tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post9201231102224430116..comments2021-05-01T07:49:11.014-07:00Comments on Darwin's God: Evolution: A One-in-a-Billion ShotUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger48125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-8506516034362915782010-03-27T08:40:31.866-07:002010-03-27T08:40:31.866-07:00I agree with Cornelius insofar as this particular ...I agree with Cornelius insofar as this particular discussion was about probability calculations pertaining to scientific inference, not about metaphysics. I enjoyed the exchange, perhaps there will be a continuation in the future. Thanks for the link. Cheers!peter olofssonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14068502250814188023noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-35610553033121494942010-03-26T17:27:46.281-07:002010-03-26T17:27:46.281-07:00nano:
=====
Speaking of having it both ways, I ca...nano:<br /><br />=====<br />Speaking of having it both ways, I can's comment on your stats, but the methodology you're employing here seems remarkably similar to that employed by SOber in the PNAS paper you are always touting. THere, he uses the two competing hypotheses of separate and common descent and says that as separate descent becomes less likely, common descent becomes more likely. you claim that this shows evolution is a metaphysical theory because some hypotheses of separate descent (such as those espoused by Answers in Genesis) are based on religious tenets.<br />=====<br /><br />The arguments for evolution are *explicitly* metaphysical and religious. This isn't a "claim" I'm making. You are promoting a religious theory that is contradicted by the science.<br /><br /><br />====<br />Yet here you are comparing evolution and design, when some hypotheses of design (for example Dembski's ideas) are based on religious tenets . is your methodology now metaphysical as well? you can't have it both ways.<br />====<br /><br />That was peter o's scenario that I was responding to. And more importantly, the calculation was driven by scientific problems with evolution.Cornelius Hunterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12283098537456505707noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-61561376414208776192010-03-26T17:21:04.383-07:002010-03-26T17:21:04.383-07:00peter olofsson:
Yes, I agree that a Bayesian appr...peter olofsson:<br /><br />Yes, I agree that a Bayesian approach can't get you very far in problems like these. But false predictions ought to count (as I know you agree). I take a different approach here:<br /><br />www.DarwinsPredictions.com<br /><br />where I evaluate the reaction of evolutionary theory to the falsified expectations. Obviously there are times when a falsified prediction does a theory little harm, but other times when there really is a fundamental problem. This becomes rather obvious in the adjustments the theory must make in reaction to the observation.Cornelius Hunterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12283098537456505707noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-13084694376487694232010-03-26T17:11:08.512-07:002010-03-26T17:11:08.512-07:00Very good, always nice to agree on something. Anyw...Very good, always nice to agree on something. Anyway, I think your main problem is not so much in the math as in the philosophy; how can one reasonably assign probabilities such as P(O|D) which are, invariably, needed for any upper bounds.peter olofssonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14068502250814188023noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-6485490929590675772010-03-26T16:52:28.124-07:002010-03-26T16:52:28.124-07:00peter olofsson.
====
We're talking about the ...peter olofsson.<br /><br />====<br />We're talking about the ratio P(O|E)/P(O) per your original post, nothing else. This is the quantity I showed to be at least 0.91, with my proposed probabilities. Now you are computing something else. Let's stay focused.<br />====<br /><br />Of course, with your proposed probabilities, P(O|E)/P(O) is at least 0.91.Cornelius Hunterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12283098537456505707noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-86177598868040807712010-03-26T16:12:04.271-07:002010-03-26T16:12:04.271-07:00We're talking about the ratio P(O|E)/P(O) per ...We're talking about the ratio P(O|E)/P(O) per your original post, nothing else. This is the quantity I showed to be at least 0.91, with my proposed probabilities. Now you are computing something else. Let's stay focused.peter olofssonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14068502250814188023noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-37954223649476918642010-03-26T15:19:02.594-07:002010-03-26T15:19:02.594-07:00peter olofsson:
==========
(1) If a number is at ...peter olofsson:<br /><br />==========<br />(1) If a number is at least 0.91, it is mathematically impossble that it is less than 0.2. I stand dogmatically by this statement until you prove me wrong. :)<br />==========<br /><br />That seems strange. After an observation, P(E) is reduced, so P(D) increases. After several observations the ratio reduces below 0.2. For example, the dominant terms become:<br /><br />P(E|O) = [ P(O|E) / P(O|D) / [1 - P(E)] ] * P(E)<br /><br />so the ratio might be:<br /><br />P(O|E) / P(O|D) / [1 - P(E)] <br /><br />= 0.01 / 0.1 / 0.9 = 0.11 < 0.2<br /><br />Much lower values are possible with easily feasible, higher values of P(O|D) and lower values of P(O|E).Cornelius Hunterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12283098537456505707noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-37288828180863337842010-03-26T14:24:18.416-07:002010-03-26T14:24:18.416-07:00Cornelius,
(1) If a number is at least 0.91, it i...Cornelius,<br /><br />(1) If a number is at least 0.91, it is mathematically impossble that it is less than 0.2. I stand dogmatically by this statement until you prove me wrong. :) <br /><br />(2) Now, you are the one who suggested a "very high" value of P(E) and a "quite low" value of P(O|E). I chose 0.999 and 0.01 for the sake of argument (you suggested P(O|E)=0.1 but nothing for P(E); I assume "very high" is more extreme than "quite low"). If you don't like my choice of numbers, provide your own. Please suggest a "very high" value of P(E), a "quite low" value of P(O|E) that gives a ratio <br />P(O|E)/P(O) that is "well below 0.2." <br /><br />(3) Again, my bound is a LOWER bound so it is useless to your type of conclusion.peter olofssonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14068502250814188023noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-23454353942926935272010-03-26T13:49:29.683-07:002010-03-26T13:49:29.683-07:00peter olofsson:
============
2. It is AT LEAST 0...peter olofsson:<br /><br /><br />============<br />2. It is AT LEAST 0.91. You cannot achieve anything with LOWER bounds, you need upper bounds. Interestingly, you still do not seem to acknowledge that your "conservative" value of 0.2 is mathematically impossible.<br />============<br /><br />No, 0.2 is not mathematically impossible. It is conservative given the high confidence of the evolutionary predictions. How does that work in your example? Yes, the ratio is "AT LEAST 0.91" when P(D) has that small value. But in your scenario, it grows as P(E) reduces, because they are complementary. So the ratio reduces well below 0.2.<br /><br /><br />============<br />By the way, thanks for letting me discuss these issues at your blog!<br />============<br /><br />Absolutely, you are always welcome.Cornelius Hunterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12283098537456505707noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-76377532899568203902010-03-26T12:40:54.879-07:002010-03-26T12:40:54.879-07:00Clarification of (2) above: You claimed that P(O|E...Clarification of (2) above: You claimed that P(O|E)/P(O) is at most 0.2; I proved that it is at least 0.91.peter olofssonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14068502250814188023noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-2069494200675214912010-03-26T12:36:29.756-07:002010-03-26T12:36:29.756-07:001. What constitues a "conservative" boun...1. What constitues a "conservative" bound is in this context completely arbitrary. Why is P(O|D)=0.1? Why not 0.001 or 0.00000000000001 or something else? What is D anyway? The only conditional probability you can even hypothetically hope to estimate is P(O|E) since E(volution) is defined via mutation and selection which is a stochastic process, allowing for probability calculations, at least in theory. Practically, it's very difficult though, depending on what O is. To get to P(O|D) you need to specify what D is and what probability it confers on O, not just arbitrarily claim that a value of 0.1 is "good enough."<br /><br /><br />2. It is AT LEAST 0.91. You cannot achieve anything with LOWER bounds, you need upper bounds. Interestingly, you still do not seem to acknowledge that your "conservative" value of 0.2 is mathematically impossible. <br /><br />3. I agree, multiple false predictions should count somehow. I just don't see much promise in using Bayes' theorem (even applied correctly). The conclusions depend so heavily on arbitrary probaility assignments that they become meaningless. The opposite of arbitrarily reducing P(O|D) is arbitrarily inflating it and there is no objective way to assert either.<br /><br />By the way, thanks for letting me discuss these issues at your blog!peter olofssonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14068502250814188023noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-62920140893434287802010-03-26T11:53:58.186-07:002010-03-26T11:53:58.186-07:00peter olofsson:
=====
1. You are wrong about ...peter olofsson:<br /><br />=====<br /> 1. You are wrong about basic probability again:<br /><br /> P(O|D) DOES NOT EQUAL 1-P(O|E)!<br /><br /> There is no such rule for conditional probabilities, Additivity applies to the event left of the conditioning bar, not the one to the right.<br />=====<br /><br />Of course, that was a model for use in your scenario. You suggested that the evolutionist, in addition to predicting that P(O|E) is low, would also want P(O|D) to be low. That conveniently protects evolution from falsifying observations, but doesn't seem realistic. For these types of predictions, these conditional probabilities are more likely to be opposed.<br /><br />So if this isn't fair, let's use something more conservative. How about P(O|D) = (1-P(O|E)) / 10. Surely that is a conservative model. So with P(O|E) set to 0.01, then P(O|D) is about 0.1. Pretty small. Good enough? In that case the 14 observations results in P(E|O) of 10^-10.<br /><br /><br />========<br /> 2. I find it interesting that you insist on your bound being "conservative" despite the fact that I demonstrated it being mathematically impossible. I showed that P(T|O) is at least 0.91, yet you claim it is less than 0.2. Explanation?<br />========<br /><br />If you use the total probability theorem, as I showed above, then P(E|O) is 0.91 for a single observation. But additional observations drive it down further.<br /><br />=====<br />3. To get a conservative bound, you must assign a value to P(O|D). Since you are the one claiming this type of analysis is meaningful and detrimental to evolution, what value do you choose and why?<br />=====<br /><br />I discussed P(O|D) in #1 above. We agree that the choices for these probabilities are difficult to defend. But I think multiple false predictions should count somehow, and I'm trying to show this using conservative assumptions. Even then it can be challenged, I agree, but then we're headed toward unfalsifiability. For instance, one could say P(O|D) is always really small, as you have suggested. But this seems like special pleading. At some point E becomes unfalsifiable if we just arbitrarily reduce P(O|D) to save it.Cornelius Hunterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12283098537456505707noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-28737723845899967432010-03-26T10:41:05.943-07:002010-03-26T10:41:05.943-07:00Correction to (2) above: I showed that the ratio
...Correction to (2) above: I showed that the ratio <br />P(O|E)/P(O) is at least 0.91, yet you claim it is less than 0.2.peter olofssonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14068502250814188023noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-60588416615806099962010-03-26T10:39:01.239-07:002010-03-26T10:39:01.239-07:00Dear Cornelius,
1. You are wrong about basic prob...Dear Cornelius,<br /><br />1. You are wrong about basic probability again: <br /><br />P(O|D) DOES NOT EQUAL 1-P(O|E)!<br /><br />There is no such rule for conditional probabilities, Additivity applies to the event left of the conditioning bar, not the one to the right. <br /><br />2. I find it interesting that you insist on your bound being "conservative" despite the fact that I demonstrated it being mathematically impossible. I showed that P(T|O) is at least 0.91, yet you claim it is less than 0.2. Explanation?<br /><br />3. To get a conservative bound, you must assign a value to P(O|D). Since you are the one claiming this type of analysis is meaningful and detrimental to evolution, what value do you choose and why?peter olofssonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14068502250814188023noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-88682471768340639512010-03-26T09:26:38.628-07:002010-03-26T09:26:38.628-07:00Cornelius,
Speaking of having it both ways, I can&...Cornelius,<br />Speaking of having it both ways, I can's comment on your stats, but the methodology you're employing here seems remarkably similar to that employed by SOber in the PNAS paper you are always touting. THere, he uses the two competing hypotheses of separate and common descent and says that as separate descent becomes less likely, common descent becomes more likely. you claim that this shows evolution is a metaphysical theory because some hypotheses of separate descent (such as those espoused by Answers in Genesis) are based on religious tenets. Yet here you are comparing evolution and design, when some hypotheses of design (for example Dembski's ideas) are based on religious tenets . is your methodology now metaphysical as well? you can't have it both ways.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-4539133881270198302010-03-26T09:06:10.286-07:002010-03-26T09:06:10.286-07:00peter olofsson:
==========
Whether you use the to...peter olofsson:<br /><br />==========<br />Whether you use the total probability theorem or not, it is there. Bounds on the ratio P(O|E)/P(O) cannot be chosen independently of the probabilities involved. Let's try some numbers. We want P(E) to be large, let say 0.999. Then we want P(O|E) to be small, let's say 0.01. What is P(O)? Well, it depends on what other hypotheses there are. Let's say there's only one, D, which then has P(D)=0.001. The total probability theorem gives<br /><br />P(O)=P(O|E)P(E)+P(O|D)P(D)=0.00999+P(O|D)*0.001<br /><br />which means that the ratio P(O|E)/P(O) equals<br /><br />0.01/(0.00999+P(O|D)*0.001)<br /><br />The smallest possible value of this ratio is obtained if P(O|D)=1 and equals 0.91. Thus, your "incredibly conservative" value of 0.2 cannot even be obtained.<br /><br />Different values of P(E) and P(O|E) give different lower bounds of course, but for your calculations you would need an upper bound and that would depend on P(O|D). I doubt your evolutionist would give it a very high value.<br />==========<br /><br />You doubt an evolutionist would give P(O|D) a very high value in this scenario of two, mutually exclusive, theories that provide completeness? It sounds like he is having it both ways. The observation, O, is unlikely on evolution and on design? That doesn't make much sense. In fact, if he says O is unlikely on evolution, then it is *likely* on design. P(O|D) is the complement of P(O|E) :<br /><br />P(D) = 1 - P(E)<br />P(O|D) = 1 - P(O|E) <br /><br />so,<br /><br />P(O) = P(O|E)P(E) + P(O|D)P(D)<br />P(O) = P(O|E)P(E) + [1-P(O|E)]P(D)<br />P(O) = P(O|E)P(E) + [1-P(O|E)] [1 - P(E)]<br /><br />so,<br /><br />P(E|O) = [P(O|E) / P(O)] P(E) <br />P(E|O) = [ P(O|E) / [ P(O|E)P(E) + [1-P(O|E)] [1 - P(E)] ] ] P(E) <br /><br />P(E|O) = 1 / [ 1 + [1-P(O|E)] [1 - P(E)] / [P(O|E)P(E)] ]<br /><br /><br />Using your numbers P(E|O) comes out to 10^-23 for the fourteen observations, far worse than my conservative calculation of 1 in a billion.Cornelius Hunterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12283098537456505707noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-7734120689823640912010-03-25T18:04:30.488-07:002010-03-25T18:04:30.488-07:00Cornelius,
You say that you have "done severa...Cornelius,<br />You say that you have "done several other calculations, such as uniformly randomizing P(O)." If you have them posted somewhere, please let me know. I am curious as to how you are doing it.peter olofssonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14068502250814188023noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-29773402101219992562010-03-25T18:01:35.992-07:002010-03-25T18:01:35.992-07:00Cornelius,
I agree, we could set P(E)=1 and make e...Cornelius,<br />I agree, we could set P(E)=1 and make evolution a priori true (or set P(E)=0 and make it a priori false). One could always argue what the probability P(E) really means, and that's why I also think it's meaningless to talk about "conservative" numbers; there is simply no benchmark with which to compare. It one in a million a small probability? Not compared to one in a billion which in turn is huge compared to one in a trillion, and so on. <br /><br />However, if one attempts to use Bayes' theorem, everything comes down to the numbers one chooses, and you cannot avoid invoking alternative hypotheses and the probabilities of observations under these hypotheses.peter olofssonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14068502250814188023noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-34077713454599215992010-03-25T17:56:46.742-07:002010-03-25T17:56:46.742-07:00Cornelius,
Thanks for the clarification, I should...Cornelius,<br /><br />Thanks for the clarification, I should have understood you meant P(E). <br /><br />Whether you use the total probability theorem or not, it is there. Bounds on the ratio P(O|E)/P(O) cannot be chosen independently of the probabilities involved. Let's try some numbers. We want P(E) to be large, let say 0.999. Then we want P(O|E) to be small, let's say 0.01. What is P(O)? Well, it depends on what other hypotheses there are. Let's say there's only one, D, which then has P(D)=0.001. The total probability theorem gives<br /><br />P(O)=P(O|E)P(E)+P(O|D)P(D)=0.00999+P(O|D)*0.001<br /><br />which means that the ratio P(O|E)/P(O) equals<br /><br />0.01/(0.00999+P(O|D)*0.001)<br /><br />The smallest possible value of this ratio is obtained if P(O|D)=1 and equals 0.91. Thus, your "incredibly conservative" value of 0.2 cannot even be obtained. <br /><br />Different values of P(E) and P(O|E) give different lower bounds of course, but for your calculations you would need an upper bound and that would depend on P(O|D). I doubt your evolutionist would give it a very high value.peter olofssonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14068502250814188023noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-44374447791927009742010-03-25T17:50:39.700-07:002010-03-25T17:50:39.700-07:00peter olofsson:
Following up. Consider the possib...peter olofsson:<br /><br />Following up. Consider the possibility that the ratio P(O|E) / P(O) is close to unity, as you suggest. IOW, the P(O|E) values are say 10^-6, but P(O), as it turns out, always just happens to be very small and not much larger than 10^-6, so the ratio is always almost 1.0.<br /><br />In that case, the probability of evolution, given all those falsified predictions, remains pretty high. The price we pay for this is that evolution becomes unfalsifiable, as Popper suggested. IOW, the falsification of all these fundamental predictions has essentially no effect on its probability.<br /><br />And of course there is no justification for making all the P(O) values so small. I've done several other calculations, such as uniformly randomizing P(O). You always obtain small probabilities for evolution.Cornelius Hunterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12283098537456505707noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-18809063758827739262010-03-25T17:00:23.220-07:002010-03-25T17:00:23.220-07:00peter olofsson:
Sorry, I meant the prior, P(E), n...peter olofsson:<br /><br />Sorry, I meant the prior, P(E), not P(O). Sorry for the confusion.<br /><br />I assume you don't have a problem with starting with a conservatively high value for P(E).<br /><br />Next we have P(O). I agree it cannot be computed. I thought I made it clear that I am using a conservative bound for the ratio P(O|E) / P(O), rather than using the total probability theorem to get at P(O).<br /><br />You suggest the ratio is close to unity for small P(O). When evolutionists make high-confidence predictions which they are quite certain of, that means that the actual observation, O, which falsified the prediction, reduces the probability of evolution. This is true regardless of P(O). The ratio P(O|E) / P(O) is always going to be small for observations that falsify high-confidence predictions. The value of 0.2 is incredibly conservative and evolution-friendly calculation.<br /><br />That is why I ask: Do false predictions count? If one cannot accept even such a conservative calculation, then it appears false predictions do not and we're dealing with theory protectionism. Protectionism is the strategy evolutionists often use.Cornelius Hunterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12283098537456505707noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-2662998184182229282010-03-25T16:40:39.472-07:002010-03-25T16:40:39.472-07:00If P(O|E) is small and P(O) is 1/2, P(O|D) cannot ...If P(O|E) is small and P(O) is 1/2, P(O|D) cannot also be small. Thus, you sneak in an assumption about the likelihood of the observation under a design hypothesis. But your evolutionist would not make that assumption. Indeed, if he thinks P(O|E) is small, then P(O) will also be small and the ratio close to 1.peter olofssonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14068502250814188023noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-62890927727681973142010-03-25T16:17:27.619-07:002010-03-25T16:17:27.619-07:00peter olofsson:
====
I do not think your calculat...peter olofsson:<br /><br />====<br />I do not think your calculations make any sense.<br /><br />First of all, to compute the undonditional probability P(O), you need the conditional probabilities.<br />====<br /><br />What's wrong with using a large value?<br /><br /><br />====<br />Third, the values used are not “extremely conservative,” they are completely arbitrary.<br />====<br /><br />Do false predictions count?Cornelius Hunterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12283098537456505707noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-85999469650419000052010-03-25T15:43:25.274-07:002010-03-25T15:43:25.274-07:00Dear Mr Hunter,
I do not think your calculations ...Dear Mr Hunter,<br /><br />I do not think your calculations make any sense. <br /><br />First of all, to compute the undonditional probability P(O), you need the conditional probabilities. Let’s say there are two theories, D(esign) and E(volution). Bayes’ formula states<br /><br />P(E|O)=P(O|E)P(E)/P(O)<br /><br />where<br /><br />P(O)=P(O|E)P(E)+P(O|D)P(D)<br /><br />The only probability we could even hypotheically hope to estimate is P(O|E). When you assume that P(O) is 1/2 and that P(O|E) is “small,” you are imposing conditions on the remaining probabilities. <br /><br />Second, the probabilities are not “difficult” to gauge, they are impossible to gauge. What is P(D)? Some would say 0, some would say 1. Let’s not even get into the philosophical issues of assigning probabilities to events that have already happened.<br /><br />Third, the values used are not “extremely conservative,” they are completely arbitrary.peter olofssonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14068502250814188023noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3855268335402896473.post-85608340829523741112010-03-25T10:55:52.512-07:002010-03-25T10:55:52.512-07:00Apparently the theological and philosophical argum...Apparently the theological and philosophical arguments Darwinists often make are not coherent logically. No one here seems willing to try to support them with logic. <br /><br /><i>Please show us where in the theory of evolution that a griffin would falsify the theory.</i><br /><br />It seems to me that a platypus fits the bill of a mosaic as much as an imaginary organism like the griffin would. What can be observed in reality already challenges and defies the imagination to the point that some apparently become confused and mistake their imaginations for reality merely because they can imagine things. It's often that difficult. At any rate, it doesn't really matter given that evolution hasn't been specified to predict one sort of organism or another in the first place. If griffins were observed then I would imagine that they would make perfect sense in light of evolution, just like everything else does.<br /><br />On the other hand, if I was a singular Creator leaving evidence of that fact in biology one of the best ways probably would be mosaics of some sort. One would need to falsify nature based commonality or phylogeny yet still show a common source for the way things unfold/evolve. <br /><br /><i>Or perhaps you could provide some reasoning.</i><br /><br />Apparently he's already retracted whatever he was imagining. It really shouldn't be that hard to come up with numerous falsifications for a rigorously specified scientific theory like "evolution." After all, as Zach has noted it is just like the theory of gravity. <br /><br />A possible explanation for theological arguments of this sort may be historical. Note that the story of a provincial Christian who goes on a journey and finds answers to his religion in the Darwinian creation myth is so common that it is provincial itself. The mythology of Progress that typifies his new creation myth just happens to match his own supposed progress from ignorance to knowledge. The irony is that he typically becomes an imbecile easily overwhelmed by illusions of knowledge based on little more than imagining things about the past due to the structure of Darwinian "reasoning." Even blogs written by people of this sort are named after theological arguments like the “panda’s thumb,” which has more to do with their own sectarian religious past and/or the historical roots of Darwinism than science. The theological and philosophical arguments typical to Darwinists seem to be rather puerile and shallow, something along the lines of: “God wouldn’t make a panda’s thumb like this because a perfect God wouldn't tinker.” And so on. Perhaps that’s because they typically leave their original faith as an ignorant schoolboy. At any rate, religious arguments about what God would or would not do have absolutely nothing to do with what natural selection actually does and there is little evidence that it "creates" thumbs.<br /><br /><i>The same for a centaur...</i><br /><br />Ironically the urge to merge illustrated in ancient nature based paganism doesn't seem all the different from the Darwinian urge to merge based on naturalism. <br /><br />At any rate, I can imagine that a centaur would be incorporated in evolutionary creation myths easily enough. Why don't proponents of ID work their way around to citing their own imaginations as the equivalent of scientific evidence or a scientific theory? If they ever have they certainly haven't done so to the same extent that Darwinists have. It often seems that the real issue is different psychological patterns seen politically in the general patterns of left/imagery/blurring/tolerance and right/iconoclasm/discrimination.mynymhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07095211421748579139noreply@blogger.com