tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post813452279400456044..comments2024-01-23T02:32:28.567-08:00Comments on Darwin's God: Problems With the Canonical Giant-Impact Model of Moon EvolutionUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger79125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-79769858500248626382014-01-23T18:14:56.529-08:002014-01-23T18:14:56.529-08:00Jeff: But you must, to be consistent, say that &qu...Jeff: But you must, to be consistent, say that "it might not have utility."<br /><br />Z: Sure.<br /><br />J: We've made head way. Let's stick with it. Can one know it's more probable that it HAS utility than that it DOESN'T? As I'm understanding you, you would have to say no. And with that "no" is the end of any reason to argue. For one can never find positive evidence for anything, just as Scott admits.<br /><br />Z: The evidence suggests the existence of the universe.<br /><br />J: Define evidence and how explain such that the definition explains HOW it "suggests" anything whatsoever.<br /><br />Z: However, you can't argue about the universe from a strictly LOGICAL point of view. There has to be the experience of fire, of passion. An isolated mind with no sensory input is not capable of understanding the universe. <br /><br />J: You're confused. A "sense" can consistently be defined as a class of sentient experience, implying nothing about stuff "out there." You've already admitted this in earlier discussions. But this means there can never BE positive evidence for "stuff out there" unless inductive criteria and it's axioms are simply KNOWN to be true.<br /><br />It matters not whether we know anything, Z. We BELIEVE we do. And since all beliefs are only conceivable to us as premises or derived inferences/conclusions, SOME of the premises must be believed to be KNOWN intuitively to render intelligible the distinction between more or less plausible DERIVED beliefs. It matters not whether this is all illusory. The very INTELLIGIBILITY of the distinction requires the relevant fundamental BELIEFS. <br /><br />In short, we have to BELIEVE we know certain things to get the very INTELLIGIBILITY of the distinction between more or less plausibility of other DERIVED beliefs, whether or not this is all illusory. And that's all foundationalism means.<br /><br />You are insisting that we must BELIEVE that we DON'T have WARRANTED belief. But then what's to argue about? It's over at that point. Because there's no way to non-arbitrarily distinguish between more or less plausible/probable DERIVED conclusions. But an arbitrary distinction, by definition, has nothing to do with what we MEAN by plausible/probable and warranted. Why would I care about your (assuming a-plausibly and therefore contra parsimony that you exist!) arbitrariness over my own?<br />Jeffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16852362499722076519noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-67305493465896004062014-01-22T05:34:55.940-08:002014-01-22T05:34:55.940-08:00Jeff: But you must, to be consistent, say that &qu...<b>Jeff</b>: <i>But you must, to be consistent, say that "it might not have utility." </i><br /><br />Sure. <br /><br /><b>Jeff</b>: <i>And you must, to be consistent, add that it's impossible to ever determine which is true. </i><br /><br />That's only a problem because you can't deal with uncertainty. <br /><br /><b>Jeff</b>: <i>Which is another way of saying you have no idea whether there's a universe. </i><br /><br />There you go again with your black-and-white thinking. The evidence suggests the existence of the universe. If it bothers you, just add "Given the existence of the universe" as a suffix to any declarative sentence. <br /><br /><b>Jeff</b>: <i>Thus, there is no way to influence another mind LOGICALLY by your approach. </i><br /><br />Of course there is. However, you can't argue about the universe from a strictly LOGICAL point of view. There has to be the experience of fire, of passion. An isolated mind with no sensory input is not capable of understanding the universe. <br />Zachrielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16081260898264733380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-37441040225226041142014-01-21T17:31:24.224-08:002014-01-21T17:31:24.224-08:00Jeff: Arbitrary axioms don't render anything c...Jeff: Arbitrary axioms don't render anything certain.<br /><br />Z: Of course not. But it may have utility.<br /><br />J: But you must, to be consistent, say that "it might not have utility." And you must, to be consistent, add that it's impossible to ever determine which is true.<br /><br />Z: The Law of Non-contradiction divides the universe into exactly two distinct parts. It's handy to think that way, but the universe doesn't have to go along with you just because it's easier for you to think about it. <br /><br />J: Which is another way of saying you have no idea whether there's a universe. And I agree. You don't. So why are you arguing? You can never demonstrate that any proposition has positive evidence in its favor. Thus, there is no way to influence another mind LOGICALLY by your approach. So what are you appealing to other than my mind since you have no intellectual argument FOR anything.Jeffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16852362499722076519noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-86366480498626472882014-01-21T05:20:23.215-08:002014-01-21T05:20:23.215-08:00Jeff: Arbitrary axioms don't render anything c...<b>Jeff</b>: <i>Arbitrary axioms don't render anything certain.</i><br /><br />Of course not. But it may have utility. <br /><br /><b>Jeff</b>: <i>An axiom isn't even intelligible without using the LNC as a principle. </i><br /><br />The Law of Non-contradiction divides the universe into exactly two distinct parts. It's handy to think that way, but the universe doesn't have to go along with you just because it's easier for you to think about it. <br /> <br />Zachrielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16081260898264733380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-70336128624441028272014-01-20T17:55:51.388-08:002014-01-20T17:55:51.388-08:00Z: Your problem is that you want certainty, insist...Z: Your problem is that you want certainty, insist upon it, but you can't have it.<br /><br />J: It doesn't matter what I have or want. What matters is what we do and whether it's explicable. That's only knowable if foundationalism is true. One can't even CONCEIVE of the falsehood of foundationalism without using the LNC as a supposed ground of the intelligibility of that idea.<br /><br />Z: If you want deductive certainty, you have to adopt arbitrary axioms. <br /><br />J: Arbitrary axioms don't render anything certain. An axiom isn't even intelligible without using the LNC as a principle. There isn't a classical logic book in the world that says what you're saying. Hence, you are not at all talking about ACTUAL deduction and its believed significance to human thought. <br /><br />As for non-classical logic, you have yet to give me an example of its claims or its demonstrated utility.Jeffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16852362499722076519noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-49740367838146542982014-01-20T12:59:47.151-08:002014-01-20T12:59:47.151-08:00Jeff: Only if you can simply KNOW that distinction...<b>Jeff</b>: <i>Only if you can simply KNOW that distinctions between more and less plausibility correspond to reality. </i><br /><br />Your problem is that you want certainty, insist upon it, but you can't have it. If you want deductive certainty, you have to adopt arbitrary axioms. You want your parallel postulate or not? It's up to you. <br />Zachrielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16081260898264733380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-43955688540139494242014-01-19T20:02:08.957-08:002014-01-19T20:02:08.957-08:00Z: Of course it's knowable in the sense of pla...Z: Of course it's knowable in the sense of plausible. There is no certainty. <br /><br />J: Only if you can simply KNOW that distinctions between more and less plausibility correspond to reality. But you insist you don't possess such foundational knowledge. Nor can you prove it from a-plausible premises.Jeffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16852362499722076519noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-2049848248992128472014-01-19T10:25:04.264-08:002014-01-19T10:25:04.264-08:00Jeff: But since "I have the capacity to adopt...<b>Jeff</b>: <i>But since "I have the capacity to adopt assumptions" is not a knowable proposition (if foundationalism is false), it is mere pontification to say "you can adopt it or not." </i><br /><br />Of course it's knowable in the sense of plausible. There is no certainty. <br />Zachrielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16081260898264733380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-45857867557542114252014-01-19T08:33:00.991-08:002014-01-19T08:33:00.991-08:00Jeff: since you insist that foundationalism is fal...Jeff: since you insist that foundationalism is false<br /><br />Z: It's an arbitrary assumption. You can adopt it or not. <br /><br />J: But since "I have the capacity to adopt assumptions" is not a knowable proposition (if foundationalism is false), it is mere pontification to say "you can adopt it or not." So is "science" JUST another set of bald pontifications? And if so, why is it any more defensible than any other set? <br /><br />You're not saying enough to demarcate science from what you call non-science such that science is recognizably valuable. Indeed, nothing IS recognizable as valueable if the claim "I have the capacity to recognize" is, itself, a bald pontification.<br /><br />You can't test the axioms that ground the intelligibility of "tests."Jeffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16852362499722076519noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-63563287546111557732014-01-18T10:18:21.123-08:002014-01-18T10:18:21.123-08:00Jeff: since you insist that foundationalism is fal...<b>Jeff</b>: <i>since you insist that foundationalism is false</i><br /><br />It's an arbitrary assumption. You can adopt it or not. <br />Zachrielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16081260898264733380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-91058736391461715702014-01-18T09:25:56.334-08:002014-01-18T09:25:56.334-08:00Z: Awareness occurs in the moment.
J: Awareness ...Z: Awareness occurs in the moment. <br /><br />J: Awareness requires positive duration. <br /><br />Now, since you insist that foundationalism is false, how do you argue that I'm wrong?Jeffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16852362499722076519noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-49874214024782029092014-01-18T07:46:49.929-08:002014-01-18T07:46:49.929-08:00So one can be aware for a duration of precisely 0?...So one can be aware for a duration of precisely 0? How could you know that?Jeffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16852362499722076519noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-51503340284164306972014-01-17T11:23:26.848-08:002014-01-17T11:23:26.848-08:00Jeff: How can you be aware when 1) awareness is in...<b>Jeff</b>: <i>How can you be aware when 1) awareness is inconceivable unless it occurs with a positive duration</i><br /><br />http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D58LpHBnvsI<br />Awareness occurs in the moment. <br />Zachrielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16081260898264733380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-29607237989737175502014-01-17T07:37:09.166-08:002014-01-17T07:37:09.166-08:00How can you be aware when 1) awareness is inconcei...How can you be aware when 1) awareness is inconceivable unless it occurs with a positive duration, and 2) a positive duration implies the need for MEMORY, and 3) you deny that the claim that memories occur is self-evident?! Dude, there's NO way around foundationalism if there is such a thing as knowledge. If we claim we can distinguish between beliefs that are knowledge and those that aren't, you need distinct necessary/sufficient conditions (i.e., causes) for that. <br /><br />Benevolent/competent teleology is what can conceivably account for that distinction. Nothing else can. Of course, I'm all ears if you have hypothetico-deductive premises that account for that distinction which are independently known to be true. Good luck.Jeffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16852362499722076519noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-7018369620862636572014-01-16T09:54:01.709-08:002014-01-16T09:54:01.709-08:00Jeff: If you're not aware of having experience...<b>Jeff</b>: <i>If you're not aware of having experienced an apparent memory, what would make you think you've had a sensation at all, much less one that you could make further assumptions about? </i><br /><br />Of course you're aware of the sensation. One might quibble as to what to make of it. <br />Zachrielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16081260898264733380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-54635724500441287162014-01-16T09:27:04.543-08:002014-01-16T09:27:04.543-08:00J: Jeff: I assume by "sensation of memory&quo...J: Jeff: I assume by "sensation of memory" that you mean you experience apparent memories involuntarily. But how would you know the claim/proposition you made is true <br /><br />Z: You can't. You might be a brain in a vat. So you have a choice of assuming your sensations are a reflection of something real and building from there, or not.<br /><br />J: If you're not aware of having experienced an apparent memory, what would make you think you've had a sensation at all, much less one that you could make further assumptions about?Jeffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16852362499722076519noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-32835175715317509312014-01-15T11:37:07.412-08:002014-01-15T11:37:07.412-08:00Jeff: I assume by "sensation of memory" ...<b>Jeff</b>: <i>I assume by "sensation of memory" that you mean you experience apparent memories involuntarily. But how would you know the claim/proposition you made is true </i><br /> <br />You can't. You might be a brain in a vat. So you have a choice of assuming your sensations are a reflection of something real and building from there, or not. <br /> Zachrielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16081260898264733380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-83554162469560780102014-01-15T06:11:24.318-08:002014-01-15T06:11:24.318-08:00Jeff: But you deny you know you remember.
Z: We d...Jeff: But you deny you know you remember.<br /><br />Z: We did no such thing! People have a sensation of memory. You can try to ignore your memory or you can embrace it!<br /><br />J: I assume by "sensation of memory" that you mean you experience apparent memories involuntarily. But how would you know the claim/proposition you made is true since you deny the self-evidentiality of EVERY proposition? This is what I mean by my claim that atheists do learn by contradicting themselves constantly. They deny foundationalism, and then turn around and think JUST like a foundationalism. <br /><br />So the real question, to those of us who are sane, is, "who posits the least to explain the most?" And since you, as an atheist, can't even rule out counter-inductive conceptions of extra-ego "reality," a benevolent/competent theism that is articulated to explain the validity of human inductive criteria wins that question HANDS DOWN.<br />Jeffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16852362499722076519noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-24020201318701855812014-01-13T09:06:41.636-08:002014-01-13T09:06:41.636-08:00Jeff: But you deny you know you remember.
We did...<b>Jeff</b>: <i>But you deny you know you remember. </i><br /><br />We did no such thing! People have a sensation of memory. You can try to ignore your memory or you can embrace it! <br /><br /><br />Zachrielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16081260898264733380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-60957722534330791162014-01-13T04:23:52.350-08:002014-01-13T04:23:52.350-08:00Z: No. Just adopt it as a fundamental.
J: But yo...Z: No. Just adopt it as a fundamental. <br /><br />J: But you deny you know you remember. So you would never know whether you "adopted" anything.<br /><br />Jeff: So why would you assume you have a history at all?<br /><br />Z: Why not? It's fun and productive! <br /><br />J: But you claim you don't know you've ever remembered having fun or any other experience. So how could you know whether you've ever experienced fun, much less due to some particular state of affairs (seeings how you deny knowing any state is caused by other states).Jeffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16852362499722076519noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-18765777544146439532014-01-12T12:28:05.290-08:002014-01-12T12:28:05.290-08:00Jeff: But a sentient experience per se isn't a...<b>Jeff</b>: <i>But a sentient experience per se isn't a "reflection" of anything. One must INFER that it is.</i><br /><br />No. Just adopt it as a fundamental. <br /><br /><b>Jeff</b>: <i>So why would you assume you have a history at all? </i><br /><br />Why not? It's fun and productive! <br />Zachrielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16081260898264733380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-77815019585636572612014-01-12T06:31:19.304-08:002014-01-12T06:31:19.304-08:00Z: We might make the assumption that our sensation...Z: We might make the assumption that our sensations are reflections of "reality".<br /><br />J: But a sentient experience per se isn't a "reflection" of anything. One must INFER that it is. What would be the premises of that inference? Also, you deny that any proposition is self-evident. That would include the proposition, "Apparent memories have occurred," and "Some apparent memories are actual memories." So why would you assume you have a history at all? It's not like you need to explain anything, because you deny that the proposition, "Some events are caused," is knowable.<br /><br />Z: One doesn't deduce memories. One experiences them. <br /><br />J: You deny that claim is self-evident. And it's utterly impossible to prove it once you deny the existence of self-evident propositions. IOW, I could say "Nothing ever deduces or experiences memories or apparent memories," and you have no evidence to the contrary.Jeffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16852362499722076519noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-49808305642346877282014-01-11T14:28:49.980-08:002014-01-11T14:28:49.980-08:00We might make the assumption that our sensations a...We might make the assumption that our sensations are reflections of "reality". Zachrielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16081260898264733380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-83061371607511295872014-01-11T14:08:10.038-08:002014-01-11T14:08:10.038-08:00Then articulate the necessary conditions that, whe...Then articulate the necessary conditions that, when stated as propositions, IMPLY that plausible/warranted belief occurs. Surely you see why you can't do that when you admit you can't even account for memory per se. What you call beliefs are indistinguishable from a-plausible, unwarranted beliefs.<br /><br />And theists can't prove THAT there are such things AS plausible/warranted beliefs. They can, however, posit necessary conditions for their existence. Atheists can do neither.Jeffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16852362499722076519noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-57759887282202469952014-01-11T12:24:06.293-08:002014-01-11T12:24:06.293-08:00Jeff: One can't deduce that memories occur exc...<b>Jeff</b>: <i>One can't deduce that memories occur except by positing premises that, per atheism, are no less seemingly implausible than premises that imply memories DON'T occur.</i><br /><br />One doesn't deduce memories. One experiences them. <br />Zachrielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16081260898264733380noreply@blogger.com