The Big Lie
In her wacky video promoting evolution Carin Bondar states that science doesn’t lie. This sentiment is common amongst evolutionists and the problem is that evolution isn’t science, and if it was, then science would be guilty of lying. Over the top criticism? No, these simply are the facts.
The demarcation problem is notoriously difficult. Just what is and isn’t science, and how do we discern the difference? These can be perplexing questions, but evolution is nowhere close to the subtle boundary line between science and non science.
Evolutionists before Darwin, Darwin, and evolutionists since Darwin all make religious claims in their motivation and defense of evolution. These religious claims are not an aside, they are the core theoretic of evolution. Without them there would be no evolution.
And what is evolution? It is the claim that the world spontaneously arose. The biological world here on Earth, including all the species, originated via a process of random events and natural law—chance and necessity.
This claim is at odds with the scientific evidence. So evolution is a religiously motivated idea that contradicts the empirical data. Evolution clearly is not science, by anyone’s definition.
Second, evolution certainly does lie. For while evolutionists quibble over many things, they agree and insist that evolution is a fact, fully supported and made compelling by the science. That simply is not true.
To be sure, scientists can debate over how best to understand and interpret the many observations we have from science. And one can find many observations that appear to support evolutionary theory.
But this is being kind.
There simply is no question that the preponderance of the scientific evidence presents enormous problems for evolutionary theory. Yes we can debate the details, but we are nowhere close to evolution being a scientific fact, beyond all reasonable doubt, fully supported by the evidence, and so forth. Quite the opposite—evolution is astronomically unlikely from a scientific perspective.
One hates to use the word “lie” and we always try to understand differing perspectives. But this high claim that evolution is a scientific no-brainer is so preposterous, so far from any stretch of the truth, it defies the benefit of the doubt. At some point one must call a spade a spade. Perhaps Bondar needs a sequel.
CH: Evolutionists before Darwin, Darwin, and evolutionists since Darwin all make religious claims in their motivation and defense of evolution. These religious claims are not an aside, they are the core theoretic of evolution. Without them there would be no evolution.
ReplyDeleteIf that were true, then how is it that 'evolutionists' are to be found among every religious faith and none at all?
Even the Pope declared that religion and ToE are not at odds.
ToE is just a scientific theory, and behaves like all the other scientific theories. It makes no religious claims at all. Yes, it does reject un-, sub-, and supernatural explanations, but so does every scientific theory. That is one of the reasons it is a scientific theory.
And what is evolution? It is the claim that the world spontaneously arose.
Flat wrong. Evolution is about how life develops, not how it began.
The origin of life is certainly a related question, but ToE doesn't speak to it directly. That would be abiogenesis.
This claim is at odds with the scientific evidence.
No it isn't. There is no positive evidence whatsoever for the idea that life did not arise through natural processes. And what's more, there never really can be. Because by their very nature you cannot measure, study or demonstrate non-natural processes. Whether such forces exist is for the theologians and philosophers to discuss. But scientists restrict themselves entirely to the natural world.
For while evolutionists quibble over many things, they agree and insist that evolution is a fact, fully supported and made compelling by the science. That simply is not true.
Says who? You?
Do you really think you understand biology better than actual biologists (rhetorical question, there, obvs)?
Quite the opposite—evolution is astronomically unlikely from a scientific perspective.
I know you WANT that to be true because you are immovably wedded to the idea that God made the world, But it simply isn't true.
Ritchie:
DeleteIf that were true, then how is it that 'evolutionists' are to be found among every religious faith and none at all?
So when atheists say this world wouldn’t have been created, that doesn’t count?
Even the Pope declared that religion and ToE are not at odds.
And the Pope is not religious?
ToE is just a scientific theory, and behaves like all the other scientific theories. It makes no religious claims at all.
Right, just science. “Odd arrangements and funny solutions are the proof of evolution—paths that a sensible God would never tread but that a natural process, constrained by history, follows perforce. No one understood this better than Darwin. Ernst Mayr has shown how Darwin, in defending evolution, consistently turned to organic parts and geographic distributions that make the least sense.”
No it isn't. There is no positive evidence whatsoever for the idea that life did not arise through natural processes. And what's more, there never really can be.
Bingo, we have a winner.
Do you really think you understand biology better than actual biologists (rhetorical question, there, obvs)?
It’s not a matter of understanding biology.
Ritchie have you watched a pro-Evolution lecture in the last 20 years? One of the primary arguments for evolution is teleological. "God would have never designed like this, etc."
DeleteGo look at TalkOrigins.. Here is an example of a typical teleological argument they make for Evolution.
"All life is based on DNA, yet an intelligent designer could have used other methods."
"Common phenotypes don't necessarily have to share common biochemical processes. An intelligent designer could have used different biochemical processes between similar phenotypes."
Yea, real scientific, huh? This is how Evolution is sold to the public.
lifepsy:
DeleteThis is how Evolution is sold to the public
I wouldn't put it that way. "Sold to the public" implies it is disingenuous. Evolutionists really believe this stuff.
CH:
DeleteSo when atheists say this world wouldn’t have been created, that doesn’t count?
What does it matter what atheists say? What has that to do with evolution?
I realise in your head that atheists and 'evolutionists' are one and the same. But this is simply false. They are two distinct groups of people. One holds a theological position, and the other accepts an unrelated scientific theory.
There is certainly overlap - some 'evolutionists' are atheists too. But other 'evolutionists' are Christian. Others Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Sikh, etc.
So I ask my question again, since you have not addressed it: how it is that 'evolutionists' are to be found among every religious faith and none at all if it makes specific religious claims? Wouldn't those claims contradict the tenets of at least some of those religions?
"And the Pope is not religious?"
Of course he is - Christian! So you have the leader of the Christian religion (or one branch of it, at least) declaring his religion is not at odds with the theory of evolution.
Which is the exact opposite claim to the one you are making.
"Right, just science."
Sarcasm is no refutation.
ME: There is no positive evidence whatsoever for the idea that life did not arise through natural processes. And what's more, there never really can be.
YOU: Bingo, we have a winner.
I really do not understand you here. Did you, perhaps misread what I wrote?
If you AGREE that there is no positive evidence that life did NOT arise through natural processes and there never can be, then you are agreeing that the notion is unscientific. You are agreeing, in short, that scientists must restrict themselves to naturalistic explanations.
Which is exactly what 'evolutionists' do. And is what you criticise them for doing.
It’s not a matter of understanding biology.
This is perhaps your oddest statement of all.
It IS a matter of understanding biology. That's exactly what it is.
lifespy:
DeleteOne of the primary arguments for evolution is teleological. "God would have never designed like this, etc."
That is simply wrong. No-one supports evolution by saying "God wouldn't have done it like this." To make that statement at all, one must assume a God - which no scientist would do (professionally), let alone make assumptions about what that being would or would not do.
The arguments for evolution are all evidence-based: the fossil record, genetics, genealogy, biological distribution, direct observation in both the lab and field, and more.
"Go look at TalkOrigins.."
The purpose of the TalkOrigins website is not to simply explain evolution. It is to study and comment on the arguments between ToE and Creationism.
In this context, what God would or would not do DOES become relevant. But not because ToE makes any claims to this - but because Creationism does. It is Creationism which introduces God to the discussion, not evolution.
"All life is based on DNA, yet an intelligent designer could have used other methods."
"Common phenotypes don't necessarily have to share common biochemical processes. An intelligent designer could have used different biochemical processes between similar phenotypes."
These are both perfectly sensible statements. And ones which do not support your point above.
These statements are critiquing Creationism. Again, it is Creationism which proposes an intelligent designer.
Yea, real scientific, huh? This is how Evolution is sold to the public.
No it isn't. You will not find such statements, or anything like them, in science textbooks or biology journals.
You WILL find them whenever (sensible) people discuss Creationism. THIS is the philosophy (I cannot correctly call it a 'theory', since it fails to meet the criteria) which rests on teleological arguments.
Ritchie: ToE is just a scientific theory, and behaves like all the other scientific theories.
DeleteSo can you reference all these other scientific theories that depend on teleological arguments like Evolution does? (examples already provided above)
Ritchie:
DeleteSo I ask my question again, since you have not addressed it: how it is that 'evolutionists' are to be found among every religious faith and none at all if it makes specific religious claims? Wouldn't those claims contradict the tenets of at least some of those religions?
No, just because someone says they are Christian or atheist, or whatever, doesn’t mean they can’t hold to evolutionary metaphysics. That is why I pointed out that even atheists make these religious claims.
I realise in your head that atheists and 'evolutionists' are one and the same.
Where did I say that?
I really do not understand you here. Did you, perhaps misread what I wrote?
You claim that there cannot be, in principle, evidence that life did not evolve. That claim is not scientific, it is philosophical. It is yet another example of the many types of non scientific, metaphysical, arguments for evolution. Evolution is the ridiculous claim that the spontaneous origin of the species is a fact, it comes from metaphysics not from science. I pointed this out, you denied any such thing, and then turned around and provided an example.
This is perhaps your oddest statement of all. It IS a matter of understanding biology. That's exactly what it is.
No, the biology is the easy part, on which everyone agrees. We all know about bones, muscles, and ATP. No argument on the science. The metaphysics does the heavy lifting.
lifespy:
DeleteSo can you reference all these other scientific theories that depend on teleological arguments like Evolution does? (examples already provided above)
You are simply wrong. Evolution does not depend on teleological arguments.
CH:
Deletejust because someone says they are Christian or atheist, or whatever, doesn’t mean they can’t hold to evolutionary metaphysics.
But you're saying these 'evolutionary metaphysics' make statements about the existence or non-existence of a creator?
So how can people who disagree on whether such a creator exists agree on 'evolutionary metaphysics'?
You claim that there cannot be, in principle, evidence that life did not evolve.
Incorrect. I said there can never be evidence of non-natural processes.
This is bigger than mere evolution - it is at the core of science. No scientific field can incorporate non-natural processes into their workings.
To do science you simply and absolutely MUST assume all relevant processes and forces are natural - that is to say, you must discount un-, sub-, or super- natural ones. This is simply essential for doing any kind of science.
And yet you criticise ToE for doing it. You call it 'evolutionary metaphysics'. Which is odd on many levels. For one thing, it is not unique to evolutionary theory - EVERY theory in science does this. For another, you cite this as a reason that ToE is unscientific. But in reality it is the reason why ToE IS scientific.
Evolution is the ridiculous claim that the spontaneous origin of the species is a fact, it comes from metaphysics not from science. I pointed this out, you denied any such thing, and then turned around and provided an example.
Cornelius, non-natural forces are untestable. That is not metaphysics. That is simply fact.
And given this, we therefore cannot include non-natural forces in scientific explanations. No field of modern science can or does.
No, the biology is the easy part, on which everyone agrees. We all know about bones, muscles, and ATP. No argument on the science. The metaphysics does the heavy lifting.
The metaphysics, I'm afraid, is yours. You are trying to force open a window to leave wiggle room for the possibility of a supernatural explanation for life on Earth. But such a thing cannot be scientifically done.
Just as there is no room for a supernatural agent controlling the weather in meteorology, just as there is no room for a supernatural agent controlling sickness in germ theory, just as there is no room for a supernatural agent controlling the movement of objects in the theory of gravity, so too is there no room for a supernatural agent controlling the development of life on Earth in evolutionary theory. What really makes no sense is that you only rail against the last of these.
Ritchie: You are simply wrong. Evolution does not depend on teleological arguments.
DeleteThen why do leading evolutionists constantly use teleology as one of their main arguments? Are they trying to trick people by using fake needless arguments?
Why are teleological arguments used in multiple "potential falsification" criteria at TalkOrigins? Go look for yourself.
Evolutionists are clearly on record as having used teleological arguments for decades.
Ritchie, you are obviously in denial.
CH: That is why I pointed out that even atheists make these religious claims.
DeleteThis is a bad criticism because it can be applied to just about any theory of the growth of knowledge. As such, it cannot be used in a critical way.
For example, we cannot rule out that a supernatural being chose to create the world we observe, all at once, one month ago, for some good reason we cannot understand, either. As such, you wouldn't be the author of the book Darwin's God. Rather, it would have been authored by that supernatural being.
Does that mean the idea that you authored the book Darwin's God is religious?
Nor can we rule out that lighting still is the result of God’s anger, and all of the people killed by lighting were killed for some good reasons we cannot understand. For example, some deserved to be punished, while others were killed to make it merely appear to be random, so it would not reveal that God exists and violate our free will.
Does our inability to rule this other other, make the theory that lighting strikes are natural events religious?
Again, “we cannot rule out that God didn’t do X for some good reason we cannot understand” is a bad criticism because it’s applicable to anything logically possible and it’s consequences. This is because God can supposedly do anything logically possible. As such, it cannot be used in a critical way.
I don’t see why this is so difficult for Cornelius, or anyone else here, to recognize this is a bad argument - especially once I’ve pointed out it could be applied to virtually anything.
lifespy:
DeleteThen why do leading evolutionists constantly use teleology as one of their main arguments?
Who and where?
Sites such as TalkOrigins are weighing up the Creationism v evolution debate. Teleology does come into play there - because Creationism invites it in.
Sources which ACTUALLY explain and present the theory of evolution, independently of being hounded by Creationist objections, are to be found in textbooks, scientific journals, and educational materials. And you will not find teleological arguments in them, any more than you will find teleological arguments used to prop up the theory of gravity.
Evolutionists are clearly on record as having used teleological arguments for decades.
In support of ToE, or when criticising Creationism?
You will find it's the latter.
You are being rather disingenuous. If your issue is with teleological arguments, then why do you not criticise Creationism for using exactly them?
Scott:
DeleteI don’t see why this is so difficult for Cornelius, or anyone else here, to recognize this is a bad argument
Sheer force of will.
Ritchie:
DeleteBut you're saying these 'evolutionary metaphysics' make statements about the existence or non-existence of a creator?
No, not at all. I gave you the example from Gould.
So how can people who disagree on whether such a creator exists agree on 'evolutionary metaphysics'?
Because the metaphysics have nothing to do with existence. You somehow read that in.
Ritchie:
DeleteI said there can never be evidence of non-natural processes.
More metaphysics. Bingo again.
To do science you simply and absolutely MUSTassume all relevant processes and forces are natural - that is to say, you must discount un-, sub-, or super- natural ones. This is simply essential for doing any kind of science.
Then evolution is not science. How do evolutionists know that “Odd arrangements and funny solutions are the proof of evolution—paths that a sensible God would never tread”? You are your own judge.
CH: How do evolutionists know that “Odd arrangements and funny solutions are the proof of evolution—paths that a sensible God would never tread”? You are your own judge.
DeleteWe have no explanation as to why a sensible God would create the odd arrangements and funny solutions we observe. However, we do have a good explanation as to why biological Darwinism would create these same arrangements and solutions.
The arrangements and solutions are empirical observations - evidence. That one theory provides explanation for that evidence, while the other does not represents criticism. Specifically, we make progress when we specifically devise criticisms with the intention that at least one theory will fail.
In addition, how could anyone know creating the universe we observe, all at once, 150 years ago is something a sensible God wouldn't do? Again, what theories would be effected by this choice? Are they all religious as well?
Part of the world we observe includes objects pulling on each other based on their mass. How did God choose to bring this aspect about?
Being supposedly all knowing, God could know the mass of every object in the universe. Being supposedly all powerful, he could exert the amount of force necessary, regardless of how much mass. And, being supposedly infinite, he could keeping track of all of the objects in the universe without negatively effecting his ability to do anything else. However, what would be the consequences of this?
If God were pulling on objects according to their mass, if someone falls off a cliff, slips in the bathtub or steps under a falling piano, God would be playing an direct, active role in their death. This is in contrast to creating a natural law that indirectly operates on objects in a way that is indifferent to the outcome. If I were concerned about God’s wisdom, sovereignty, etc., (which I’m not) a natural law that is impartial and acts the same everywhere in the universe would solve the problem quite neatly, wouldn’t it?
Does this mean the theory that gravity is a natural law that acts uniformly in the universe isn’t science, but a religious belief?
CH:
DeleteBecause the metaphysics have nothing to do with existence. You somehow read that in.
Cornelius, you really are talking yourself round in circles. You said these 'evolutionary metaphysics' were religious claims.
Please speak plainly, once and for all - are these 'evolutionary metaphysics' religious or not? And if so, what precisely are the religious claims that they make?
ME: I said there can never be evidence of non-natural processes.
YOU: More metaphysics. Bingo again.
If you would like to challenge this, then please provide details as to how one could possibly provide evidence of a non-natural force, even theoretically.
Then evolution is not science. How do evolutionists know that “Odd arrangements and funny solutions are the proof of evolution—paths that a sensible God would never tread”? You are your own judge.
Scott has it right - these 'odd arrangements' do positively support ToE, and do not positively support Creationism/ID. They are exactly what we should expect to find if ToE was true. But there is no reason to think we should find them if Creationism were true - indeed there is no reason to think we should find any sort of pattern of evidence at all.
By the way, is there a particular reason you are avoiding his question? Is the notion that gravity is a natural force which acts uniformally in the universe a religious belief?
Ritchie:
DeleteCornelius, you really are talking yourself round in circles. You said these 'evolutionary metaphysics' were religious claims. Please speak plainly, once and for all - are these 'evolutionary metaphysics' religious or not? And if so, what precisely are the religious claims that they make?
Circles? So tell us, what exactly is it about: “Odd arrangements and funny solutions are the proof of evolution—paths that a sensible God would never tread” that you don’t understand?
If you would like to challenge this, then please provide details as to how one could possibly provide evidence of a non-natural force, even theoretically.
It’s always funny when you point out an evolutionist’s metaphysical assumption he wants you to disprove it, oblivious to the real point. Far be it for me to disabuse you of your metaphysics. The point is that it is metaphysics. Your conviction that the scientifically silly idea that the species arose spontaneously is based on metaphysics. But as Alfred North Whitehead once observed, adherents take their most crucial assumptions to be obvious and in no need of justification. These underlying assumptions are unspoken and undefended because, as Whitehead put it, “Such assumptions appear so obvious that people do not know what they are assuming because no other way of putting things has ever occurred to them.”
But there is no reason to think we should find them if Creationism were true
Yes, “would never tread” was the wording.
Scott:
DeleteWe have no explanation as to why a sensible God would create the odd arrangements and funny solutions we observe.
“would never tread” was the wording.
CH:
DeleteCircles? So tell us, what exactly is it about: “Odd arrangements and funny solutions are the proof of evolution—paths that a sensible God would never tread” that you don’t understand?
I understand it perfectly. The issue here is that ToE is not built upon such reasoning. This is a sentence critiquing Creationism, not outlining the evidence for ToE.
Now please do not dodge my question again, but answer it directly. Are these 'evolutionary metaphysics' religious or not? And if so, what precisely are the religious claims that they make?
Far be it for me to disabuse you of your metaphysics. The point is that it is metaphysics.
But it isn't metaphysics - this is methodology!
Scientists assume METHODOLOGICAL naturalism. Not METAPHYSICAL naturalism. The difference is that the former allows that non-natural forces may exist - you just cannot employ them while doing science.
This is what science uses. It is what is must employ. And it is what ToE employs.
Yes, “would never tread” was the wording.
To be fair to you, I don't object to you having an issue with the quote. Yes, it is beyond the scope of the author to know what a 'sensible God' would or would never do.
The issue is that you claim ToE is based upon such reasoning, which is absolutely wrong. I personally am putting it out there, saying it loud and clear that, if there is a God, we mere human beings have absolutely no idea what that being may or may not do, or even what they are capable of doing. That's a quote you can put up in a blog post if you wish. But, crucially, that admission has not undermined the strength of evolutionary theory one iota.
By the way, you dodged Scott's question again - even in your reply to him. Is the notion that gravity is a natural force which acts uniformally in the universe a religious belief? It really is getting very suggestive that you are conspicuously dodging this question every time.
Ritchie:
DeleteThe issue here is that ToE is not built upon such reasoning.
Of course it is. That’s how it is a “fact.”
This is a sentence critiquing Creationism, not outlining the evidence for ToE.
“Odd arrangements and funny solutions are the proof of evolution—paths that a sensible God would never tread but that a natural process, constrained by history, follows perforce. No one understood this better than Darwin. Ernst Mayr has shown how Darwin, in defending evolution, consistently turned to organic parts and geographic distributions that make the least sense.”
CH:
DeleteOf course it is. That’s how it is a “fact.”
No, it's is a fact because it is a scientific explanation that has been tested and confirmed so many times that it is now taken as a given. No biologist questions whether evolution has taken place.
“Odd arrangements and funny solutions are the proof of evolution—paths that a sensible God would never tread but that a natural process, constrained by history, follows perforce. No one understood this better than Darwin. Ernst Mayr has shown how Darwin, in defending evolution, consistently turned to organic parts and geographic distributions that make the least sense.”
My objection still stands. These 'odd arrangements' are positive evidence for evolution, and are not positive evidence for Creationism, which was the ideology of Darwin's day. What exactly is wrong with Darwin or Mayr positing evidence which supports ToE and does not support Creationism?
What is more, you have yet again ignored questions from myself and Scott. It's getting pretty obvious that this is because you simply cannot answer them. So just to make the point clear:
First, my question: "Are these 'evolutionary metaphysics' religious or not? And if so, what precisely are the religious claims that they make?"
Obviously, even though Cornelius insists ToE is 'religious', it clearly makes no religious claims or inferences at all. It does not postulate on whether a god or gods exist.
The only way in which it could be said to have anything to do with the supernatural at all is in the fact that it cannot include supernatural forces in its explanations. Which ties in nicely with Scott's question: "Is the notion that gravity is a natural force which acts uniformally in the universe a religious belief?"
If we apply Cornelius' logic to the theory of gravity, the answer is yes! If evolution is religious for discounting the supernatural, then so is gravity for doing exactly the same thing.
Ritchie:
DeleteWhat exactly is wrong with Darwin or Mayr positing evidence which supports ToE and does not support Creationism?
"paths that a sensible God would never tread" is a religious claim, your denials notwithstanding.
CH:
Delete"paths that a sensible God would never tread" is a religious claim,
But it is not the basis ToE, your claims to the contrary notwithstanding.
Scott: We have no explanation as to why a sensible God would create the odd arrangements and funny solutions we observe. However, we do have a good explanation as to why biological Darwinism would create these same arrangements and solutions.
DeleteCH: “would never tread” was the wording.
First, does changing the wording change the point I made? Does it make an explanation for God where none existed before? Does it take away the explanation that Darwinism provides?
Second, if we take creationism seriously, in that it is true in reality and that all observations should conform to it, creationists are claiming that odd arrangements and funny solutions *are* paths a sensible God “would and actually did tread”. That’s what Gould is responding to. But, in the absence of an explanation, God never has an reason to tread those particular paths.
Are you suggesting a sensible God would do something for no reason?
Sure, God could have some good reason we cannot know, but we could say the same about virtually anything. Which leads me back to the point you’ve continually ignored.
If we take the claim that you are the author of the book Darwin’s God seriously, in that it is true in reality and that all observations should conform to it, this necessarily entails creating the world we observe, all at once, last Thursday, is a path that God never took. Doesn’t it? Otherwise, God would have been the genesis of that book, not you.
Again, this is a general purpose means of denying that creation actually took place. I’ve simply changed the boundaries.
Singing psycho atheist?
ReplyDelete(barf)
"These can be perplexing questions, but evolution is nowhere close to the subtle boundary line between science and non science."
ReplyDeleteJ: Indeed. It's the classification of literally worthless hypotheses like naturalistic UCA as "scientific" that has rendered the demarcation problem so severe. As a merely historical speculation, it can't predict, and there are no analogies from our experience that indicate it. It is worthless and, therefore, unscientific if "science" has anything to do with anything valuable.
In her wacky video promoting evolution Carin Bondar states that science doesn’t lie. This sentiment is common amongst evolutionists and the problem is that evolution isn’t science, and if it was, then science would be guilty of lying. Over the top criticism? No, these simply are the facts.
ReplyDeleteScience doesn't lie, but people do. Politicians lie, clergy lie, even scientists lie. I bet Einstein told some whoppers in his day. Does that mean relativity is entirely discredited?
The demarcation problem is notoriously difficult. Just what is and isn’t science, and how do we discern the difference? These can be perplexing questions, but evolution is nowhere close to the subtle boundary line between science and non science.
That's right, it's firmly esconced on the sciencey side of the line. Who says so? The overwhelming majority of those best placed to decide, the people who actually do the science, the professional biologists.
As for the demarcation problem, as you know, statesman Edmund Burke summed it up nicely in another context: "Though no man can draw a stroke between the confines of day and night, yet light and darkness are upon the whole tolerably distinguishable."
Evolutionists before Darwin, Darwin, and evolutionists since Darwin all make religious claims in their motivation and defense of evolution. These religious claims are not an aside, they are the core theoretic of evolution. Without them there would be no evolution.
Countering religious arguments against evolution does not mean the theory is based in any way on religion or constitutes a religion. It says nothing, one way or the other, about the existence of a deity, for example.. It does not promise salvation or eternal life after death. It promotes no particular creed nor moral code. It doesn't send evangelists and missionaries to the darkest corners of the world to convert benighted heathens to the Church of Darwin. It is about as much a religion as not collecting stamps is a hobby.
And what is evolution? It is the claim that the world spontaneously arose. The biological world here on Earth, including all the species, originated via a process of random events and natural law—chance and necessity.
This is just wrong, as you've been told many times before. the theory of evolution deals with how life has changed and diversified over time after it had appeared. Darwin didn't know how it all started and said so. We still don't know, in spite of some progress in research into the problem
Second, evolution certainly does lie. For while evolutionists quibble over many things, they agree and insist that evolution is a fact, fully supported and made compelling by the science. That simply is not true.
No, you and your ilk continually allege that evolutionists make this claim when they do no such thing. You studiously ignore the distinction between the fact of evolution - the observed phenomena which constitute the process - and the theory of evolution - a work-in-progress explanation of the observed process.
The fact is that the theory of evolution, while far from perfect or complete, is still the best game in town. Nothing else even comes close in science That's why so many of the attacks are clearly inspired by religious and political beliefs, not science.
Ian:
DeleteNo, you and your ilk continually allege that evolutionists make this claim when they do no such thing. You studiously ignore the distinction between the fact of evolution - the observed phenomena which constitute the process - and the theory of evolution - a work-in-progress explanation of the observed process.
You're equivocating on evolution. Please see these posts:
http://darwins-god.blogspot.com/2010/07/web-weavers.html
http://darwins-god.blogspot.com/2012/05/you-wont-believe-what-evolutionists.html
Ian: The fact is that the theory of evolution, while far from perfect or complete, is still the best game in town.
DeleteJ: Well, the "fact" that descent with variation occurs isn't contentious to anyone. It happens every time a baby is born. As for a theory that supposedly has any relevant relation to the hypothesis of UCA, there is none. UCA is a metaphysical hypothesis. Nothing we know implies it's possible. And no analogies drawn from observations indicate it.
Cornelius Hunter January 18, 2014 at 5:00 PM
Delete[...]
You're equivocating on evolution. Please see these posts:
http://darwins-god.blogspot.com/2010/07/web-weavers.html
http://darwins-god.blogspot.com/2012/05/you-wont-believe-what-evolutionists.html
From the Wikipedia entry for "Equivocation":
Equivocation ("to call by the same name") is classified as an informal logical fallacy. It is the misleading use of a term with more than one meaning or sense (by glossing over which meaning is intended at a particular time). It generally occurs with polysemic words (words with multiple meanings).
Animals descend from other animals. Animals can experience phenotypical change over time. These changes can confer an adaptive advantage in a given environmental context. Examples are industrial melanism in the peppered moth, bacteria which are able to digest the waste products of nylon manufacture or metabolize citric acid as a carbon source. Mutations occur in the genomes of animals for various reasons. Mutations have been found which have given rise to changes which confer adaptive advantage. All these are factual claims born out by observations They are the facts of evolution.
The theory developed by Charles Darwin to explain what he had observed, which has been substantially modified since then in the light of more recent research, is an attempt to account for what has been observed. As Gould noted, facts and theories are not the same things and scientists are well aware of it. The theory is the best currently available but it is not fact nor is it claimed to be.
When you allege that evolutionists claim evolution is a fact you fail to distinguish between the observed phenomena which constitute the process of evolution and the theory which seeks to explain what is observed. The observations are claimed to be fact, certainly by Gould's definition, the theory is not. That is equivocation.
Jeff January 19, 2014 at 8:00 AM
Delete[...]
J: Well, the "fact" that descent with variation occurs isn't contentious to anyone. It happens every time a baby is born. As for a theory that supposedly has any relevant relation to the hypothesis of UCA, there is none. UCA is a metaphysical hypothesis. Nothing we know implies it's possible. And no analogies drawn from observations indicate it.
Descent with variation occurs. We have a genetic mechanism which accounts for that variation. We have examples of those variations confering an adaptive advantage on organisms fortunate enough to experience them. We have fossil sequences indicating those variations have occured in the distant past.
UCA is a good hypothesis that can be reasonably inferred from observations. It also slides past Ockham's razor since it only require an explanation for the origin of one, or perhaps a few, 'creation' events. With SA you have millions of separate origins or entities, each demanding explanation. It's easy to see which is the more parsimonious.
Jeff: Nothing we know implies [Universal Common Ancestry] possible.
DeleteYou mean noting you accept as knowledge, right? Furthermore, exactly what philosophy of science is this a requirement of? Please be specific.
Jeff: And no analogies drawn from observations indicate it.
From the link on Popper and evolution...
I blush when I have to make this confession; for when I was younger, I used to say very contemptuous things about evolutionary philosophies. When twenty-two years ago Canon Charles E. Raven, in his Science, Religion, and the Future, described the Darwinian controversy as "a storm in a Victorian teacup," I agreed, but criticized him for paying too much attention "to the vapors still emerging from the cup," by which I meant the hot air of the evolutionary philosophies (especially those which told us that there were inexorable laws of evolution). But now I have to confess that this cup of tea has become, after all, my cup of tea; and with it I have to eat humble pie. [Popper, 1972, p. 241] (Bold emphasis mine)
What did Popper mean by this? Popper's theory of epistemology is evolutionary. As such, it is his cup of tea. So, yes, there is an analogy. Biological Darwinism falls under our current, best explanation for the universal growth of knowledge.
Again, why don't you start out explaining how knowledge grows, then point out how biological darwinism doesn't fit that explanation? Please be specific.
Oh, that's right. You think that knowledge in specific spheres comes from authoritative sources, rather than genuinely being created. Of course, if I've got it wrong, please explain exactly where and how your view differs, in detail.
IOW, you're personal objection to said explanation does not constitute the lack of an analogy.
Also see..
DeleteEvolutionary Epistemology
EET (The Evolutionary Epistemology of Theories) is the label for the program which attempts to analyze the development of human knowledge and epistemological norms by appealing to relevant biological considerations. Some of these attempts involve analyzing the growth of human knowledge in terms of selectionist models and metaphors
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-evolutionary/
Popper, among others, is credited with this field and multiple analogies are presented.
This is why I keep saying these arguments are parochial. They selectively ignore progress made in the field of epistemology.
Scott: Jeff: Nothing we know implies [Universal Common Ancestry] possible.
DeleteYou mean noting you accept as knowledge, right? Furthermore, exactly what philosophy of science is this a requirement of? Please be specific.
J: It's amazing how you neither shut up nor put up. Can you NOW articulate what you "know" that "implies [Universal Common Ancestry] possible?" PLEASE?! And PLEASE be specific.
I don't HAVE to be right for YOU to be wrong. PLEASE tell me you get basic logic to that extent.
Scott: This is why I keep saying these arguments are parochial. They selectively ignore progress made in the field of epistemology.
DeleteJ: You deny the existence of positive evidence for the occurrence of progress. Again, I don't have to be RIGHT for you to be WRONG.
Ian: We have fossil sequences indicating those variations have occured in the distant past.
DeleteJ: No, nothing we know about genetics indicates currently-observed fossil succession has anything to do with what historical mutations would have caused. That's you confusing your imagination with reason.
Ian: UCA is a good hypothesis that can be reasonably inferred from observations.
J: Articulate the observations and how they "indicate" it.
Ian: It also slides past Ockham's razor since it only require an explanation for the origin of one, or perhaps a few, 'creation' events.
J: The Razor has to do with the number of premises required to imply the relevant effects. No one can even articulate such premises that have any known relation to natural causality.
Ian: With SA you have millions of separate origins or entities, each demanding explanation.
J: SA can mean two ancestors or 200 thousand.
Ian: It's easy to see which is the more parsimonious.
J: Parsimony applies to explanations. You have no explanation of either abiogenesis or the posited lineages. An explanation is a set of statements that IMPLIES the relevant effects.
Scott: You mean [nothing] you accept as knowledge, right? Furthermore, exactly what philosophy of science [requires knowing something that implies UCA is possible]? Please be specific.
DeleteJeff: It's amazing how you neither shut up nor put up. Can you NOW articulate what you "know" that "implies [Universal Common Ancestry] possible?" PLEASE?! And PLEASE be specific.
Just as soon as you articulate which philosophy of science has a requirement of “knowing that something is possible”, whatever that means, and how one might actually go about doing that.
For example, in the case of atomic theory, how did we know that atoms were possible? Had we observed them doing anything at all? What would it even mean to say that we “knew atoms were possible”?
Scott: This is why I keep saying these arguments are parochial. They selectively ignore progress made in the field of epistemology.
Jeff: You deny the existence of positive evidence for the occurrence of progress. Again, I don't have to be RIGHT for you to be WRONG.
For someone who knows he has memories, you sure seem to have problems recalling them.
For the umpteenth time, I don’t deny that evidence exists or that it plays an important role in science. I’m saying that empiricism was mistaken about the role that evidence plays in science. Specifically, I’m suggesting that Empiricism got it backwards.
Modus ponens arguments beg the question. But we can make progress by transforming them into modus tollens.
See my comment below.
Scott: For the umpteenth time, I don’t deny that evidence exists ...
DeleteJ: But you do deny knowing anything about the past, including what you have or haven't denied.
Scott: ... or that it plays an important role in science.
J: But you claim the proposition "Science plays an important role" is an utterly a-plausible proposition on the other hand.
Scott: For example, in the case of atomic theory, how did we know that ...?
J: Knowledge requires the truth of foundationalism. I'm not saying one can prove foundationalism. You, on the other hand, can't even define "knowledge" such that it's discernibly distinquishable from any pontification whatsoever.
Another way of saying it, Scott, is this: If foundationalism is true, knowledge exists. If foundationalism if false, knowledge can't even be defined. Note, I haven't said foundationalism (and, therefore, the existence of knowledge) is demonstrable. Indeed, nothing COULD be demonstrable if foundationalism is false.
DeleteJeff: J: But you do deny knowing anything about the past, including what you have or haven't denied.
DeleteNo, Jeff. We disagree on what it means to know something and how we know it.
Jeff: J: But you claim the proposition "Science plays an important role" is an utterly a-plausible proposition on the other hand.
No, you’re assuming I’m a disappointed justificationist. But I’ve explicitly denied this over and over again.
Scott: For example, in the case of atomic theory, how did we know that atoms were possible? Had we observed them doing anything at all? What would it even mean to say that we “knew atoms were possible”?
Note the part in BOLD. Is there some particular reason why you incompletely quoted me?
Jeff: Knowledge requires the truth of foundationalism.
Yes, that’s what you keep saying Jeff. But you haven’t explained how foundationalism actually solves any problems. Nor have you walked me though how you define the boundary of non-basic and basic beliefs. So, it’s unclear what requirement it has.
Jeff: Another way of saying it, Scott, is this: If foundationalism is true, knowledge exists. If foundationalism if false, knowledge can't even be defined.
Except I’ve provided a definition. So, apparently, what you really mean is that, knowledge cannot be defined in a way you find acceptable.
Science doesn't lie??? How lame a defence of evolution can they get. This is over folks.
ReplyDeleteScience is a methodology. Not a thing..
Human failure to use the methodology leads to error. Evolution has been a failure of scientific methodology.
In fact I think YEC and ID fail to demonstrate why evolution is not a theory. Not just a wrong answer but somehow still science.
Saying its a religion does imply this and does put evolution to the test of proving itself. Yet otherwise creationists need to aim more.
CH: Evolution clearly is not science, by anyone’s definition.
ReplyDeleteWhat did Karl Popper really say about Evolution?
"The fact that the theory of natural selection is difficult to test has led some people, anti-Darwinists and even some great Darwinists, to claim that it is a tautology. . . . I mention this problem because I too belong among the culprits. Influenced by what these authorities say, I have in the past described the theory as "almost tautological," and I have tried to explain how the theory of natural selection could be untestable (as is a tautology) and yet of great scientific interest. My solution was that the doctrine of natural selection is a most successful metaphysical research programme. . . . [Popper, 1978, p. 344]
I have changed my mind about the testability and logical status of the theory of natural selection; and I am glad to have an opportunity to make a recantation. . . . [p. 345]
The theory of natural selection may be so formulated that it is far from tautological. In this case it is not only testable, but it turns out to be not strictly universally true. There seem to be exceptions, as with so many biological theories; and considering the random character of the variations on which natural selection operates, the occurrence of exceptions is not surprising. [p. 346]"
http://ncse.com/cej/6/2/what-did-karl-popper-really-say-evolution
Scott, the debate is not over natural selection. It's over claims of POSITIVE evidence for UCA. Wake up, dude.
DeleteJeff: Scott, the debate is not over natural selection.
DeleteThat's an excerpt, Jeff. Did you actually bother to read the article? Apparently not. The title of the article is What did Karl Popper really say about Evolution?. As such, It's not just limited to natural selection.
"Indeed, the recent vogue of historicism might be regarded as merely part of the vogue of evolutionism—a philosophy that owes its influence largely to the somewhat sensational clash between a brilliant scientific hypothesis concerning the history of the various species of animals and plants on earth, and an older metaphysical theory which, incidentally, happened to be part of an established religious belief.
What we call the evolutionary hypothesis is an explanation of a host of biological and paleontological observations—for instance, of certain similarities between various species and genera—by the assumption of common ancestry of related forms.
. . . I see in modern Darwinism the most successful explanation of the relevant facts. [Popper, 1957, p. 106; emphasis added]
There exists no law of evolution, only the historical fact that plants and animals change, or more precisely, that they have changed. [Popper, 1963b, p. 340; emphasis added]
I have always been extremely interested in the theory of evolution and very ready to accept evolution as a fact. [Popper, 1976, p. 167; emphasis added]
The Mendelian underpinning of modern Darwinism has been well tested and so has the theory of evolution which says that all terrestrial life has evolved from a few primitive unicellular organisms, possibly even from one single organism. [Popper, 1978, p. 344; emphasis added]"?
Jeff: It's over claims of POSITIVE evidence for UCA.
Again CH wrote: Evolution clearly is not science, by anyone’s definition.
By Popper's definition, in science, there isn't positive evidence, only criticism. This is because modus tollens arguments (positive evidence) beg the question, but can be transformed as modus ponens ( which is criticism). Again, are you going to ignore this yet again?
Perhaps it's you that needs to "Wake up, Dude"?
Furthermore, I've already quoted from this article on this blog. So, apparently, Cornelius knew quite well that his statement was false.
Again, it would seem that Cornelius has correctly tagged this post as "Lies", but for reasons other than he originally intended.
Popper: The Mendelian underpinning of modern Darwinism has been well tested and so has the theory of evolution which says that all terrestrial life has evolved from a few primitive unicellular organisms, possibly even from one single organism. [Popper, 1978, p. 344; emphasis added]"?
DeleteJ: So what was the test that was applied to the hypothesis "that all terrestrial life has evolved from a few primitive unicellular organisms, possibly even from one single organism?" A raise of hands?
Scott: Evolution clearly is not science, by anyone’s definition.
J: So how many hold Popper's view (that science has nothing to do with "positive" evidence) that actually DO science, in your opinion? Because if it's a very small minority, what difference does it make to the debate? Or are you saying "science" is to be defined by small minorities of scientists?
Scott: Again, are you going to ignore this yet again?
J: I've never ignored it, Scott. I've pointed out that deduction is of no knowable worth if all propositions are a-plausible. That this is over your head is astonishing.
Jeff: So what was the test...
DeleteAgain, did you bother to actually read the article? Apparently, not.
”In an earlier work, Popper discussed the historical sciences in which the scientific method of theoretical sciences is used:
This view is perfectly compatible with the analysis of scientific method, and especially of causal explanation given in the preceding section. The situation is simply this: while the theoretical sciences are mainly interested in finding and testing universal laws, the historical sciences take all kinds of universal laws for granted and are mainly interested in finding and testing singular statements. [Popper, 1957, p. 143ff]
What Popper calls the historical sciences do not make predictions about long past unique events (postdictions), which obviously would not be testable. (Several recent authors—including Stephen Jay Gould in Discover, July 1982—make this mistake.) These sciences make hypotheses involving past events which must predict (that is, have logical consequences) for the present state of the system in question. Here the testing procedure takes for granted the general laws and theories and is testing the specific conditions (or initial conditions, as Popper usually calls them) that held for the system.
A scientist, on the basis of much comparative anatomy and physiology, might hypothesize that, in the distant past, mammals evolved from reptiles. This would have testable consequences for the present state of the system (earth's surface with the geological strata in it and the animal and plant species living on it) in the form of reptile-mammal transition fossils that should exist, in addition to other necessary features of the DNA, developmental systems, and so forth, of the present-day reptiles and mammals.”
Is there something about this you do not understand?
CH: Evolution clearly is not science, by anyone’s definition.
DeleteScott: By Popper's definition, in science, there isn't positive evidence, only criticism. This is because modus tollens arguments (positive evidence) beg the question, but can be transformed as modus ponens ( which is criticism). Again, are you going to ignore this yet again?
Jeff: So how many hold Popper's view (that science has nothing to do with "positive" evidence) that actually DO science, in your opinion?
Is there a particular reason you keep misrepresenting me? Specifically, you haven't show how our differences are actually relevant to the issue at hand.
01. Do I agree that empirical evidence plays an important role in science? Yes.
Empiricism was an improvement because it promoted the importance of empirical evidence in science. However, Empiricism is mistaken about the specific role that empirical evidence plays. So, we are in agreement that empirical evidence plays an important role in science.
02. Do I think that the specific empirical evidence in question needs to be thrown out merely because it is considered positive? No.
I’m not suggesting that we need to throw out all of the empirical evidence and replace it with some other “non positive” empirical evidence. As such, for the most part, we are in agreement about what empirical evidence is relevant.
03. Do I think evolution is the best explanation for the biological adaptations we observe? Yes.
So, we are in agreement about which theory we should adopt. Where I disagree is the role that empirical evidence plays in reaching that conclusion.
Specifically, I’m pointing out that observations of how those scientists reached that conclusion are comparable with conjecture and criticism as described by Popper. IOW, I’m not saying biologist can’t make any progress because they are completely mistaken about “positive evidence”. Rather they are mistaken about the role that evidence played in how they made that progress.
Scott: This is because modus tollens arguments (positive evidence) beg the question, but can be transformed as modus ponens (which is criticism).[Are] you going to ignore this yet again?
Jeff: I've never ignored it, Scott.
Then why is there nothing in your above response which addresses the question begging of modus ponens (which is ampliative) and how it can be transformed into modus tollens (which is critical and deductive)?
Jeff: I’ve pointed out that deduction is of no knowable worth if all propositions are a-plausible. That this is over your head is astonishing.
Except, as I’ve already clarified, I do not consider all propositions equal because some will have withstood criticism better than others. You seem to keep forgetting that you’re the Foundationalist, not I.
Scott: Except, as I’ve already clarified, I do not consider all propositions equal because some will have withstood criticism better than others.
DeleteJ: But you insist there is ZERO positive evidence for the claim that there are propositions that have withstood criticism, let alone better than others. Thus, the counter claim is not discernibly false or worse in any sense. So you take away with one hand what you give with another. You've mad no advance from absolute skepticism. You just don't realize it because you can't reason your way out of a wet paper bag.
Not that reason would amount to hill a beans to a non-foundationalist. No premises discernibly better than others, no conclusions discernibly better than others. Not rocket science, Scott.
DeleteScott: "This would have testable consequences for the present state of the system (earth's surface with the geological strata in it and the animal and plant species living on it) in the form of reptile-mammal transition fossils that should exist, in addition to other necessary features of the DNA, developmental systems, and so forth, of the present-day reptiles and mammals.”
DeleteIs there something about this you do not understand?
J: Yes. How do you know that if mammals are descendants of reptiles that there would be morphological transitions? And how do you know what they would look like? And how do you test any of this if you don't know events are caused, or that the LNC is true? You forget how much you deny is knowable. None of what Popper is saying makes a lick of sense in terms of his own epistemology.
Scott: Empiricism was an improvement because it promoted the importance of empirical evidence in science.
J: On the other hand, you insist that you can't know you have memories. So your claim is as a-plausible as its logical contrary, never mind whatever a-logical contraries might exist that you insist can't be ruled out.
Jeff: But you insist there is ZERO positive evidence for the claim that there are propositions that have withstood criticism, let alone better than others. Thus, the counter claim is not discernibly false or worse in any sense. So you take away with one hand what you give with another.
DeleteAgain, you’re clearly misrepresenting me. To say empirical evidence is not ampliative is not to say there is no empirical evidence. As I’ve already pointed out elsewhere, you’re confusing me with a disappointed justificationist. But, I’m not a justificationist.
Again, see Responses to the dilemma of the infinite regress versus dogmatism: http://www.the-rathouse.com/Bartley/Leeson-vol.html
Relativists tend to be disappointed justificationists who realise that positive justification cannot be achieved. From this premise they proceed to the conclusion that all positions are pretty much the same and none can really claim to be better than any other. There is no such thing as the truth, no way to get nearer to the truth and there is no such thing as a rational position.
By refusing to discard justificationism, you’re the one with the problem. You’re just projecting it on me.
Jeff: You've mad no advance from absolute skepticism.
Sounds to me like you’re claiming we cannot make progress on the issue.
Jeff: You just don't realize it because you can't reason your way out of a wet paper bag.
Says, who, Jeff, you? That’s particular rich coming from someone who has yet to even acknowledge, let alone reason his way past the criticisms of Foundationalism. Apparently, you think I can’t “reason my way out of a paper bag” because I refuse to ignore those same criticisms and have moved on to more rational forms of epistemology.
Scott: Is there something about this you do not understand?
DeleteJeff: Yes. How do you know that if mammals are descendants of reptiles that there would be morphological transitions?
Dariwinsm is the theory that the knowledge found in the genome of biological organisms is genuinely created over time via a form of trial and error. This is in contrast to having always existed, in which case, organisms could have immediately changed without any morphological transitions. You don’t need to create knowledge of how to build a mammal if it already exists.
Jeff: And how do you know what they would look like?
Given the above, why would you expect us to know what they will look like? We cannot predict the impact of the growth of knowledge. This is why we cannot predict evolutionary changes, despite being subject to the laws of physics. This is also why Cornelius’ objections of evolutionary “failures” are simply more handwaving.
Jeff: And how do you test any of this if you don't know events are caused, or that the LNC is true?
Disagreeing with you on what knowledge is and how we know it isn’t the same as suggesting we do not know anything and cannot make progress. That’s yet another example of hand waving.
Scott: This is in contrast to having always existed, in which case, organisms could have immediately changed without any morphological transitions.
DeleteWhat do I mean by this? One scenario includes the idea that cells were pre-programmed with the knowledge of how to create any organism. However, before the instructions of how to build organisms could have been pre-programmed those cells, that knowledge would have already existed in the designer, which it put it in the cells in some other form. So, it’s merely moving from one place to another.
And if that designer is God, who would supposedly have always known how to create any organism that existed in the past, exists today or could possibly exist in the future, then no genuinely new knowledge was actually created. It merely changed form.
This is why Creationism is misleadingly named; it actually denies that genuine creation actually took place.
Furthermore, this is implied in the case of ID, as the designer is abstract and has no defined limitations. If you doubt this, could ID’s designer have been a race of highly intelligent aliens? But, this simply will not do, as ID proponents will simply ask, “but who designed the aliens”, right?
Again, this sort of objection is based on the idea that knowledge in specific spheres comes from authoritative sources, rather than having genuinely created over time. This is why I keep saying the core of the conflict is epistemological in nature.
Scott: We cannot predict the impact of the growth of knowledge.
What do I mean by this?
The Unknowable & how to prepare for it: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SVgGYQ_5ID8
Jeff: the debate is not over natural selection
ReplyDeleteIt's over whether you can find the book you left on the table.
Z: It's over whether you can find the book you left on the table.
DeleteJ: Well, with the likes of you and Scott, yes. Because YOU are that clueless, apparently.
Ian Spedding:You [Hunter] studiously ignore the distinction between the fact of evolution - the observed phenomena which constitute the process - and the theory of evolution - a work-in-progress explanation of the observed process.
ReplyDeleteExactly.
Cornelius' not-very-successful attempts to blur this distinction, despite numerous attempts to clarify things for him suggests some form of
Oops premature post, though I clicked review, not post. Cornelius, your site is so cranky, both in the functionality and the broader meaning, it does not repay the effort of trying to comment here.
ReplyDeleteAlan, that's funny. You don't really believe that or you would not be here!
ReplyDeleteDr. Hunter, I appreciate very much that you opened comments to your posts again. Your kind and patient replies are evidence of your thoughtfulness. Your willingness to let them have their say demonstrates your openness to real scientific inquiry. And their comments, for the most part, prove your point.
ReplyDeleteJeff: But you insist there is ZERO positive evidence for the claim that there are propositions that have withstood criticism, let alone better than others.
ReplyDeleteWe didn't read that in his comments at all. Scott is pointing to positive evidence.
You seem to hijack every thread with the same sterile argument. Maybe Cornelius Hunter might start you a thread on just your chosen subject.
Z: We didn't read that in his comments at all. Scott is pointing to positive evidence.
DeleteJ: No, Z. Scott denies the human ability to discover positive evidence per se. He doesn't reassert the denial in every comment he makes. But that's beside the point. He claims to have "adopted" the LNC (even though he denies the ability to discover positive evidence for existence of memories), so I'm pointing out the absurdity of his claims. Just as I have your own. You can't discover positive evidence via your epistemology either. You're just too clueless to realize it. Scott is more accurate than you in that respect, if only serendipitously.
Jeff: Scott denies the human ability to discover positive evidence per se.
DeleteThat's very odd. Scott has pointed to confirmable evidence and identified it as such.
Jeff: You can't discover positive evidence via your epistemology either.
That's very odd. The book is still on the table.
Jeff: No, Z. Scott denies the human ability to discover positive evidence per se.
DeleteJeff, it's obvious that you're being disingenuous and Zachriel sees though it.
There can be evidence *for* evolution, just not in an ampliative sense. That’s because you cannot prove *anything* is true or probably true, let alone evolutionary theory.
So, you’re being disingenuous by focusing on definitions, rather than actually addressing my position, the issue behind it, etc.
Jeff: He claims to have "adopted" the LNC (even though he denies the ability to discover positive evidence for existence of memories), so I'm pointing out the absurdity of his claims.
They are not merely my claims, Jeff. Nor am I simply pulling them out of my *ss. I’m simply pointing out that Cornelius’ arguments are parochial because they ignore progress we, as human beings, have made in the field of epistemology. I have adopted Critical Rationalism because it has withstood the most criticism. This is in contrast to Foundationalism, which is a form of justificationism, and has not withstood rational criticism. But, by all means, please feel free to address those criticisms with something beyond the mere claim that we cannot know anything without Foundationalism. That is what it means to be a Foundationalist.
Furthermore, what you keep describing is compatible with Critical Rationalism. Again, you’re focusing on definitions, not the ideas behind them. Popper doesn’t deny that we can make progress, but that inductivists are confused about how we make that progress. Modus ponens can be transformed into modus tollens.
You have still yet to even acknowledge this, yet alone provide any useful criticism. Why do think this is the case?
Z: That's very odd. Scott has pointed to confirmable evidence and identified it as such.
ReplyDeleteJ: No, he denies, as I do, the logical possibility of naive falsificationism. And he denies there is positive evidence for the value of any criteria.
Jeff: You can't discover positive evidence via your epistemology either.
Z: That's very odd. The book is still on the table.
J: Because you say so?
Scott: That’s because you cannot prove *anything* is true or probably true, let alone evolutionary theory.
ReplyDeleteJ: Got that, Z?
Scott: They are not merely my claims, Jeff.
J: How do you know? And, yes, definitions are necessary to communicate.
Scott: Nor am I simply pulling them out of my *ss.
J: You don't know whether such things exist. Remember?
Scott: I’m simply pointing out that Cornelius’ arguments are parochial
J: After telling me that no claim is knowably true or even probably true (including the claim that there are such things as parochial arguments). Yes, I get it.
Scott: ... because they ignore progress we, as human beings, have made in the field of epistemology.
J: But you insist we can't know EITHER that any of the states of affairs entailed in that claim have ever been instantiated OR that the claim that those states of affairs have been instantiated is PROBABLE. Yes, I GET it.
Scott: I have adopted Critical Rationalism because it has withstood the most criticism.
J: And then you can't define "knowledge" while denying that your statement there is even knowably true or probable. Yes, I GET it.
Scott: This is in contrast to Foundationalism, which is a form of justificationism, and has not withstood rational criticism.
J: See above. Yes, I GET it. And, Scott: One can't apply criticism to foundationalism in a way that is implicative or indicative of anything knowably useful after denying that propositions have either knowable probability or relative probability.
Scott: But, by all means, please feel free to address those criticisms
J: I could make up other criteria. How would you criticize them in a way that is knowably useful? You don't even think we can know it's more probable than not that apparent memories have occurred.
Scott: with something beyond the mere claim that we cannot know anything without Foundationalism. That is what it means to be a Foundationalist.
J: Define "knowledge." Good luck.
Scott: Furthermore, what you keep describing is compatible with Critical Rationalism.
J: No, it's not. My view is that knowledge only exists IF foundationalism is true. And that we can't help BUT believe we know things. Your view essentially means that even if knowledge is caused, it can not be known WHAT causes it. But then how do you distinguish beliefs that are knowledge from beliefs that are NOT knowledge? Can't be done, Scott.
Scott: Popper doesn’t deny that we can make progress, but that inductivists are confused about how we make that progress.
J: This from the man who insists that he can't know it's probable that apparent memories occur.
Scott: Modus ponens can be transformed into modus tollens.
J: So what? Premises are either true or not. If they're not, conclusions are not knowably true. If they can't be known to be probable, conclusions can't be known to be probably true. Deduction is worthless without the VALIDITY of induction.
Scott: You have still yet to even acknowledge this,
J: I've acknowledged it over and over. I just realize it buys you nothing if no propositions are known to BE true or PROBABLY true. It's worse, Scott. You deny that RELATIVE probability of propositional claims is knowable. That's UTTER know-nothing-ism;
Scott: yet alone provide any useful criticism.
J: According to you, any claim that a criticism is useful is not only NOT knowable, but not knowably PROBABLE and not knowably RELATIVELY more or less probable than any OTHER claim. That includes that claim that some criteria are useful. But keep on pontificating. It's quite the hoot.
Jeff: Can one know it's more probable that it HAS utility than that it DOESN'T?
ReplyDeleteSure.
Jeff: As I'm understanding you, you would have to say no.
That's your black-and-white thinking again.
Jeff: Define evidence ...
Sense information that justifies a belief in a relevant claim; for instance, the book is on the table.
Jeff: A "sense" can consistently be defined as a class of sentient experience, implying nothing about stuff "out there."
It may or may not be about "stuff out there", however, once we both agree we see the book on the table, we have the beginnings of objectivity.
Jeff: But this means there can never BE positive evidence for "stuff out there" unless inductive criteria and it's axioms are simply KNOWN to be true.
That's the problem with someone who can't deal with uncertainty. Sure, we can't "prove" induction, however, we have experience, and we have confidence in induction. You insist on certainty, but you'll never have it. You can assume axioms for your philosophy, but you can't "prove" them.
Jeff: Why would I care about your (assuming a-plausibly and therefore contra parsimony that you exist!) arbitrariness over my own?
Because no matter how convoluted your philosophy, the book is on the table.
Jeff: Define evidence ...
DeleteZ: Sense information that justifies a belief in a relevant claim; for instance, the book is on the table.
J: Define "information" and "justifies."
Jeff: A "sense" can consistently be defined as a class of sentient experience, implying nothing about stuff "out there."
Z: It may or may not be about "stuff out there", however, once we both agree we see the book on the table, we have the beginnings of objectivity.
J: Not when you've already denied the ability to know I actually exist. You keep re-smuggling in as objective what you've already insisted is merely subjective. I see now why you don't find the occurrence of actual memories particularly plausible.
Jeff: But this means there can never BE positive evidence for "stuff out there" unless inductive criteria and it's axioms are simply KNOWN to be true.
Z: That's the problem with someone who can't deal with uncertainty.
J: But I can. It's you that claims we can't know that one proposition is more plausible than another.
Z: Sure, we can't "prove" induction,
J: Nor can we prove its axioms.
Z: however, we have experience,
J: You can't know that if you deny the knowability of the occurrence of memories.
Z: and we have confidence in induction.
J: Right. But I'm consistent in that confidence and you are utterly inconsistent. You just keep forgetting what you've denied previously.
Z: You insist on certainty, but you'll never have it.
J: Certainty can simply be an inability to be radically skeptical. IOW, it can be the existential impossibility of doubting EVERYTHING. In that sense, most (probably all) people are certain about something.
Z: You can assume axioms for your philosophy, but you can't "prove" them.
J: But we don't originate them voluntarily. They occur naturally. Then we can retroactively deny them or not VOLUNTARILY. But to deny them all is to be left with no axioms to USE for INFERENCES. The question is, do we agree on those naturally-formed beliefs that function as axioms that are necessary for deductive and inductive reasoning or not? It matters NOT whether they're true. What matters is that we BELIEVE them. THEN we can have something to argue about INDUCTIVELY.
Jeff: Why would I care about your (assuming a-plausibly and therefore contra parsimony that you exist!) arbitrariness over my own?
Z: Because no matter how convoluted your philosophy, the book is on the table.
J: How do you know? Just pontificating isn't science, Z. Or is that how you define science?
Jeff: No, he denies, as I do, the logical possibility of naive falsificationism.
ReplyDeleteSo do we! All observations are fraught with uncertainty.
Falsification is just another observation. We set up a dichotomy, one that divides the universe into a very tiny sliver, and everything else. However, the universe doesn't always cooperate. The division may not be clean. The observation may not mean what we think it means. Even the most direct falsification may be problematic.
Jeff: Because you say so?
You can pretend it's not. While we can't have absolute certainty, the book is almost certainly on the table. We can see it there. We can touch it, flip its pages. Others have come up and confirmed the book to be there. Scientists have written treatises on the book on the table. Philosophers have debated the meaning of "table" and "book" and "on". Yet, the book is there, on the table.
That's not absolute "proof", of course, but it very strong evidence nonetheless.
Jeff: No, he denies, as I do, the logical possibility of naive falsificationism.
DeleteZ: So do we! All observations are fraught with uncertainty.
J: That's not why naive falsificationism is impossible. Naive falsificationism is impossible once you deny the existence of any criteria for distinguishing between false memories and merely apparent memories, or sense "perceptions" and illusions, etc. But you two refuse to grant that even inductive criteria are non-arbitrary. Thus, absolutely nothing is knowable -- not even whether any proposition is more plausible than any other. You're left with an infinite set of merely logically conceivable histories, none of which can be shown to be more plausible than another.
Z: Falsification is just another observation. We set up a dichotomy, one that divides the universe into a very tiny sliver, and everything else. However, the universe doesn't always cooperate.
J: You're confusion is awe-inspiring. You can't even warrantedly infer THAT a universe exists, dude. You don't know anything to GET that far.
Scott: They are not merely my claims, Jeff.
ReplyDeleteJeff: How do you know?
I’m a Popperian, Jeff. Not Karl Popper, William Bartley, etc. They are not my ideas, I’ve only adopted them.
Jeff: And, yes, definitions are necessary to communicate.
Remind me, exactly what kind of empiricist did Cornelius say he was? Oh, right. He’s refused to do so, despite being directly asked to do so over and over again.
Also, from the Wikipedia entry on Epistemology…
Epistemology […] is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge[1][2] and is also referred to as "theory of knowledge". It questions what knowledge is and how it can be acquired, and the extent to which knowledge pertinent to any given subject or entity can be acquired.
Are you suggesting that the entire field of Epistemology doesn’t exist, since the question of what is knowledge and how it’s acquired is settled and we cannot make any progress on the subject?
Scott: I’m simply pointing out that Cornelius’ arguments are parochial because they ignore progress we, as human beings, have made in the field of epistemology.
Jeff: After telling me that no claim is knowably true or even probably true (including the claim that there are such things as parochial arguments). Yes, I get it.
Again, it’s obvious that you are misrepresenting me as you didn’t even quote the entire sentence I wrote, which has been key to my argument. (see above)
To quote Popper…
The question about the sources of our knowledge . . . has always been asked in the spirit of: ‘What are the best sources of our knowledge—the most reliable ones, those which will not lead us into error, and those to which we can and must turn, in case of doubt, as the last court of appeal?’ I propose to assume, instead, that no such ideal sources exist—no more than ideal rulers—and that all ‘sources’ are liable to lead us into error at times. And I propose to replace, therefore, the question of the sources of our knowledge by the entirely different question: ‘How can we hope to detect and eliminate error?’
IOW, his arguments are parochial because they are assuming there is only one question we can ask regarding the growth of knowledge. Personally disagreeing with this wouldn’t make his argument any less parochial.
Scott: Furthermore, what you keep describing is compatible with Critical Rationalism.
Jeff: No, it's not. My view is that knowledge only exists IF foundationalism is true.
As I’ve already pointed out, that’s non-controversial, Jeff. I’m talking about the description of the actual steps you take when pressed (and you actually respond).
Take the following observations. When placed in close proximity, a piece of steel moves towards a magnet. Since we cannot observe causes, this observation is both compatible with the idea that magnets attract specific kinds of metals or that some supernatural being decides to directly intercede, at every instance, and pull specific kinds of metal closer to magnets when they are in close proximity.
So, while you are correct in that the ideas about knowledge grows, such as Foundationalism and Critical Rationalism, are not compatible with each other, I’m referring to the description that inductivists and Foundationalists give when describing how they reach conclusions.
Example?
Again, walk me though the steps of how you determine if a belief is non-basic, and requires justification, or basic, and does not require justification. What you will describe, in practice, is compatible with conjecture and criticism.
Scott: Modus ponens can be transformed into modus tollens.
ReplyDeleteJeff: So what? Premises are either true or not. If they're not, conclusions are not knowably true. If they can't be known to be probable, conclusions can't be known to be probably true.
How do you know they are true, Jeff? If we knew we lived in a world where the premise is actually true, you’d have something there. But, as of yet, you haven’t explained how you actually know this, in practice. (see my question above) As such, premises represent a form of conjecture. A guess. We then look for ways to falsify our guesses in the form of criticisms, tentatively discard those to be found in error and adopt ones that best survive criticism.
Any modus ponens argument can be transformed into modus tollens. As such, positive arguments are also compatible with deductive arguments. Popper provided a better explanation for the same observations.
Jeff: Deduction is worthless without the VALIDITY of induction.
How did you get that from the former part of the paragraph quoted above? Walk me through it. Or are you simply just towing the Foundationalist line?
Also, from the following article on uncertainty: http://nautil.us/issue/2/uncertainty/why-its-good-to-be-wrong
”Fallibilism, correctly understood, implies the possibility, not the impossibility, of knowledge, because the very concept of error, if taken seriously, implies that truth exists and can be found. The inherent limitation on human reason, that it can never find solid foundations for ideas, does not constitute any sort of limit on the creation of objective knowledge nor, therefore, on progress. The absence of foundation, whether infallible or probable, is no loss to anyone except tyrants and charlatans, because what the rest of us want from ideas is their content, not their provenance: If your disease has been cured by medical science, and you then become aware that science never proves anything but only disproves theories (and then only tentatively), you do not respond “oh dear, I’ll just have to die, then.”
Scott: Also, from the Wikipedia entry on Epistemology…
DeleteEpistemology […] is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge[1][2] and is also referred to as "theory of knowledge". It questions what knowledge is and how it can be acquired, and the extent to which knowledge pertinent to any given subject or entity can be acquired.
J: K. You saw it right there: Epistemology […] is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature ... of knowledge. Now put your big boy britches on and define knowledge ONCE and for ALL.
Jeff: Now put your big boy britches on and define knowledge ONCE and for ALL.
DeleteFirst, I've already made summaries and pointed to references on the question. That you happen to disagree doesn't mean a definition has not been provided.
Second, you do realize you've just made my point for me. Right?
IOW, the idea that we should define knowable ONCE and for ALL implies that we have (or should have) some definition of knowledge that does not improve and that we cannot make progress on.
But that's your conception of human knowledge, which you're projecting on me.
Scott (quoting): ”Fallibilism, correctly understood, implies the possibility, not the impossibility, of knowledge,
DeleteJ: According to wikipedia:
"Fallibilism (from medieval Latin fallibilis, "liable to err") is the philosophical principle that human beings could be wrong about their beliefs, expectations, or their understanding of the world, and yet still be justified in holding their incorrect beliefs."
I thought you didn't believe beliefs could be justified?
Scott: IOW, the idea that we should define knowable ONCE and for ALL implies that we have (or should have) some definition of knowledge that does not improve and that we cannot make progress on.
DeleteJ: You can't make progress on IDENTIFYING what knowledge is because "identification" is defined AS as species of knowledge. But it can't be known to be a species if you don't know what the class is. All we can do is demarcate the axioms and criteria we call knowledge and go from there. But please tell me when it was determined that humans changed their mind about the criteria of parsimony and breadth of predictive explanation and the axioms of causality, law of identity, categories of more/less, etc.
Indeed, Scott, how do we even interpret ancient texts without assuming they thought like we do except for the kinds of differences of opinion that we know still exist due to too little information or just plain selfishness. Both these limit one's ability to think clearly.
DeleteFrom the article..
DeleteA fallibilist cannot claim to be infallible even about fallibilism itself.
No, it doesn't, Jeff. At least, not in the sense you're implying.
From the very same Wikipedia entry...
Unlike skepticism, fallibilism does not imply the need to abandon our knowledge; we need not have logically conclusive justifications for what we know. Rather, it is an admission that, because empirical knowledge can be revised by further observation, any of the things we take as knowledge might possibly turn out to be false.
Of course, you'd have to understand this difference before you can provide genuine criticism. This sort of question indicates you're squabbling over definitions, rather than actually paying attention to the ideas being presented.
Scott: we need not have logically conclusive justifications for what we know.
DeleteJ: This depends COMPLETELY on the definition of knowledge. All logical consistency ( and you CLAIM you adopt the LNC) DEPENDS on clear definition. So put those britches on and get after it.
Jeff: So what? Premises are either true or not.
ReplyDeleteScott: How do you know they are true, Jeff?
J: Scott, maybe this is your problem. You don't read what I say. What's the "they" you're referring to? The LNC is a single proposition. Granted, It's truth is required for its intelligibility, but that's beside the point. It's still just ONE proposition.
Oh, and Z, the LNC is not an abstraction from observations. Observations aren't intelligibly contrastable with non-observations UNLESS the LNC/Law of Identity is valid.
Scott: Modus ponens can be transformed into modus tollens.
DeleteJeff: So what? Premises are either true or not. If they're not, conclusions are not knowably true. If they can't be known to be probable, conclusions can't be known to be probably true.
Scott: How do you know they are true, Jeff? If we knew we lived in a world where the premise is actually true, you’d have something there. But, as of yet, you haven’t explained how you actually know this, in practice. (see my question above) As such, premises represent a form of conjecture. A guess.
Jeff: Scott, maybe this is your problem. You don't read what I say. What's the "they" you're referring to?
Gee Jeff, I think what you meant by “they” is reasonably clear when viewed in context. But, you keep quoting fragments of my responses. Why do you think that might be the case?
Jeff: The LNC is a single proposition. Granted, It's truth is required for its intelligibility, but that's beside the point. It's still just ONE proposition.
Can you point out where the comment I responded to you referenced the LoNC? Please be specific.
Also, I’ve already explained why I’ve adopted the LoNC. I don’t have any good criticisms of it. Again, why don’t you explain your criteria for differentiating between non-basic beliefs and basic beliefs. For example, do you have any good criticisms of the LoNC, Jeff? I’m guessing you don’t either.
Jeff: If science ONLY disproves, then the claim that you've had a disease and that it's been cured and that it was cured by science is not a valid claim.
Not valid under which philosophy of science, Jeff, your’s? And exactly how might that work, in practice? Please be specific.
For example, what about the logical positivists, Jeff? In the 1820s, they thought statements were meaningless unless they could be verified. The idea gained traction until it drew escalated criticism around 1945.
From the Wikipedia entry on Logical Positivism….
It was clear that empirical claims cannot be verified universally true.[14] Thus, as initially stated, the verifiability criterion made universal statements meaningless, and even made statements beyond empiricism for technological but not conceptual reasons meaningless, which would pose significant problems for science.[22][35][36] These problems were recognized within the movement, which hosted attempted solutions—Carnap's move to confirmation, Ayer's acceptance of weak verification—but the program drew sustained criticism from a number of directions by the 1950s. Even philosophers disagreeing among themselves on which direction general epistemology ought to take, as well as on philosophy of science, agreed that the logical empiricist program was untenable, and it became viewed as self contradictory.[37] The verifiability criterion of meaning was itself unverified.[37]
Popper, among others, is credited with criticisms of the idea and it’s falling out. So, it would seem that we’ve had many ideas about what knowledge is. And ideas such as Critical Rationalism will and have been improved upon. That’s not merely implied in an inductivist sense, because it has in the past, but because of our explanations about how knowledge grows (how the world works).
Scott: Also, I’ve already explained why I’ve adopted the LoNC. I don’t have any good criticisms of it.
DeleteJ: You also have no bad NON-CIRCULAR criticisms of it. That's the relevant point. There is no way to INTELLIGIBLY criticize it. The LNC/LOI is just another way of saying we can distinguish. If we can't distinguish, we can't intelligibly criticize. You're really confused.
Article: If your disease has been cured by medical science, and you then become aware that science never proves anything but only disproves theories (and then only tentatively), you do not respond “oh dear, I’ll just have to die, then.”
ReplyDeleteJ: If science ONLY disproves, then the claim that you've had a disease and that it's been cured and that it was cured by science is not a valid claim. Remember, Scott, you're claiming science doesn't cure. Science ONLY disproves theories. This is why I know you haven't "adopted" the LNC. You violate it incessantly.
J: And, Z, if science ONLY disproves theories, then it doesn't produce positive evidence -- unless of course you just define the disproof of a theory as the production of positive evidence. But of course no theory can be disproved if the LNC is not just KNOWN to be valid. Indeed, the very nature of the concept requires that the law of identity is valid. And the LNC is just the law of identity at the propositional level.
ReplyDeleteJeff: No, it's not. My view is that knowledge only exists IF foundationalism is true.
ReplyDeleteScott: As I’ve already pointed out, that’s non-controversial, Jeff.
J: On the contrary, Scott. You have claimed ALL knowledge is created from non-knowledge. Foundationalism claims knowledge must exist in axiomatic form before it can exist ALSO in inferential form. Your claim is then denied by you to be EITHER axiomatic knowledge OR therefore inferential knowledge. As a foundationalist rationalist, I have yet to hear what other class of knowledge there is other than axiomatic or inferential/derived. I don't think such knowledge is even DEFINABLE. And you have thus far given evidence of that.
Scott: Furthermore, what you keep describing is compatible with Critical Rationalism.
DeleteJeff: No, it's not. My view is that knowledge only exists IF foundationalism is true.
Scott: As I’ve already pointed out, that’s non-controversial, Jeff. I’m talking about the description of the actual steps you take when pressed (and you actually respond).
Scott: So, while you are correct in that the ideas about knowledge grows, such as Foundationalism and Critical Rationalism, are not compatible with each other, I’m referring to the description that inductivists and Foundationalists give when describing how they reach conclusions. .
Jeff: On the contrary, Scott. You have claimed ALL knowledge is created from non-knowledge.
I’m suggesting that knowledge genuinely grows, Jeff. That it did not necessarily exist before. If that’s what you mean by “ALL knowledge is created from non-knowledge”, then yes. Otherwise, I’m at a loss as to what you mean by this or it’s relevance.
Jeff: Foundationalism claims knowledge must exist in axiomatic form before it can exist ALSO in inferential form.
So what, Jeff? Again, this is non-controversial. I’m talking about the explanations behind the steps people take.
Jeff: Your claim is then denied by you to be EITHER axiomatic knowledge OR therefore inferential knowledge.
In Critical Rationalism, axioms are simply the deepest level of explanation we currently have. Otherwise, they have no special status. This doesn’t imply that physics does not serve as the foundation of many theories. Criticism consists of taking theories seriously, in that we assume they are true in reality, for the purpose of criticism, along with the rest of our current, best theories, and that all of our observations should conform to them.
Jeff: As a foundationalist rationalist, I have yet to hear what other class of knowledge there is other than axiomatic or inferential/derived. I don't think such knowledge is even DEFINABLE. And you have thus far given evidence of that.
For someone who claims to know they have memories, you’re quite forgetful. Again, your disagreement doesn’t mean such a class hasn’t been provided.
Scott (quoting): The absence of foundation, whether infallible or probable, is no loss to anyone except tyrants and charlatans,
ReplyDeleteJ: This is claim utterly unknowable per critical rationalism.
Scott (quoting): The inherent limitation on human reason, that it can never find solid foundations for ideas, does not constitute any sort of limit on the creation of objective knowledge
J: That claim is utterly unknowable per critical rationalism. Critical rationalism MEANS that it can't be known WHETHER criteria are valid for generating objective conclusions. Critical rationalism can't account at all for WHETHER there is such a thing as objective knowledge. And what does knowledge even mean if it isn't OBJECTIVE?
Scott (quoting): The absence of foundation, whether infallible or probable, is no loss to anyone except tyrants and charlatans, because what the rest of us want from ideas is their content, not their provenance:
DeleteScott (quoting): ”Fallibilism, correctly understood, implies the possibility, not the impossibility, of knowledge, because the very concept of error, if taken seriously, implies that truth exists and can be found. The inherent limitation on human reason, that it can never find solid foundations for ideas, does not constitute any sort of limit on the creation of objective knowledge nor, therefore, on progress.
Quote mining yet again Jeff? Seems pretty desperate of you.
Jeff: That claim is utterly unknowable per critical rationalism. Critical rationalism MEANS that it can't be known WHETHER criteria are valid for generating objective conclusions. Critical rationalism can't account at all for WHETHER there is such a thing as objective knowledge. And what does knowledge even mean if it isn't OBJECTIVE?
It’s not? Then why did Popper write a book called Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach? Do you know the arguments he put forth there? What are your criticisms of his view?
If your approach to criticizing Popper is another example of how you “criticize” theories, then it’s unclear why should I even bother responding to your objections on evolutionary theory.
Jeff: Oh, and Z, the LNC is not an abstraction from observations.
ReplyDeleteStart with dichotomy. We see the book on the table.
Jeff: Observations aren't intelligibly contrastable with non-observations UNLESS the LNC/Law of Identity is valid.
Your personal limitations are not incumbent on others.
In any case, we see the book. That divides the observed universe. It doesn't mean it's the only way to divide the universe. It doesn't mean the identification is perfect, or that there's no overlap between the book and the rest of the universe. We abstract this to a dichotomy, but the abstraction is *only a representation*. Neither the universe nor our minds have to fit within the narrow confines of the dichotomy, or your philosophy.
Jeff: Oh, and Z, the LNC is not an abstraction from observations.
ReplyDeleteZ: Start with dichotomy. We see the book on the table.
J: It's not a dichotomy. There are multiple relationships entailed in the proposition if it is conveying the idea of "stuff out there." Any or all of them could be false per you. Thus, the number of logically conceivable possibilities is more than two.
Jeff: Observations aren't intelligibly contrastable with non-observations UNLESS the LNC/Law of Identity is valid.
Z: Your personal limitations are not incumbent on others.
J: Limitations is irrelevant to rational criticism. If you can transcend the law of identity in your thinking, that doesn't change the fact that you can't communicate apart from propositions whose only intelligibility to humans qua humans is grounded in the law of identity. Science is a HUMAN pursuit isn't it, Z? Or is it just the pursuit of a small minority for a value only TO that minority at the expense of everyone else? Or is it indefinable to humans QUA humans? IOW, is it only intelligible to some evolutionary advanced race of homo?
In any case, we see the book. That divides the observed universe. It doesn't mean it's the only way to divide the universe. It doesn't mean the identification is perfect, or that there's no overlap between the book and the rest of the universe. We abstract this to a dichotomy, but the abstraction is *only a representation*. Neither the universe nor our minds have to fit within the narrow confines of the dichotomy, or your philosophy.
I forgot to delete off the last part of your response, Z. I wasn't leaving there intentionally to convey anything.
DeleteJeff: It's not a dichotomy.
ReplyDeleteNow you got it!
Jeff: It's not a dichotomy.
DeleteZ: Now you got it!
J: This makes it worse for your position, not better. If there were only 2, you'd at least have 50-50 chance of being right. As it is, there's an infinite number of just logically conceivable histories, never mind a-logical ones. And in the meanwhile, you have no ability to even know that one proposition is even RELATIVELY more plausible/probable than another.
Jeff: As it is, there's an infinite number of just logically conceivable histories, never mind a-logical ones.
DeleteWe've been over this before, Jeff.
Explanatory theories are explanations about how the world works. This is in contrast to mere logical possibilities, of which there are an infinite number.
Good explanations for phenomena are hard to come by. While they start out as conjecture, they are subject to criticism in many forms, including empirical testing. So, they are not merely guess, as you're implying, but good explanatory theories, which are rare.
Jeff: And in the meanwhile, you have no ability to even know that one proposition is even RELATIVELY more plausible/probable than another.
Again, if by proposition you mean logical possibility, then yes. But in science, the goal is a good explanations about how the world works, not merely logical possibilities.
Scott: Explanatory theories are explanations about how the world works. This is in contrast to mere logical possibilities, of which there are an infinite number.
DeleteJ: When you deny that it's plausible or probable that apparent memories have occurred, the distinction is non-derivable nor self-evident. So I'll ask again, what 3rd category of knowledge is there besides axioms (whether criteria, relations, etc) and conclusions DERIVED therefrom inferentially?
That's the point, Scott. Everything you say is indistinguishable from arbitrary ramblings per your epistemology. And yet you think CH, if he exists as per your wild speculation, should give a jack squat what you think. CH knows that real scientists who to argue for research funding can't say that there is no such thing as positive evidence for ANY claim whatsoever. So you're literally irrelevant to these conversations. No significant number of self-proclaimed scientists are going to publicly claim your degree of know-nothing-ism out of one side of their mouth while asking for money from taxpayers out of the other. Yet, at least. Be patient.
Jeff: When you deny that it's plausible or probable that apparent memories have occurred, the distinction is non-derivable nor self-evident.
DeleteThat would only the case if I were a disappointed Justificationist, Jeff. We’ve been over this before.
Jeff: So I'll ask again, what 3rd category of knowledge is there besides axioms (whether criteria, relations, etc) and conclusions DERIVED therefrom inferentially?
For someone who suppedly has memories….
http://www.the-rathouse.com/Bartley/Leeson-vol.html
3. Responses to the dilemma of the infinite regress versus dogmatism
In the light of the dilemma of the infinite regress versus dogmatism, we can discern three attitudes towards positions: relativism, “true belief” and critical rationalism [Note 3]
Relativists tend to be disappointed justificationists who realise that positive justification cannot be achieved. From this premise they proceed to the conclusion that all positions are pretty much the same and none can really claim to be better than any other. There is no such thing as the truth, no way to get nearer to the truth and there is no such thing as a rational position.
True believers embrace justificationism. They insist that some positions are better than others though they accept that there is no logical way to establish a positive justification for an belief. They accept that we make our choice regardless of reason: "Here I stand!". Most forms of rationalism up to date have, at rock bottom, shared this attitude with the irrationalists and other dogmatists because they share the theory of justificationism.
According to the critical rationalists, the exponents of critical preference, no position can be positively justified but it is quite likely that one (or more) will turn out to be better than others in the light of critical discussion and tests. This type of rationality holds all its positions and propositions open to criticism and a standard objection to this stance is that it is empty; just holding our positions open to criticism provides no guidance as to what position we should adopt in any particular situation. This criticism misses its mark for two reasons. First, critical rationalism is not a position. It is not directed at solving the kind of problems that are solved by fixing on a position. It is concerned with the way that such positions are adopted, criticised, defended and relinquished. Second, Bartley did provide guidance on adopting positions; we may adopt the position that to this moment has stood up to criticism most effectively. Of course this is no help for people who seek stronger reasons for belief, but that is a problem for them, and it does not undermine the logic of critical preference.
Liberalism has been forced to constantly work against the grain of the received opinions, locked in place by the justificationist or true belief mindset so the gains of one generation have often been lost to the forces of irrationalism and authoritarianism in the next. But the really penetrating insight provided by Bartley’s work is that traditional theories of rationality (based on the assumption of justificationism) perpetuate the justificationist tradition/framework/mindset and hence the dilemma of the infinite regress versus dogmatism. Hence it seems that rationalists of the justificationist variety, like Bertrand Russell (who was described as a “passionate skeptic”, unwittingly nurture the framework that creates so many problems for rationalists.
Again …
DeleteIn Critical Rationalism, [what you call] axioms are simply the deepest level of explanation we currently have. Otherwise, they have no special status. This doesn’t imply that physics does not serve as the foundation of many theories [but that it’s not logically justified by that foundation]. Criticism consists of taking theories seriously, in that we assume they are true in reality, for the purpose of criticism, along with the rest of our current, best theories, and that all of our observations should conform to them.
I don’t know how to make this any clearer. Had you actually taken the time to read the references I’ve provided, you’d understand this. But, apparently, your strategy is to remain willfully ignorant.
Foundationism is a very specific explanation about the world works, not merely what we will observe. Again, it seems that you cannot recognize that your conception of human knowledge is an idea that is subject to criticism.
That's the point, Scott. Everything you say is indistinguishable from arbitrary ramblings per your epistemology.
DeleteIf I was a disappointed justificationist, then yes. But, as I’ve pointed out, I’m not a justificationist. You are.
Relativists tend to be disappointed justificationists who realise that positive justification cannot be achieved. From this premise they proceed to the conclusion that all positions are pretty much the same and none can really claim to be better than any other. There is no such thing as the truth, no way to get nearer to the truth and there is no such thing as a rational position.
Jeff: And yet you think CH, if he exists as per your wild speculation, should give a jack squat what you think.
First, all I need to do is point out that CH’s arguments are parochial. And I’ve done just that. When he says evolutionary theory conflicts with “the science” he’s assuming there is just one “science” and that it conflicts with the theory. But, as I’ve pointed out, this simply isn’t true. Example? See the link on Popper and evolution from the NCSE.
Second, of course he doesn’t care. He made that clear when he refuses to disclose exactly what kind of empiricist he is. So, he’s not interested in presenting genuine criticism. Rather, he’s throwing “mud” at a theory he personally finds objectionable in hope that something sticks.
Third, he knows his target audience already believes that knowledge in specific spheres comes from authoritative sources. So, he doesn’t need to convince them of something they already believe. As such, why bother? Not to mention that, if he explicitly tried, this would implicitly concede that his argument is parochial.
So, of course, he isn’t going to respond. No one here is claiming CH is stupid.
Jeff: CH knows that real scientists who to argue for research funding can't say that there is no such thing as positive evidence for ANY claim whatsoever. So you're literally irrelevant to these conversations.
Which is a blatant attempt to misrepresentation of my position, as I’ve pointed out over and over again. Specifically, you’re assuming that empirical evidence can only play one role, and that it cannot be used to narrow down explanatory theories.
Again, from the Wikipedia entry on Logical Positivism….
It was clear that empirical claims cannot be verified universally true.[14] Thus, as initially stated, the verifiability criterion made universal statements meaningless, and even made statements beyond empiricism for technological but not conceptual reasons meaningless, which would pose significant problems for science.[22][35][36] These problems were recognized within the movement, which hosted attempted solutions—Carnap's move to confirmation, Ayer's acceptance of weak verification—but the program drew sustained criticism from a number of directions by the 1950s. Even philosophers disagreeing among themselves on which direction general epistemology ought to take, as well as on philosophy of science, agreed that the logical empiricist program was untenable, and it became viewed as self contradictory.[37] The verifiability criterion of meaning was itself unverified.[37]
So, it seems that you’re confused about what scientists actually believe or think we haven’t made progress beyond the 1920’s.
For example, are you saying David Deutsch, who is a Popperian, isn’t a real scientist?
Furthermore, CH claims that God could have created the world we observe via method X and that anything impacted by that specific creation method isn’t science. But as I’ve pointed out, there are an infinite number of other ways that God could have created this very same world, which would render virtual everything non-science.
So, again, his argument is parochial. He’s just throwing mud at a theory he finds objectionable in the hope that something sticks.
Scott: Jeff: When you deny that it's plausible or probable that apparent memories have occurred, the distinction is non-derivable nor self-evident.
DeleteThat would only the case if I were a disappointed Justificationist, Jeff. We’ve been over this before.
J: No, Scott. If you don't know you remember, you can't know you're remembering what happened. Thus you can't know anything about a "world" that's "out there." Your confusion is UTTER.
Scott (quoting): "According to the critical rationalists, the exponents of critical preference, no position can be positively justified but it is quite likely that one (or more) will turn out to be better than others in the light of critical discussion and tests."
DeleteJ: Out of one side of the mouth it's admitted that there are no test criteria that are evidently true. But then, out of the other side of the math, the "god" insists that he/she can create EX NIHILO (since test criteria aren't knowably valueable) knowably "better" positions.
One can only marvel. If these people were denying the law of contradiction, it would be one thing. Because then the the "three" But at least Scott insists he's adopted it.
And what, other than the LNC/LOI can be assumed in the following statement?:
'In the light of the dilemma of the infinite regress versus dogmatism, we can discern three attitudes towards positions: relativism, “true belief” and critical rationalism.'
But that's just wrong. There's precisely 2 possibilities conceivable in terms of the LNC/LOI. Either foundationalism is valid, or no distinction between knowledge and non-knowledge is conceivable. This is why non-foundationalists can't even define knowledge. To define is to CONSCIOUSLY demarcate/distinguish. But no one can consistently claim to be conscious of having demarcated or distinguished if one denies HAVING remembered on the grounds that no propositions/positions are obviously true or distinguishably more or less probably true. You need the capacity to do the latter distinction to know WHETHER you've made the other distinction.
Thus, critical rationalists are stuck in ABSOLUTE skepticism IF the LNC is a valid principle. If the LNC is not a valid principle, it's obvious that no one could know the number of a-logical possibilities there might be..
Jeff: When you deny that it's plausible or probable that apparent memories have occurred, the distinction is non-derivable nor self-evident.
DeleteScott: That would only the case if I were a disappointed Justificationist, Jeff. We’ve been over this before.
Jeff: No, Scott. If you don't know you remember, you can't know you're remembering what happened. Thus you can't know anything about a "world" that's "out there." Your confusion is UTTER.
You’re implying I have a problem that you don’t.
First, it’s the opposite. I’ve discarded justificationism. You, on the other hand, have not. As such, the problem is your’s to answer. You’re the foundationalist, Jeff, not me.
Second, for the umpteenth time, how does Foundationalism solve the problem of you *knowing* you remembered what happened? If you define knowledge as having a foundation or being logically justified, while not explaining how this actually works, in practice, then you’re merely towing the Foundationalist line. Of course, wouldn’t “know” I have memories as you merely defined it a narrow scope.
But this would be a parochial argument as it ignores the entire field of epistemology. And, having pointed this out over and over again, it’s disingenuous at best.
Apparently, you *feel* it’s obvious that we have memories. But, while it might seem that way psychologically, as hindsight is 20/20, when we take the idea seriously, we find it doesn’t survive rational criticism. Specifically, the idea isn’t “out there” anywhere for us to observe. Rather Popper suggests that it’s actually due to a overwhelming number of criticisms we apply at the conscious and unconscious level. We accept it because we have no good criticisms of the idea.
That we actually have memories is an idea that is extremely hard to vary without significantly reducing it’s ability to explain a great deal of phenomena. So, it’s a good explanation. The same can be said about many other ideas you consider obvious, should you choose to rationally criticize them.
I do not have any good criticisms of the idea that I have actual memories, so I have not discarded it. I’m guessing you have no good criticisms of it either, right? But, in my case, the same cannot be said for justificationism. I have good criticisms of it, so I have discarded it, along with its problems. So, no, I’m not a disappointed Justificationist as you keep implying.
Again, what is your criteria for determining the boundary between non-basic ideas that need to be justified and basic ideas that do not. Please be specific.
Why is getting an answer to this question like pulling teeth?
Jeff: Out of one side of the mouth it's admitted that there are no test criteria that are evidently true.
DeleteWrong. You’re using a narrow view of the role of evidence and truth. Again, it’s parochial.
Jeff: But then, out of the other side of the math, the "god" insists that he/she can create EX NIHILO (since test criteria aren't knowably valueable) knowably "better" positions.
I must be a justificationist because my concept of human knowledge just so happens to intersect with the role played by your conception of God? Really?
'In the light of the dilemma of the infinite regress versus dogmatism, we can discern three attitudes towards positions: relativism, “true belief” and critical rationalism.’
Jeff: But that's just wrong. There's precisely 2 possibilities conceivable in terms of the LNC/LOI. Either foundationalism is valid, or no distinction between knowledge and non-knowledge is conceivable.
Yes, Jeff. You’ve made it clear that it’s wrong, given *your* view. But you haven’t explained why this is the case, let alone what the LoNC has do with it. Why don’t you walk me though it, Jeff? Why are they locally contradictory. Because they are defined that way by justificationism? But that’s the entire point of the paper on Bartley.
To quote from: http://nautil.us/issue/2/uncertainty/why-its-good-to-be-wrong
”The theory of knowledge is a tightrope that is the only path from A to B, with a long, hard drop for anyone who steps off on one side into “knowledge is impossible, progress is an illusion” or on the other side into “I must be right, or at least probably right.” Indeed, infallibilism and nihilism are twins. Both fail to understand that mistakes are not only inevitable, they are correctable (fallibly). Which is why they both abhor institutions of substantive criticism and error correction, and denigrate rational thought as useless or fraudulent. They both justify the same tyrannies. They both justify each other.”
Jeff: To define is to CONSCIOUSLY demarcate/distinguish. But no one can consistently claim to be conscious of having demarcated or distinguished if one denies HAVING remembered on the grounds that no propositions/positions are obviously true or distinguishably more or less probably true.
Please provide a quote of me denying that I have memories. I’ve asked for this several times now, and you have yet to produce any. So, kindly put up or stop putting words in my mouth.
Again, disagreeing with you on what it means to know we have memories or how we know it does not constitute a denial that I have memories.
Jeff: Thus, critical rationalists are stuck in ABSOLUTE skepticism IF the LNC is a valid principle. If the LNC is not a valid principle, it's obvious that no one could know the number of a-logical possibilities there might be..
Again, this would only be the case if you deny the entire field of epistemology. This would be yet another case where you deny that we can and have made progress.
Z: Again, what is your criteria for determining the boundary between non-basic ideas that need to be justified and basic ideas that do not. Please be specific.
DeleteJ: We seek parsimony for the set of beliefs that are necessary to our satisfaction. As such, that search is inductive. As such, people will differ in opinion on the matter. You think you're saying something significant by trading "obvious" for "take seriously." To take seriously what is not now nor ever can be obvious to you is to BE a radical skeptic. Because it is to take SERIOUSLY the idea that you're probably never accurately remembering what was or wasn't "taken seriously."
Scott, no one lives like that. They speak to one another as if many beliefs are shared because they're OBVIOUS enough to take seriously in choice adjudication unto our satisfaction. But there's always difference in opinion in inductive matters.
The progress we make in epistemology is in increasing the parsimony for the set of those axiomatic beliefs that we can use to attain that breadth of PREDICTIVE explanation SEEMINGLY conducive to our satisfaction.
I've been over this before.
Jeff: Thus, critical rationalists are stuck in ABSOLUTE skepticism IF the LNC is a valid principle. If the LNC is not a valid principle, it's obvious that no one could know the number of a-logical possibilities there might be..
Scott: Again, this would only be the case if you deny the entire field of epistemology. This would be yet another case where you deny that we can and have made progress.
J: The entire field of epistemology has nothing to do with the validity of the LNC as a principle. Epistemologists could be illusions or false memories and the LNC would not be undermined one iota. The law of identity applies to concepts whether or not those concepts are derived from illusions or imaginary thought products.
The identification of progress in epistemology REQUIRES that we believe some minimum level of satisfaction attainment is attainable and that social satisfaction is part of that. Otherwise there would be no motivation to PROGRESS. Progress apart from sentience has no meaning. But atheism means that such a belief is ABSOLUTELY blind. This in turn means you can never believe anything else non-blindly--INCLUDING whether there has ever been progress.
Jeff: they're OBVIOUS enough
DeleteGood phrasing. Even though nothing is certain, some things are obvious enough for people to mutually agree.
Jeff: Epistemologists could be illusions or false memories and the LNC would not be undermined one iota.
The Law of Non-contradiction works great in the toy-world of classical logic. The universe may or may not cooperate with your toy-world.
Jeff: The identification of progress in epistemology REQUIRES that we believe some minimum level of satisfaction attainment is attainable and that social satisfaction is part of that.
"some minimum level of satisfaction attainment is attainable". Sounds like a personal problem. Turns out that atheists have motivations that can be satisfied too.
Scott: Again, what is your criteria for determining the boundary between non-basic ideas that need to be justified and basic ideas that do not. Please be specific.
DeleteJeff: We seek parsimony for the set of beliefs that are necessary to our satisfaction. As such, that search is inductive.
Again, walk me though it, Jeff. Merely saying “we use induction” isn’t helpful as you could choose to call anything Induction, including rolling dice as to determine what beliefs need to be justified and which do not.
Furthermore, parsimony is an example of a more generalized criteria: we adopt ideas that are hard to vary without significantly reducing their ability to explain the phenomena at hand.
I’ll address the rest of your comments once you walk me though the process, in detail.
Scott: Even though nothing is certain, some things are obvious enough for people to mutually agree.
DeleteJ: I told you can't help but fall back on foundationalism. As I told Z, in everyday parlance, there is no difference between saying "proposition P is obviously true" and saying "I'm certain that proposition P is true." If by "certain" you mean derived inferentially, then of course foundationalism denies that. Foundationalism is PRECISELY the claim made by C.S. Lewis -- "If nothing is OBVIOUS, nothing can be PROVED." By which he meant that inferentially-derived beliefs can't have any more "obviousness" or "evincing" power than the premises. And in many cases, they have less, and for OBVIOUS reasons.
Scott: Merely saying “we use induction” isn’t helpful as you could choose to call anything Induction,
J: Except we don't. It's well defined in logic books. Pick one up sometime.
Scott: we adopt ideas that are hard to vary without significantly reducing their ability to explain the phenomena at hand.
J: Again, Scott, inductive criteria apply TO explanations. Parsimony is one such criteria. Breadth of PREDICTIVE explanation is another.
Scott: Turns out that atheists have motivations that can be satisfied too.
J: Of course. Because you TOO are intelligently designed to KNOW and CHOOSE based on your KNOWLEDGE. For some reason you're so silly you think there's a relevant difference in saying one is certain of the truth or falsehood of a proposition and that one realizes the truth or falsehood of a proposition is obvious.
ob·vi·ous
adjective
1. easily seen, recognized, or understood; open to view or knowledge; evident: an obvious advantage.
certain
cer·tain
adjective
4. established as true or sure; unquestionable; indisputable: It is certain that he tried.
Foundationalism is HOW people think. They derive conclusions inferentially from naturally-formed beliefs that seem OBVIOUS to them. They also find upon reflection that there are more parsimonious sets of naturally-caused beliefs that are sufficient to account for those inferences that are relevant to their greatest long-term satisfaction.
People will differ in these sets of axioms as they do in all manner of inductive inferences. Inductive reasoning DEPENDS upon experience. And no two people have identical experience. THAT people think BOTH inductively and deductively explains both why they agree AND disagree.
The relevant question to debate is what do each of us think is obvious, and how does it account for our disagreements. If my set of axioms (propositions that seem OBVIOUS) is more parsimonious than yours and yet accounts for all of what has been well-corroborated by tests, why would I change to your less parsimonious set? Why, in that case, would parsimony all of a sudden be a bad criteria?
Jeff: "If nothing is OBVIOUS, nothing can be PROVED."
DeleteThe Earth is obviously flat.
Jeff (quoting): ob·vi·ous
adjective
1. easily seen, recognized, or understood; open to view or knowledge; evident: an obvious advantage.
certain
cer·tain
adjective
4. established as true or sure; unquestionable; indisputable: It is certain that he tried.
Hmm. They mean different things after all.
Jeff: Foundationalism is HOW people think.
Yet, people have the ability to question "obvious" beliefs. And when they do, they sometimes discard those beliefs.
Jeff: If my set of axioms (propositions that seem OBVIOUS)
Other than the "obvious" Earth is flat, what other axioms do you adopt?
Jeff: "If nothing is OBVIOUS, nothing can be PROVED."
DeleteZ: The Earth is obviously flat.
J: See how silly your claim about "obvious" claims was? You and Scott can't be truthful or consistent.
Here's your error. The belief IN an earth is an inductively DERIVED belief. It's not obvious. That's why it takes infants a LONG time to interpret their experience in terms of those inferred 3-D-extended entities they believe exist by the time they can conceive of an "earth." There is nothing OBVIOUS about the existence of an earth, much less whether it's flat or spherical.
So now we're back to where we began. You don't really believe ANYTHING is obvious. And that's why science can't be demarcated in a way by which you could tell it's useful by your approach.
Z: Hmm. They mean different things after all.
DeleteJ: They both have the import related to why people choose one way over another. You and Scott can't even account for THAT. But y'all probably don't even believe in libertarian free-will. But if so, how could you demonstrate logically that we're not free if that isn't a self-evident fact? Alternatively, why, by assuming it, do you end up with paradigms with greater TESTED explanatory breadth? Determinism is the belief that the axioms that ground the intelligibility of "testability/falsifiability" aren't discernibly more or less plausible/probable than any other axioms. And that means that determinism is a belief that is inconsistent with the claim that it is either discernibly self-evident, or more probable/plausible that not, that there have been problems, solutions, explanations, etc.
Science, then, per determinism, has no more discernible value than the putative ex cathedra assertions of a pope.
Jeff: If there were only 2, you'd at least have 50-50 chance of being right.
ReplyDeleteYou seem to think that we have no evidence of the book on the table, that's it's all a matter of guessing.
We have evidence, Z. It's called the satisfaction of inductive criteria. It's just that we have precisely ZERO such satisfaction for UCA. If you haven't figured out that's what CH is saying, you're a bit on the dense side. But that's a given since you think foundationalism is false. Because all that can mean is that you think there is a 3rd class of knowledge than KNOWLEDGE of the validity of axioms/criteria or the knowledge derived inferentially/discursively (from those axioms/criteria) conclusions.You haven't enlightened us with that 3rd class of knowledge, because there is none. And apart from foundationalism, the other 2 aren't knowledge either. You're UTTERLY confused.
DeleteJeff: It's just that we have precisely ZERO such satisfaction for UCA.
DeleteThat's the usual area discussion, but you always divert into sterile and irrelevant philosophical points.
Jeff: But that's a given since you think foundationalism is false.
We already stated that's not our position. Must be the memory thing you keep talking about.
Z: We already stated that's not our position.
DeleteJ: Your position is arbitrary and therefore uncompelling to sane people. Maybe putting guns to the heads of dissenters will get you a few apparent converts. Worth a shot, eh (no pun intended)?
Z: Must be the memory thing you keep talking about.
J: This from the man who denies it's obvious that memories occur. A bona-fide hoot you are, Z.
Jeff: This from the man who denies it's obvious that memories occur.
DeleteDidn't say that either. While we can never be absolutely certain, it is obvious that most memories are meaningful.
So, Z, will you NOW say that it's OBVIOUS that memories occur? And will you then contradict yourself by denying foundationalism again?
DeleteZ: it is obvious that most memories are meaningful
DeleteJ: That's foundationalism, Z. Once you accept that, contra Scott, we can NOW proceed to seeing how much we agree is OBVIOUS. But since you have indicated that you don't think that the LNC is OBVIOUSLY a valid principle, memories buy you nothing in terms of that mode of explanation that assumes as axiomatic the LNC. So again, Z, what problems have non-classical logic helped us solve? And were those problems only apprehended by transcending the LNC/LOI?
Jeff: That's foundationalism
DeleteUm, no. Foundationalism implies certainty. There is no certainty.
Jeff: But since you have indicated that you don't think that the LNC is OBVIOUSLY a valid principle, memories buy you nothing in terms of that mode of explanation that assumes as axiomatic the LNC.
The LNC is obviously a useful principle, and the foundation of classical logic. However, the empirical world doesn't always fit into nice dichotomies.
Jeff: That's foundationalism
DeleteZ: Um, no. Foundationalism implies certainty. There is no certainty.
J: When you say a proposition is obviously true, that's just another way of saying it's self-evident in the sense that foundationalism requires.
Jeff: But since you have indicated that you don't think that the LNC is OBVIOUSLY a valid principle, memories buy you nothing in terms of that mode of explanation that assumes as axiomatic the LNC.
J: The LNC is obviously a useful principle, and the foundation of classical logic. However, the empirical world doesn't always fit into nice dichotomies.
Z: You're confused. If the empirical world was not always consistent with the LNC, then it would NOT be obvious that the LNC is useful. What you're misunderstanding is that science is tentative. No theory HAS to be true. If a theory, to be true, has to posit the failure of the LNC in some cases, it makes no difference TO the LNC. Because ALL scientific theories are TENTATIVE. This is why one can NEVER disprove the universality of the law of identity/LNC.
And a theory can be useful WHILE false at the level of generalization it was originally posited for. The LNC is unfalsifiable.
The thing you keep forgetting is that there are axioms that are necessary to render "falsifiability" INTELLIGIBLE (truth-corresponding or no). The LOI/LNC is such a principle/axiom. Thus, by DEFINITION it can't be discernibly falsified.
DeleteJeff: When you say a proposition is obviously true, that's just another way of saying it's self-evident in the sense that foundationalism requires.
ReplyDeleteEverything about the world is necessarily uncertain.
Jeff: And a theory can be useful WHILE false at the level of generalization it was originally posited for. The LNC is unfalsifiable.
Or it can be true, but useless.
The Law of Non-contradiction is a model. Like all models, it may work great in theory, but may or may not be applicable in practice. The world doesn't always lend itself to clear dichotomies or categorizations.
Jeff: The LOI/LNC is such a principle/axiom. Thus, by DEFINITION it can't be discernibly falsified.
That's right. It's an axiom, an assumption accepted for the basis of argument or inference. It's an essential component of the toy-world of classical logic.
Jeff: When you say a proposition is obviously true, that's just another way of saying it's self-evident in the sense that foundationalism requires.
DeleteZ: Everything about the world is necessarily uncertain.
J: You just stated a proposition in the indicative mood. When you say a proposition is obviously true, that's just another way of saying it's self-evident in the sense that foundationalism requires. You're a foundationalist. All people are.
Z: The Law of Non-contradiction is a model. Like all models, it may work great in theory, but may or may not be applicable in practice.
J: That's irrelevant. You could never demonstrate that it's inapplicable.
Z: The world doesn't always lend itself to clear dichotomies or categorizations.
J: You can't know that. All we can discern is that we can't explain everything.
Z: Jeff: The LOI/LNC is such a principle/axiom. Thus, by DEFINITION it can't be discernibly falsified.
Z: That's right. It's an axiom, an assumption accepted for the basis of argument or inference.
J: The relevant point is that you can't choose to and then act out the REJECTION of it.
Z: That doesn't mean it works for all problems. It's like Euclidean geometry. It works great for a whole class of problems. Humans considered it *obvious*. Yet, on non-human scales, it doesn't even apply. It turns out what was *obvious* was just an artifact of being human. The universe is not beholden to what you think is *obvious*.
J: Give me an example of where the positing that classically-contradictory statements can both be true has solved a problem. Good luck.
Z: The Law of Non-contradiction is a model.
DeleteJ: The LNC is required to CONCEIVE of a model. You're utterly confused. No LNC, no distinctions.
Jeff: You just stated a proposition in the indicative mood.
DeleteSure. We're fairly certain of the statement. You can preface it with "As far as we can tell ..."
Jeff: When you say a proposition is obviously true, that's just another way of saying it's self-evident in the sense that foundationalism requires.
If by foundationalism, you mean "pretty certain" or "as far as we know", then sure. But what most people mean is a foundation of certainty.
Zachriel: The world doesn't always lend itself to clear dichotomies or categorizations.
Jeff: You can't know that. All we can discern is that we can't explain everything.
There are all sorts of categorizations which don't have clear boundaries.
Jeff: Give me an example of where the positing that classically-contradictory statements can both be true has solved a problem.
Petitio principii. If it's classical, then the Law of Non-contradiction applies—by definition.
Jeff: The LNC is required to CONCEIVE of a model.
That would mean that no one could conceive of an alternative logic—but they have.
Z: Sure. We're fairly certain of the statement. You can preface it with "As far as we can tell ..."
DeleteJ: Which just begs the question, "Whence the idea that you have the capacity to 'tell'"? Out of thin air? In which case it's indistinguishable from any other claim in terms of relative plausibility/probability.
Jeff: When you say a proposition is obviously true, that's just another way of saying it's self-evident in the sense that foundationalism requires.
Z: If by foundationalism, you mean "pretty certain" or "as far as we know", then sure. But what most people mean is a foundation of certainty.
J: Foundationalism is what is required to have enough certainty to choose one way over another. In everday parlance, "certain" is not distinguishable from "obvious," which you yourself use.
Zachriel: The world doesn't always lend itself to clear dichotomies or categorizations.
Jeff: You can't know that. All we can discern is that we can't explain everything.
Z: There are all sorts of categorizations which don't have clear boundaries.
J: Only because the categories aren't clearly defined, not because of the LNC.
Jeff: Give me an example of where the positing that classically-contradictory statements can both be true has solved a problem.
Z: Petitio principii. If it's classical, then the Law of Non-contradiction applies—by definition.
J: Rather, if definitions are involved in any "logic," it is classical. To define is to demarcate such that DISTINCTIONS can be done PER the definition..
Jeff: The LNC is required to CONCEIVE of a model.
Z: That would mean that no one could conceive of an alternative logic—but they have.
J: How do you know? What human problems have been solved thereby? Can you think of even ONE example?
BTW, Scott would not agree with you that either:
Delete1) that there are any propositions that are obviously true
OR
2) that the RELATIVE probability or RELATIVE degree of positive evidence for any two propositions is derivable by humans (IOW, per Scott, one can't discern that any proposition is more or less probable or more or less positively plausible than any other).
In short, you have demonstrated (as have all others so far) that you don't agree with Scott either. Or else you're contradicting yourself.
Jeff: Which just begs the question, "Whence the idea that you have the capacity to 'tell'"?
DeleteMemory and such are apparently functions of biology, a result of evolution.
Jeff: In which case it's indistinguishable from any other claim in terms of relative plausibility/probability.
It's certainly possible its all a dream. There's no way to tell for sure. Just preface our statements with "Given the world is real ..." or "Given what we experience ..." It makes for cumbersome speech, but whatever it takes to put your mind at ease.
Jeff: Foundationalism is what is required to have enough certainty to choose one way over another.
Sorry, you can't have certainty. It makes you uncomfortable, but there it is.
Jeff: Only because the categories aren't clearly defined, not because of the LNC.
No. It's because the universe is a complex continuum, while logic is discrete. You can never fully represent a complex continuum with discrete arithmetic. Continuum >> Discrete
Jeff: if definitions are involved in any "logic," it is classical.
Not if the definition includes classifications with chaotic edges.
Jeff: Which just begs the question, "Whence the idea that you have the capacity to 'tell'"?
DeleteZ: Memory and such are apparently functions of biology, a result of evolution.
J: Again you demonstrate your utter confusion. One must believe there are memories to even INFER a UCA history, much less at a degree of "apparently." You continually put the cart before the horse. You make precisely zero logical sense.
Jeff: In which case it's indistinguishable from any other claim in terms of relative plausibility/probability.
Z: It's certainly possible its all a dream. There's no way to tell for sure. Just preface our statements with "Given the world is real ..." or "Given what we experience ..." It makes for cumbersome speech, but whatever it takes to put your mind at ease.
J: My mind is at ease. But notice the difference between the two "given"'s. The first is hypothetical. The second is a confident assertion of fact. You can't even give examples that are equally relevant to your points. Because your whole approach is absolutely arbitrary.
Jeff: Foundationalism is what is required to have enough certainty to choose one way over another.
Z: Sorry, you can't have certainty. It makes you uncomfortable, but there it is.
J: Foundationalism only requires that sense of "certainty" that is applicable to what you mean by "obvious." You're utterly confused.
Jeff: Only because the categories aren't clearly defined, not because of the LNC.
Z: No. It's because the universe is a complex continuum, while logic is discrete. You can never fully represent a complex continuum with discrete arithmetic. Continuum >> Discrete
J: To distinguish between continuum and discrete requires the use of the LNC. You are UTTERLY confused. The LNC/LOI is that principle that allows distinctions PER SE.
Jeff: if definitions are involved in any "logic," it is classical.
Z: Not if the definition includes classifications with chaotic edges.
J: Well, if the edges are so chaotic that you can't distinguish, then how do you explain anything with it? Much less test? That's the point, Z. Your approach is so arbitrary that you can't demarcate science from non-science.
Jeff: If the empirical world was not always consistent with the LNC, then it would NOT be obvious that the LNC is useful.
ReplyDeleteThat's silly. Humans make up a toy-world of classical logic, a model. It works for many problems humans devise. Big surprise!
That doesn't mean it works for all problems. It's like Euclidean geometry. It works great for a whole class of problems. Humans considered it *obvious*. Yet, on non-human scales, it doesn't even apply. It turns out what was *obvious* was just an artifact of being human. The universe is not beholden to what you think is *obvious*.
“The fact that we live at the bottom of a deep gravity well, on the surface of a gas covered planet going around a nuclear fireball 90 million miles away and think this to be normal is obviously some indication of how skewed our perspective tends to be.” — Douglas Adams
Jeff: One must believe there are memories
ReplyDeleteOf course there are memories.
Zachriel: "Given the world is real ..." or "Given what we experience ..."
Jeff: The first is hypothetical. The second is a confident assertion of fact.
We don't deny having experiences, which are in the here-and-now. Thought your contention was over memory. People experience memory. They infer these memories reveal something about the past.
Jeff: Foundationalism only requires that sense of "certainty" that is applicable to what you mean by "obvious."
Even things people take as obvious may not be true. There is still uncertainty. That's hardly the basis for philosophical foundationalism.
Jeff: To distinguish between continuum and discrete requires the use of the LNC.
The Law of Non-contradiction is an artifact of human thought processes, particularly categorization. It's validity depends on the application.
Jeff: Well, if the edges are so chaotic that you can't distinguish, then how do you explain anything with it?
Because only the edges may be indistinct. We can accept the Law of Non-contradiction as a valid and useful rule, as long as the propositions are classical in nature. As to whether it applies to the empirical world depends on the details of the categorizations.
Jeff: Science, then, per determinism, has no more discernible value than the putative ex cathedra assertions of a pope.
You should listen to yourself sometime. It's hilarious.
Jeff: The belief IN an earth is an inductively DERIVED belief.
Sure.
Jeff: It's not obvious.
Of course it's obvious. {Stamps on the Earth.} That's what we mean by obvious. Could be wrong, though.
Z: Of course there are memories.
ReplyDeleteJ: Which means to you, memories may have occurred or they may not have occurred. And since those are just two classically-logical possibitilies, and since you think the ability to distinguish is not a discernible ability, you posit that non-classicly-logical possibilities exist in addition to the classicaly-logical possibilities. Of course, you've never defined "logic" and showed that a non-classical logic definitionally fits in the class. Your words are meaningless.
Jeff: The belief IN an earth is an inductively DERIVED belief.
Z: Sure.
Jeff: It's not obvious.
Z: Of course it's obvious. {Stamps on the Earth.} That's what we mean by obvious. Could be wrong, though.
J: What is intelligible is that the existence of composites of 3-D-extended entities is a classically-logical possible state of affairs. But by your view, there is neither POSITIVE evidence for that claim nor is that claim self-evident. This applies to all propositions for your view. This is why your view can not account for the existence of a discernible VALUE of your view. Why would I, or any sane person, care about a view that can't do that?
Jeff: Which means to you, memories may have occurred or they may not have occurred.
DeleteMemories are experiences in the here-and-now. The question is whether they reflect the past. Sometimes they do, apparently. Sometimes they don't. And sometimes they reflect a muddle.
Jeff: What is intelligible is that the existence of composites of 3-D-extended entities is a classically-logical possible state of affairs.
That's an inductive model too.
Jeff: But by your view, there is neither POSITIVE evidence for that claim nor is that claim self-evident.
Sure there's evidence. {Stamps foot on earth again.}
Z: Memories are experiences in the here-and-now.
DeleteJ: The "now" is no more thought about than it is gone and a moment in the "past." There's no duration to a mere "now." You have to include some of the past to get duration.
Z: That's an inductive model too.
J: But you claim that's just as arbitrary as everything else.
Z: Sure there's evidence. {Stamps foot on earth again.}
J: That's not POSITIVE evidence. To get positive evidence, you need at least two things that you continually poo-poo:
1) the validity of the LNC/LOI (i.e., the ability to distinguish the claim that there are feet that stomp on something, etc from the claim that those are mere phenomenal experience).
2) The ability to determine the relative plausibility/probability/warrantedness/(whatever you want to call it) of propositions.
So whatever you mean by "evidence," it's no more discernibly valuable than that which Scott calls evidence. But at least Scott realizes that he does NOT see how to account for the existence of POSITIVE evidence.
Jeff: The "now" is no more thought about than it is gone and a moment in the "past."
DeleteThat's right.
Jeff: There's no duration to a mere "now."
That's right.
Jeff: You have to include some of the past to get duration.
We infer duration from the experience of memory.
Jeff: But you claim that's just as arbitrary as everything else.
Experience is what it is.
Jeff: That's not POSITIVE evidence.
Of course it's positive evidence. And it is subject to criticism.
Z: We infer duration from the experience of memory.
DeleteJ: It's either an obvious fact that apparent memories occur or not. If it's an obvious fact, you're doing foundationalism. If it's not an obvious fact, you can't even define knowledge so as to distinguish it from non-knowledge. No definition of knowledge is possible once you take on the burden of PROVING there is knowledge. That's impossible.
Jeff: It's either an obvious fact that apparent memories occur or not.
ReplyDeleteOf course it's obvious people experience what are called memories.
Jeff: If it's an obvious fact, you're doing foundationalism.
Call it what you will, but memories are not infallible. They may or may not accurately reflect the past. We have to subject our memories to criticism to build confidence, compare them to what others remember, and so on.
Z: Call it what you will, but memories are not infallible. They may or may not accurately reflect the past. We have to subject our memories to criticism to build confidence, compare them to what others remember, and so on.
DeleteJ: Indeed. That's foundationalism. We start with obvious claims and derive other claims inferentially therefrom that inherit their plausibility from their obvious premises. No obvious premises, no positive evidence for inferences derived therefrom. That's all foundationalism is.
Z: Call it what you will, but memories are not infallible. They may or may not accurately reflect the past. We have to subject our memories to criticism to build confidence, compare them to what others remember, and so on.
DeleteJ: Right. We apply inductive criteria to them to do this. Why you think this contradicts foundationalism is beyond me. But you have to START with the naturally-caused BELIEF that you remember a PAST event to even GET to the point of finding value in such criticism! Sane people don't go around wasting time criticizing what has ZERO natural plausibility to them in the first place.
Jeff: We start with obvious claims and derive other claims inferentially therefrom that inherit their plausibility from their obvious premises.
DeleteBut those obvious claims are also subject to criticism.
Jeff: But you have to START with the naturally-caused BELIEF that you remember a PAST event to even GET to the point of finding value in such criticism!
People can and do question their beliefs, even whether memory is a reliable guide to the past.
Jeff: Sane people don't go around wasting time criticizing what has ZERO natural plausibility to them in the first place.
Not all philosophers are insane.
Jeff: That's foundationalism.
ReplyDeleteThen your foundationalism is founded on a foundation of uncertainty.
If all you mean is that the best you can come up with is that some propositions are OBVIOUSLY more probably true than others, then yes. But that's irrelevant. You can't RID yourself of the obviousness of some propositions without denying the existence of knowledge--even if all that's obvious is that something is more probably true than something else. If you can't even get that far, then there's no such thing as positive evidence. And in that case, there is no discernible value in any positing you do. For you can't, then, even get to the probable existence of actual memories.
DeleteJeff: If all you mean is that the best you can come up with is that some propositions are OBVIOUSLY more probably true than others, then yes.
DeleteWhat we mean is that nothing is absolutely certain. Every claim about the world has to have an asterisk next to it.*
Z: What we mean is that nothing is absolutely certain.
DeleteJ: But that isn't inconsistent with foundationalism. To the extent that you think (rightly or wrongly) some claims are obviously true and use those claims as premises in inferences, you're doing precisely what foundationalists say people do.
Jeff: But that isn't inconsistent with foundationalism.
DeleteOxford Dictionary of Philosophy: Foundationalism means that knowledge is a "structure raised upon secure, certain foundations".
If by foundationalism, you mean that your foundational beliefs are uncertain and subject to criticism, then not sure what your point is after all this time.
Z: If by foundationalism, you mean that your foundational beliefs are uncertain and subject to criticism, then not sure what your point is after all this time.
DeleteJ: The sense in which the foundations are "solid" is that we can't imagine how they can be replaced. We have no categories with which to replace them now, and we have no idea how to generate new categories in our mind. Could things change in this regard? I can't prove otherwise. But why would I concern myself with the question since I have no idea how to discern a positive probability of such a future occurrence? There is no discernible value in such speculation.
But foundationalists, by definition, do NOT believe that the foundations are certain in the sense that they can be PROVED to be certain. That would contradict the very meaning of foundationalism.
Jeff: The sense in which the foundations are "solid" is that we can't imagine how they can be replaced.
DeleteNot sure your lack of imagination is binding on the universe. For instance, you may not be able to imagine a universe without the parallel postulate, but that doesn't bind mathematicians who can imagine it, or physicists and engineers who can use it.
Jeff: The sense in which the foundations are "solid" is that we can't imagine how they can be replaced.
No, you just believe they are certain because you can't imagine otherwise.
Z: For instance, you may not be able to imagine a universe without the parallel postulate, but that doesn't bind mathematicians who can imagine it, or physicists and engineers who can use it.
DeleteJ: What problems have they discernibly solved thereby? And if they have, how do you know that that parallel postulate couldn't have done so more simply?
Z: No, you just believe they are certain because you can't imagine otherwise.
J: And apparently you just blindly believe otherwise, for you have YET to provide an example.
Jeff: What problems have they discernibly solved thereby?
ReplyDeleteGeneral Relativity in physics.
GPS in engineering.
Are you saying that Lorentzian equations are not the same equations? And that therefore there is no euclidean way of thinking about the same events? Remember, Z, we don't HAVE a standard model that implies the "gravitational" motion inferred by most physicists.
DeleteJeff: Are you saying that Lorentzian equations are not the same equations?
DeleteLorentzian equations concern Special Relativity, not General Relativity.
Jeff: we don't HAVE a standard model that implies the "gravitational" motion inferred by most physicists.
What is general relativity then?
Jeff: we don't HAVE a standard model that implies the "gravitational" motion inferred by most physicists.
DeleteZ: What is general relativity then?
It's mathematical equations that model psychological experience. There's no way one can prove that they aren't consistent with metaphysical phenomenalism once you reject inductive criteria as THE valid criteria. IOW, it's not possible to prove they couldn't "work" to predict one's psychological experience even if there's nothing "out there" if, indeed, the inductive inference to stuff "out there" isn't valid in the first place.
The standard model, on the other hand, is an attempt to predict what are assumed to be the behaviors of stuff "out there" in terms of the PROPERTIES of such stuff, and yet fails, thus far, to imply the relevant observations when it comes to gravity (i.e., assuming that those who speak of it in terms of "composites" and "non-composites" aren't using the terms in their conventional sense; for if all particles in the standard model are point-"particles," what does "composite" mean in that context?).
Jeff: It's mathematical equations that model psychological experience.
DeleteIt's a model of empirical phenomena.
Jeff: The standard model, on the other hand, is an attempt to predict what are assumed to be the behaviors of stuff "out there" in terms of the PROPERTIES of such stuff
That's exactly what General Relativity does that Newtonian Mechanics does not.
Jeff: The standard model, on the other hand, is an attempt to predict what are assumed to be the behaviors of stuff "out there" in terms of the PROPERTIES of such stuff
DeleteZ: That's exactly what General Relativity does that Newtonian Mechanics does not.
J: No, it doesn't. The so-called "missing mass" problem MEANS that General Relativity doesn't account for the observations. No theory does. Nor does the Standard Model.
If you know better, articulate the specific axioms that imply the SPECIFIC observations in terms of General Relativity. Good luck!
Jeff: No, it doesn't.
DeleteOf course it does. Newtonian Gravity only consider how gravity worked. Einsteinian Gravity considers why it works.
Jeff: The so-called "missing mass" problem MEANS that General Relativity doesn't account for the observations.
Are you referring to "dark matter"? If so, that's not a challenge to General Relativity.
Jeff: No theory does. Nor does the Standard Model.
No theory accounts for all observations, but the Earth does move.
Jeff: If you know better, articulate the specific axioms that imply the SPECIFIC observations in terms of General Relativity.
http://people.hofstra.edu/stefan_waner/diff_geom/Sec13.html
Your original point was that there were no practical applications of non-Euclidean geometry. That was false.
Z: Of course it does. Newtonian Gravity only consider how gravity worked. Einsteinian Gravity considers why it works.
ReplyDeleteJ: Einsteinian Gravity doesn't explain why it works. It's just mathematical modeling. That's why the math doesn't rule out a Lorentzian interpretation.
Z: Are you referring to "dark matter"? If so, that's not a challenge to General Relativity.
J: General Relativity equations have a variable for "mass" don't they? How is missing mass/matter not a problem for the validity of such equations?
Z: No theory accounts for all observations, but the Earth does move.
J: Hmmm. I could have swore you just said even missing mass/matter isn't a problem for ER.
Jeff: If you know better, articulate the specific axioms that imply the SPECIFIC observations in terms of General Relativity.
Z: http://people.hofstra.edu/stefan_waner/diff_geom/Sec13.html
J: That's not what I mean. I mean articulate YOUR specific hypotheses about the what and where of the missing "matter/mass" to render ER consistent with ALL the observations. Again, GOOD LUCK.
Z: Your original point was that there were no practical applications of non-Euclidean geometry. That was false.
J: Non-Euclidean geometry doesn't imply space is non-euclidean, though. It can't. The conception of motion REQUIRES a frame of reference. One can assume that Einstein's ENTITY-space exists and moves. But that's not empirically demonstrable. And no gravitational theory WORKS at the level of the cosmos anyway. So there is precisely zero reason for supposing human geometrical intuition is false.
Jeff: Einsteinian Gravity doesn't explain why it works.
DeleteSure it does. Mass distorts space-time.
Jeff: That's why the math doesn't rule out a Lorentzian interpretation.
Will you quit saying that. That's Special Relativity, not General Relativity.
Jeff: General Relativity equations have a variable for "mass" don't they? How is missing mass/matter not a problem for the validity of such equations?
That's funny. Newtonian Theory can't explain where you lost your keys, so the equations are invalid.
Jeff: Non-Euclidean geometry doesn't imply space is non-euclidean, though.
No, but your claim was that non-euclidean geometry had no utility. But you are right, non-Euclidean geometry doesn't imply space is non-Euclidean. That would be tests of gravitational lensing.
Jeff: Einsteinian Gravity doesn't explain why it works.
DeleteZ: Sure it does. Mass distorts space-time.
J: We can't demonstrate that empirically. That's merely an INTERPRETATION of the math. But it's worse than that. If space is an expanding/bending entity, then how do we distinguish between entities within that entity? This is why models like that are really about assigning values to points in space when talking about stuff out there OTHER than Einstein's space.
Jeff: That's why the math doesn't rule out a Lorentzian interpretation.
Z: Will you quit saying that. That's Special Relativity, not General Relativity.
J: That's not the point. There is NO way to demonstrate EMPIRICALLY that Einstein's view of an expanding/bending/warping space is correct.
Jeff: General Relativity equations have a variable for "mass" don't they? How is missing mass/matter not a problem for the validity of such equations?
Z: That's funny. Newtonian Theory can't explain where you lost your keys, so the equations are invalid.
J: Newtons math wasn't formulated to find keys. Seriously? If the math fails, the theory can not be known to be UNIVERSAL. It's that simple.
Jeff: Non-Euclidean geometry doesn't imply space is non-euclidean, though.
Z: No, but your claim was that non-euclidean geometry had no utility. But you are right, non-Euclidean geometry doesn't imply space is non-Euclidean. That would be tests of gravitational lensing.
J: No. There's NO way to demonstrate that EMPIRICALLY. That's all an interpretation. It's not the only conceivable one.
Jeff: We can't demonstrate that empirically.
DeleteIt's called gravitational lensing. It's like looking through a distorted glass.
Jeff: Newtons math wasn't formulated to find keys.
It's missing mass!
Jeff: There's NO way to demonstrate that EMPIRICALLY.
You must be using the word "demonstrate" in some strange manner.
Jeff: We can't demonstrate that empirically.
ReplyDeleteZ: It's called gravitational lensing. It's like looking through a distorted glass.
J: It doesn't follow that space is non-euclidian.
Jeff: Newtons math wasn't formulated to find keys.
Z: It's missing mass!
J: That's an hypothesis that hasn't been confirmed by inductive criteria. You really don't get the tentativeness of science.
Jeff: There's NO way to demonstrate that EMPIRICALLY.
Z: You must be using the word "demonstrate" in some strange manner.
J: I'm using it in the only way possible. To demonstrate something only means that inductive criteria favor it. Nothing is ever absolutely demonstrated, because data sets change and people come up with explanations for events never theretofore thought of that might satisfy inductive criteria.
Jeff: It doesn't follow that space is non-euclidian.
DeleteThat's exactly what it implies. Like we said, it's like looking through a distorted glass. The lensing provides information about the deformations of the glass.
Jeff: That's an hypothesis that hasn't been confirmed by inductive criteria. You really don't get the tentativeness of science.
General Relativity has been repeatedly confirmed.
Jeff: It doesn't follow that space is non-euclidian.
DeleteZ: That's exactly what it implies. Like we said, it's like looking through a distorted glass. The lensing provides information about the deformations of the glass.
J: Glass is not space. So apparently something other than space can deform/distort, right? Indeed, without space as a REFERENCE FRAME, we can't even CONCEIVE of motion (including the motion entailed in deformation/distortion).
Jeff: That's an hypothesis that hasn't been confirmed by inductive criteria. You really don't get the tentativeness of science.
Z: General Relativity has been repeatedly confirmed.
J: And yet you say GR is consistent with static space. How can static space be shown to be non-Euclidean?
Jeff: Glass is not space.
DeleteNo, but the process of deduction is similar. We deduce the deformations of the glass by how light passes through it. Similarly with distortions of light passing through space.
Jeff: Indeed, without space as a REFERENCE FRAME, we can't even CONCEIVE of motion (including the motion entailed in deformation/distortion).
The space is deformed.
Jeff: And yet you say GR is consistent with static space. How can static space be shown to be non-Euclidean?
Gravitational lensing, as we said.
Jeff: Glass is not space.
DeleteZ: No, but the process of deduction is similar. We deduce the deformations of the glass by how light passes through it. Similarly with distortions of light passing through space.
J: You're ignorant of how deduction works. Non-Euclidean space is not IMPLIED by deformation/distortion of observed, bounded, appearances. Surely you're not this confused.
The only remaining question, then, is whether a non-euclidean finite "space" entity posited by non-Lorentzian-type theorists satisfies inductive criteria while the other interpretation doesn't. This is what I'm asking for. Can you deliver?
Jeff: Non-Euclidean space is not IMPLIED by deformation/distortion of observed, bounded, appearances.
DeleteApparently you're wrong. Einstein proposed a theory. From that theory non-trivial empirical implications were deduced. Those implications were tested, found accurate, providing empirical confirmation of the theory. Generations of additional tests have provided additional confirmations.
Z: Apparently you're wrong.
DeleteJ: No. You can't EMPIRICALLY observe whether space is a non-static, finite entity. That's why Lorentz was never proved wrong in principle. And you've already admitted that space can't be proven to be non-Euclidean.
Jeff: You can't EMPIRICALLY observe whether space is a non-static, finite entity.
DeleteNewton couldn't empirically observe the Earth moving either. Rather, the hypothesis is supported by the evidence.
Jeff: And you've already admitted that space can't be proven to be non-Euclidean.
Science doesn't "prove". Rather, the scientific evidence supports a non-Euclidean universe.