otherwise allied species. And it stands to reason that these evolutionary surprises would fall in the list of contradictory evidence, right?
Wrong. With evolutionists, all evidences support evolution, one way or another. Evolutionist Arthur Hunt, for instance claims that the findings of de novo genes refutes the notion that evolution alone can’t do the job “in no uncertain terms.” The idea that proteins can’t arise from scratch, explains Hunt, “is an illusion.”
And just how did evolution perform this feat? According to Hunt and the evolutionists, at some point in evolutionary history a segment of DNA recruited the machinery needed to begin coding for a protein. Fortunately that DNA segment contained the proper message so the resulting peptide was indeed a functioning protein. And of course subsequent mutations may have enhanced or modified the newly minted molecular machine.
There you have it. No details regarding how likely (or should I say unlikely) a non coding segment of DNA just happens to code for a functioning protein. No details on how often this would have to occur in order to evolution to get lucky.
Now don’t get me wrong—I’m not saying this evolutionary interpretation is impossible. I wasn’t there and, frankly, I don’t know enough to calculate the probabilities. (I don’t think any else does either which would explain why evolutionists haven’t provided them).
We do have some relevant experimental data. A functioning protein arising from a random DNA sequence of about 400 base pairs is extremely unlikely. Even shorter sequences need millions upon millions of tries to get anything even slightly functional.
But of course mere function isn’t good enough in the evolutionary world. Becoming fixed in the population requires useful function, or luck, or some combination of the two. And then there is the recruitment of the machinery to make the sequence code for a protein. How many times would that have to occur, and what are the probabilities?
Impossible? Certainly not, but we’re a long way from certainty. Unfortunately, certainty is precisely what Hunt and the evolutionists have. We can argue about what the scientific evidence implies, but it does not give us certainty about questions of origin. We are simply nowhere close to the evolutionist’s claim that their theory is a fact just as much as is gravity.
The claims of evolutionists are both shocking and disappointing. We scientists have the serious responsibility of public trust. Others depend on us for a fair and honest assessment of what the scientific evidence reveals—and what it doesn’t reveal. We do them, and science, an injustice by providing anything less.